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Abstract 
Maintaining a fair balance between individuals’ interests and the public interest 
is arguably believed to be the most effective approach in serving the ultimate 
objective of copyright: to promote social, economic and cultural development 
for the benefit of both rightsholders and the public at large. Through this 
balanced approach, creativity can be maximised and thrive better than by 
tilting towards one or the other. In copyright law, such balance is reflected by 
the way in which the short-term grant of exclusive rights respects the long-term 
public interest represented by limitations and exceptions to copyright. 
Despite an unclear and non-uniform definition and scope, the importance of the 
public interest has been implicitly and explicitly recognised through disparate 
forms of safeguards in different jurisdictions. However, the last few decades 
have seen a rapid development of information technologies which, in turn, has 
contributed to an unparalleled legislative drive at international level towards 
overprotecting the interests of rightsholders. This has then left the public 
interest under-protected and now constitutes an imbalance of copyright. 
This thesis therefore examines legislative intervention into the international 
copyright regime in an attempt to ensure that the public interest is uniformly 
and mandatorily safeguarded at international level. In particular, it strives to 
establish an overarching public interest defence capable of protecting certain 
aspects of public values embedded in copyright works. In achieving this, the 
thesis examines the scope of the defence, what it should entail, and what 
aspects are to be taken into account in the course of formulating and giving 
effect to the defence. The substantive chapters investigate the public policy 
grounds, the right to freedom of expression and the international three-step test, 
i.e. the roles they play in shaping the latitude and operations of the defence, 
respectively. Finally, the thesis also evaluates different ways in which the 
defence can be incorporated into the international copyright regime in order to 
effectively counterbalance the rightsholder-centric tendency and restore the 
balance of copyright. 
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 Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
One of the legal issues that is always open to debate involves how to grant 
legal privileges for individuals’ contributions without causing unreasonable 
detriment to the enjoyment of others, and vice versa. Intellectual property is 
one of the legal disciplines of which the ultimate objectives rest on an 
appropriate answer to such a question. Granting exclusive rights to those 
forging facts and ideas into intellectual property products is undeniably an 
approach to stimulate more meaningful creations, and so is allowing the 
unrestricted public enjoyment of those products. But neither extreme 
necessarily serves to enhance the environment in which creativity can be 
maximised and thrive better than maintaining the balance between the two, 
with an ultimate end of promoting the crucial aspect of social, economic and 
cultural development for the benefit both of creators and the public at large.1 
1.1.1 Introducing the term ‘public interest’ and its contributions to 
copyright 
As one of the intellectual property categories, copyright has, since the signing 
of the Berne Convention, also strived to achieve such a balance by establishing 
the regime in which short-term grants of exclusive rights are counterbalanced 
by the long-term public interest, underpinned and represented by the so-called 
copyright limitations and exceptions (L&Es). The distinct demarcation 
between grants and reservations in the copyright context has been shaped by 
how the public interest is respected within the regime.2 Despite the absence of 
a universal definition,3 the importance of the public interest has been implicitly 
                                                
1 World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), ‘What is Intellectual Property?’ WIPO 
Publication No 450(E) ISBN 978-92-805-1555-0 p 3; The Washington Declaration on 
Intellectual Property and the Public Interest. 
2 Although the notion of public interest has not always been given a straightforward or clear-
cut definition or usage, this thesis intends to discern the public interest as referring to various 
interests in the society associated with the use of copyright works, other than those of the 
rightsholders. 
3 Isabella Alexander, Copyright Law and the Public Interest in the Nineteenth Century (Hart 
Publishing 2010) Ch. 7. 
 
2 
and explicitly recognised through disparate forms of safeguards in different 
jurisdictions. 
In common law countries such as the UK, the public can enjoy an author’s 
creative works by resorting to statutory exceptions including the so-called fair-
dealing acts enshrined in the Copyright Act.4 In addition, an explicit public 
interest defence has been incorporated into statutory law.5 The defence was 
developed from the English courts’ exercise of their inherent judicial discretion 
to prevent copyright misuse and to safeguard the public values while protecting 
individual interests.6 It functions to provide a refuge for any socially valuable, 
though infringing, uses of copyright works incapable of falling within the 
scope of the permitted L&Es.7 
Another means of safeguarding the public interest can be noted in the US. 
Although there is no certain defence akin to that in the UK, the maximisation 
of social welfare and the promotion of ‘the progress of science and useful arts’ 
categorically reflect the constitutional purpose that the US copyright law is 
designed to serve.8 Accordingly, L&Es in the forms of fair use and the 
idea/expression dichotomy come into play as the clearest grounds under which 
the notion of public interest is implicitly preserved within the regime.9 
Concerning the EU copyright law,10 although there is no specific defence, the 
public interest is protected by the L&Es regime codified in Article 5 of the 
                                                
4 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), Chapter III for permitted acts. 
5 CDPA ss 30; 171(3). 
6 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott and Mary Vitoria, The modern law of Copyright and Design (3rd 
edn, Butterworths 2000) para 20.2. Beloff v Pressdam [1973] RPC 783 (Ungoed-Thomas J); 
Commonwealth v John Fairtex & Sons Ltd (Defence Papers case) [1980] HCA 44, citing 
Fraser v Evans (1969) 1 QB 349,362-63; Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84, 96-97; Woolgar 
v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police [1999] 3 All ER 604; Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans 
[1985] QB 526. 
7 CDPA Chapter III for permitted acts. See also Alexandra Sims, ‘The Public Interest Defence 
in Copyright Law: Myth or Reality?’ [2006] EIPR 335, 335. 
8 US Const, Art I, sec 8. See also William Fisher, ‘Theories of Intellectual Property’ 
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/iptheory.html> accessed 16 October 2015. 
9 Howard Besser, ‘Will Copyright Protect the Public Interest?’ (2007) 11 (1) Peace Review: A 
Journal of Social Justice 25, 26. Particularly for the fair-use doctrine, see also Sony Computer 
Entertainment America Inc v BLEEM LLC (9th Circuit 2000); Campbell v Rose-Acuff Music 
Inc 114 S Ct 1164 (1994). 
10 European Union law is a body of treaties and legislation, such as Regulations and Directives, 
which have direct  or indirect effect on the laws of EU member states. 
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Copyright Directive. 11  Those permissible L&Es are then transposed into 
member states’ legislations, which mostly contain closed lists of permitted uses 
with specific purposes and conditions such as private uses, press reviews and 
commentary and short quotations for educational or scientific purposes.12 
These narrow L&Es are also believed to provide a similar function to the 
flexible UK public interest defence and the US fair-use doctrine in securing 
some breathing space in which the enjoyment of authors’ creations can be 
shared with the public. 
1.1.2 Concerns about under-protected public interest 
Rapid development of information technologies has contributed to some 
lobbied overhauls of international copyright policies.13 In fact, the last few 
decades have seen copyright law struggle to cope with the unprecedented 
proliferation of exclusive protections regarding expanded copyrightable 
content and emerging Technological Protection Measure (TPM) and Digital 
Rights Management (DRM) schemes.14 Obvious examples of these imbalanced 
changes can be hinted from the rationales behind international copyright law 
reforms by WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). Such reforms primarily concern explicit 
recognition of new copyright subject-matter, namely computer programs and 
databases, and introduce anti-circumvention rules, both of which are expressly 
provided in favour of rightsholders.15 These international obligations have had 
great effect on the implementation of the Copyright Directive and the US 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.16 Not only has the magnitude of 
copyright protection been substantially strengthened, these measures also have 
                                                
11 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
[2001] OJ L167/10, p 10-19 (Copyright Directive). 
12 See, for example, French Intellectual Property Code, Title II, Ch. II, L122-5(2)(3a)(3b); 
German copyright Act (UrhG), Ch. VI, s 49, 51, 53. See also Paul Goldstein and PB 
Hugenholtz, International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice (2nd edn, OUP 2010) 363. 
13 Besser (n 9) 28-30; The Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public 
Interest. 
14 See Chapter 3; see also Jonathan Griffiths and Uma Suthersanen, Copyright and Free Speech 
(OUP 2005) 44-96. 
15 WCT, Arts 8, 11; WPPT, Arts 10, 14, 18. See also Giuseppe Mazziotti, EU Digital 
Copyright Law and the End-Users’ (Springer Science & Business Media 2008) 52. 
16 DMCA. 
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the unwelcome potential to prevent the contribution that digitisation could 
make in enlarging an area of public interaction, in which creativity can be 
disseminated in quicker, easier and more productive approaches.17 
While copyright has witnessed such an increasingly compelling legislative 
drive for exclusive protection side at all levels, little has been done on the other 
side of the coin. Together with its vague definition and function, 18  this 
unparalleled evolution has left the public interest under threat of under-
protection internationally. These concerns also have a tendency to tilt the long-
maintained balance of copyright to the rightsholder’s advantage and undermine 
the entire L&Es system. If the situation remains unaltered, it seems 
counterproductive to the future of copyright development where public users 
can play a pivotal role as rightsholders in shaping the most bountiful copyright 
environment and thus pursue copyright’s ultimate objectives. 
1.1.3 Legislative intervention of the public interest defence 
Having realised the imbalance of interests, numerous solutions have been 
proposed to address major copyright concerns. The case law, which will be 
examined later, shows that there have been various judicial attempts at regional 
and national levels to safeguard the public interest by resorting to legal tools 
both from inside and outside the copyright regime. Those include statutory and 
judge-made doctrines such as fair dealing, fair use, fundamental freedoms, the 
three-step test, public policy grounds, abuse of rights and copyright misuse. 
They are mostly adopted ad hoc to accommodate competing interests that the 
emerging copyright environment imposes and, therefore are subject to varying 
judicial interpretation. 
However, there is no international codification of the public interest defence. 
Thus, its recognition remains unclear and prone to being taken for granted. It is 
the purpose of this thesis to establish such a defence, one that is capable of 
providing some protection to all aspects of public values embedded in 
copyright works. 
                                                
17 Copyright Directive, Art 6; DMCA 17 USC s 1201. See also Mazziotti (n 15) 3-4. 
18 There is no widely accepted definition as to what the ‘public interest’ is or whose ‘interests’ 
are at stake. See Alexander (n 3) 16. 
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Roles of the defence based on the UK public interest concepts 
According to the derivative concept described by Jacob J. in Hyde Park v 
Yelland, there are two different roles that the public interest defence 
performs.19 The first role presents the so-called public policy grounds used to 
usurp statutory copyright in circumstances where a copyright work is, inter 
alia, immoral, obscene, deceptive or injurious to public life, public health and 
safety.20 The other functions as an exception to copyright infringement, which 
can be best given effect through the freedom of expression protection in 
situations where there is a public interest in disclosure of information clothed 
in copyright.21 Historically, the defence was originally known as the UK 
courts’ inherent jurisdiction in adopting a more general common-law principle 
to refuse to enforce copyright associated with wrongdoing –originally 
described as ‘iniquity’ and gradually referred to different terms in subsequent 
case-law such as ‘seditious, fraudulent or immoral’.22 Although the application 
of this formerly established restrictive role of the defence has recently become 
increasingly unpopular due to its high threshold and unclear operations,23 UK 
courts have also endorsed a broader or ‘encouraging’ public interest defence, 
as initially upheld in Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans and later given statutory 
basis by section 171(3) CDPA.24 Prominently, the defence in such an endorsed 
aspect was explicitly supported by Jacob J. in Hyde Park’s First Instance,25 but 
later utterly dismissed by Aldous LJ in the Court of Appeal.26 Aldous LJ’s 
radical opinion recognised that only the narrow or ‘restrictive’ public interest 
                                                
19 Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [1999] EMLR 654, 670 (Jacob J). See also 
the issues addressed in relation to the terms ‘public interest’ in Alexander (n 3) 19-20. 
20 Hyde Park v Yelland (n 19) 670 (Jacob J); Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others 
[2000] 3 WLR 215 (Aldous LJ). 
21Hyde Park v Yelland (n 19) 671 (Jacob J); Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2002] Ch 149 
(CA) [44] (Lord Phillips MR). 
22 Gartside v Outram [1857] 26 LJ Ch 113, 114 and other case law cited in Chapter 2 2.5.1 for 
more detail. See also I Alexander, Copyright Law and the Public Interest in the Nineteenth 
Century (Hart Publishing, 2010) 63-79; Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Pre-Empting Conflict - A Re-
Examination of the Public Interest Defence in United Kingdom (UK) Copyright Law’ (2014) 
34(1) Legal Studies 76, 78. 
23 Golden Eye (International) Ltd v Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch); Griffiths (n 
22) 78. See 2.8.1.1. for detailed analysis of the operations. 
24 [1985] QB 526 (Griffiths LJ). In this case where copyright and confidence claims 
overlapped, Griffiths LJ stated that ‘…it is not difficult to think of instances where, although 
there has been no wrongdoing on the part of the plaintiff, it may be vital in the public interest 
to publish a part of his confidential information’ [550]. 
25 [1999] EMLR 654. 
26 [2000] 3 WLR 215. 
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defence was justified under section 171(3) CDPA, whose scope in copyright 
law was only limited to cases of wrongdoing, not disclosure.27 Nevertheless, 
the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd,28 which 
was handed down after the HRA came into force, invalidated Aldous LJ’s 
narrow conception. Lord Phillips MR reaffirmed that the public interest 
defence can perform two different roles and, particularly, its encouraging role 
applied when, in an absence of applicable CDPA’s permitted acts, the use of 
copyright work was required by the right to freedom of expression, given effect 
by section 171(3) CDPA.29 Even so, the court seemed disinclined to provide 
any clarity as to the scope, definition or application of the defence.30 Also, 
relevant cases after Ashdown31 have by far revealed that, despite its statutory 
presence and judicial validity in UK copyright law, the public interest defence 
is still subject to uncharted scope and its application remains uncertain.  
Having elaborated above the original concept of the public interest defence, it 
is noteworthy that, while these two established roles have been connected 
through the historical development of the extra-statutory public interest 
principle in UK copyright law, they are not necessarily resolved under the 
same legal theories. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Two below, the 
circumstances involving the former role of the restrictive public interest 
doctrine are dealt with by distinct legal theories in other jurisdictions. For 
instance, while UK judges handle obscene copyright works within the UK 
copyright framework through the judge-made public policy doctrine (2.5), an 
issue of obscenity within the US is addressed by the non-statutory defence of 
morality developed through US obscenity law framework (2.6). With regard to 
misuse of copyright, the US courts have developed the doctrine of copyright 
misuse within the US copyright framework to cope with situations in which the 
                                                
27 Ibid. [64]; Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria (n 6) 21.20-21.30. See also the dissenting opinions 
by Mance LJ in [69]-[83]. 
28 [2002] Ch 149 (CA). 
29 Ibid. [58]. 
30 Ibid. [59]; Griffiths (n 22). Lord Phillips MR merely concluded that the defendant’s freedom 
of expression was adequately accommodated by fair dealing defences and, thus, there was no 
need to have recourse to section 171(3).  
31 HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 522; Grisbrook v MGN 
Ltd [2009] EWHC 2520 [71]; Vitof Limited v Altoft [2006] EWHC 1678 [175]; Unilever plc v 
Griffin [2010] FSR 33 [18]; BBCPetitioners [2012] HCJ 10 [26]. See also Griffiths (n 22). 
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exercise of copyright amounts to anti-competition or is beyond the granted 
scope (2.3). Whereas the ECJ has recognised those situations as falling within 
the abuse of rights framework and has dealt with it by adopting the general 
principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights (2.4). More arguably, what 
should be the aftermaths of the operations of those distinct doctrines adopted in 
pursuance of the restrictive public interest defence are also discussed under 
different legal theories – denial or remedial approaches (2.8).32   
Similarly, the encouraging public interest defence, which appears to be 
thoroughly analysed in Chapter Three, illustrates circumstances where the 
public interest in requiring dissemination of, or having access to, copyright-
protected works is considered under different theoretical legal frameworks. 
The development of this type of defence under the UK jurisdiction has derived 
from an equitable doctrine of the law of breach of confidence and been later 
statutorily recognised by section 171(3) CDPA, which, arguably, give effect to 
the fundamental right of freedom of expression. In the EU, the public’s interest 
in freely communicating and receiving information and ideas of all kind, 
notwithstanding copyright-protected, has been well recognised through both 
ECJ and ECtHR case law as one of the fundamental human rights and, thus, 
prominently considered under the cultural rights and freedom of expression 
frameworks (3.2.1.4, 3.3). This fundamental rights resolution is also adopted 
by the US in a more extreme form, whereby freedom of expression has its 
highest constitutional protection and therefore copyright is predominantly 
subjected to the free speech scrutiny through the fair use doctrine (3.4).   
That said, it is still the afore-mentioned proposition of the defence of public 
interest, originating from the UK context, that has shaped the choice to deal 
with, and integrate, the two divergent but closely related aspects of the defence 
within copyright law. As put forward by the thesis, both types of situation 
under which the ‘restrictive’ and ‘encouraging’ public interest defence can be 
employed will be best resolved under the copyright framework - through the 
                                                
32 Please note that the argument of non-enforcement of copyright in reprehensible copyright 
works must now takes into account the WTO Panel’s ruling in US-China-Measures Affecting 
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (WT/DS362/R) report of the 
Panel, adopted 26 January 2009. See 5.3.1 below. 
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proposed public interest defence, which  seeks to equip courts with the power 
to exempt or override copyright enforcement through grant of remedies. 
1.2 Scope and aims of the contribution 
This research examines the overarching concept of the public interest. It 
endeavours to define scopes and distinct roles of such a concept from national 
and international case law, legal concepts and doctrines and other relevant 
materials. These contribute to answering the research question: to what extent 
can a public interest defence can be statutorily introduced into the international 
copyright regime to counterbalance the owner-centric tendency and restore 
balance between rightsholders, users and the public interest? 
1.2.1 Jurisdictional selections 
Particular jurisdictions have been selected to delineate the scope of the research 
area. The EU jurisdiction attracts the research’s primary focus due to its rich, 
sophisticated and constantly developing jurisprudence. It is home to most of 
the civil law-based countries, where arguments regarding abuse of EU rights, 
freedom of expression and the three-step test are open to debate. Prominent 
case law and approaches taken by some of EU member states concerning those 
matters are worth examining for comparative purposes. In addition, the UK 
represents an influential common-law jurisdiction from which the doctrines of 
public interest and public policy supposedly emanated, and which draw 
numerous judicial interpretations and commentary. 
The focus is sometimes placed on the US copyright regime, which perceives 
the public interest in a slightly different, sometimes contrary, dimension from 
other jurisdictions. The US is renowned for its constitutional freedom of 
expression protection and for its fair-use doctrine, arguably the epitome of a 
high level of safeguarding. Public policy is also recognised differently and 
attracts different forms of legal protection. Those diversities offered by the US 
jurisdiction are worth studying as they may play an important role in shaping 
how the proposed defence would play out internationally. 
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1.3 Methodology 
Nearly half of each chapter’s substance adopts a doctrinal methodology in an 
attempt to explore and understand foundational and theoretical principles and 
philosophies underpinning the legal doctrines involved. This research method 
is characterised by the analysis of legal rules primarily found in case law and 
statute.33 By asking what the law is,34 it particularly helps address and clarify 
the complexity and obscurity rooted in the compositional structures of the 
public interest, public policy, freedom of expression and the three-step test. 
As this project’s proposal considers the possibility of formulating a 
comprehensive and universal public interest defence, a comparative 
methodology is also used to understand how the public interest and other 
related doctrines are recognised and protected within the chosen regimes. This 
allows the researcher to discover and examine similarities and distinctions 
among the jurisdictions as to how they approach and what they contribute to 
the related matters.35 In Chapter 2, for instance, a comparative evaluation of 
case law precedent takes place between the EU, UK and US regimes of 
different legal approaches used to protect the public policy grounds. This 
enables the researcher to extract from those domestic approaches the features 
that are effective and meaningful for shaping an overarching international 
public policy safeguard. 
Doctrinal methods make no effort to comprehend the behaviour to which the 
concerned doctrines relate, and so provide no practical applications or solutions 
to a situation.36 Considering the scope of this research, one should avoid letting 
autonomous approaches taken by a limited number of jurisdictions of 
comparison justify the output as that would cause ‘an inherent bias in the 
structure of comparison with far-reaching implications’, 37  confining the 
validity and generality of the research outcomes. 
                                                
33 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced 
Research Methods in the Built Environment (Wiley-Blackwell 2008) 28, 29-30. 
34 Ibid. 30. See also HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961). 
35 John Reitz, ‘How to do Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 ASCL 617, 629. 
36 Chynoweth (n 33) 30. 
37 Reza Azarian, ‘Potentials and Limitations of Comparative Method in Social Science’ (2011) 
1(4) IJHSS 113, 121. 
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Having acknowledged those limitations, this project also contemplates the 
practical dimension of the public interest defence being implemented amid 
changing circumstances. To do so, an interdisciplinary method is adopted to 
take into account the extent to which technological development would affect 
the way copyright exists to fulfil all the interests present in the society. It also 
helps consider whether the proposed defence would pass the international 
three-step test and be able to play the desired role of permitting emerging 
technology-enabling uses in practice. The merits of this methodology are 
illustrative in freedom of expression consideration, in which an effectiveness of 
copyright L&Es in protecting other competing interests is evaluated against 
obligations to comply with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). This enables examination of the quality of internal copyright 
measures in achieving particular social goals and their conformity. 38  By 
looking through the social context in which copyright is constantly developed, 
one may have a clearer overall understanding of why international copyright is 
increasingly required to tilt its focus towards public values of a given creation 
and how that can effectively be achieved. Overall, the thesis is constructed 
with the intention that the statutory public interest defence proposed will 
provide ample certainty and flexibility in the copyright L&Es regime for the 
public interest to be duly safeguarded. This will thus help tailor copyright 
towards a fair balance between rightsholders, users and the public interest in 
this ever-evolving copyright environment. 
1.4 Structure of thesis 
Chapter 2 explores the public policy aspects which represent the restrictive 
sense of the public interest defence in putting judicial control over an 
inappropriate enforcement of copyright. The third chapter examines the other 
aspects of public interest in its encouraging sense, representing an exception to 
copyright infringement in circumstances where the public interest in enjoying 
the right to freedom of expression outweighs individual protection. Whether 
the proposed defence is justified to play the designated roles at the 
international level is scrutinised in the fourth chapter, where the defence is put 
                                                
38 Chynoweth (n 33) 30. 
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to the three-step test. 
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Chapter 2. Public Policy Grounds 
This chapter looks into public policy doctrine and examines to what extent it 
can be incorporated into the ambit of the proposed public interest defence. 
Copyright is an intellectual property right, the underlying aim of which is to 
incentivise the dissemination of particular types of creative works,39 provided 
that such works are in the form of expressions.40 By rewarding the author who 
contributes their intellectual creations in expressive ways with a set of 
exclusive rights and protection, it seeks to encourage their right to freedom of 
expression. 
However, it is widely recognised in the international copyright regime that 
maintaining the balance between the interests of rightsholders and the public is 
at the heart of copyright law because the balance benefits the society through 
the exercise of exclusive rights granted to the rightsholders to publish their 
creations. It also protects society from harm caused by an inappropriate 
exercise of such rights;41 the exclusive rights are not unconditional, but subject 
to some limitations. 
There are two types of copyright limitations; encouraging and restrictive. 
These can result in different implications towards the authors’ right to freedom 
of expression. The former can be regarded as enhancing further dissemination 
of the authors’ expression, and it ensures that the use of such expressions is not 
limited to the authors only, but also to public users under certain 
circumstances. This type of user-friendly limitation has widely been recognised 
at the international level and mostly incorporated into national level. It includes 
private copying, the right to make quotations, non-commercial research and 
study, teaching, libraries, fair use and fair dealing.42 
                                                
39 See Berne Convention, Art 2 as examples of particular types of works protected by copyright 
law. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria (n 6) para 20.2. See also Alexandra Sims, ‘The Denial of 
Copyright Protection in Public Policy Grounds’ [2008] EIPR 189, 189. 
42 See Berne Convention Art 9(2), 10 and 10bis as examples of copyright exceptions at 
international level. At regional level, see the Copyright Directive, Art 5. In national level, see, 
for example, the UK CDPA in Part I Chapter III ‘Acts Permitted in relation to Copyright 
Works’; The US copyright law, s 107 for ‘fair use’. 
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Restrictive limitations tend to restrict the dissemination of authors’ creative 
expressions under certain circumstances. This is, again, based on the concept 
that the author’s right to exercise their freedom of expression is not absolute; 
rather, there should be some limits. There are types of limitations the functions 
of which are set to prevent the use of copyright from causing any harmful 
effects to others’ rights or to the public at large. Such limitations are commonly 
known as brake doctrines. They are usually invoked when national authorities 
find it necessary that particular expressions should be restricted from 
publication in the public interest, despite uncertain legal authority and 
inconsistent implementation. Defamation law is one of the brake tools, the 
function of which is to restrict people from publishing defamatory expressions 
that could harm others’ reputations.43 Similarly, a right to freely express 
creative works can also be restrained if it is exercised in a way that is in 
violation of others’ right to privacy.44 
Inconsistent legal recognitions and implications in some prominent 
jurisdictions with different legal traditions are an interesting attribute of the 
emergency brake doctrine know as public policy grounds, which this chapter 
intends to examine. The term public policy was coined from the UK common 
law tradition45 and has long been recognised in various jurisdictions although 
different legal terms have been used, such as the US copyright misuse, 
copyright protection to obscene works or the prohibition of abuse of EU legal 
rights. Given the differences in national values and interests, implementations 
of the public policy doctrine vary in terms of criteria and operations. This 
chapter will examine how public policy is understood in each the US, UK and 
EU jurisdictions, and analyse similarities and differences in their applications, 
justifications and operations against copyright protection. 
There are two broad aspects that public policy embraces – misuse and 
immorality. The former holds that improper exercise of copyright beyond its 
granted scope is contrary to its purpose. The latter embodies the principle that 
                                                
43 Frances Quinn, Law for Journalists (4th edn Pearson 2013) 222. 
44 Ibid. 316. 
45 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (Spycatcher) [1990] 1 AC 109; Hyde 
Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and Others [2000] 3 WLR 215; [2001] Ch 143 (CA). 
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any works containing immoral elements must be suppressed from publication. 
 
2.1 Definition of public policy 
Restrictive limitations, or the so-called ‘emergency brake’, operate to maintain 
a fair balance in copyright law and to guarantee that copyright is not exercised 
in an overreaching way. Particularly, when copyright law – an instrument of 
policy based on public interest46 – is used in reprehensible, immoral or abusive 
ways, this is deemed as beyond the scope of protections and contrary to the 
underlying copyright policy. 
To prevent this from happening, there must exist a justification under which 
judicial authorities are vested with some discretionary power to implement and 
adjust copyright law in accordance with public needs, public safety and 
security, public morality and other perceived policy considerations. Such 
justification should ensure that the exercise of copyright does not constitute 
any detriment to the public and its ultimate objectives. 47  Against this 
background, such justification is recognised as public policy grounds. 
Having established the reasoning above, the next stage will illustrate the 
relationship between the public policy grounds and similar doctrines to 
examine to what extent each doctrine performs its ‘emergency brake’ role in its 
own jurisdiction. With regard to its recognised functions, the public policy 
grounds prevent two main reprehensible aspects – ‘misuse’ and ‘immorality’. 
With regard to ‘misuse’, the prohibition of an abuse of rights and the US 
copyright misuse are of relevance here. The former is one of the EU’s general 
principles, which prohibits circumstances where EU rights are exercised in a 
way that circumvents national rules or contrasts with the determined 
                                                
46 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Judicial Control of Copyright on Public Policy Grounds’ in Jan J C Kabel 
and Gerard J H M Mom (eds), Intellectual Property and Information Law – Essays in Honour 
of Herman Cohen Jehoram (Kluwer law International 1998) 137, 137. 
47 This concept is manifest in English copyright cases. See Hyde Park v Yelland [1999] (n 19) 
66. 
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objectives.48 Its scope thus covers all areas of EU law without a specific 
doctrine dealing with copyright,49 which begs the question of whether it can 
perform similar functions to the US copyright misuse or the UK public policy 
when touching on the area of copyright. ‘The US copyright misuse’ is another 
concept, which falls within the ‘misuse’ aspect. Its goal is to prevent copyright 
owners from exercising exclusive rights beyond those granted to them by 
copyright law. Unlike the EU doctrine, the US doctrine is specifically designed 
to cope with copyright. 
Clearly, both doctrines seek to impose some limits to the way legal rights are 
exercised by rightsholders to protect the public from harm and maintain 
copyright’s balance. This is compatible with the underlying principles of public 
policy grounds. 
Public policy grounds in the morality sense derive from analysis of the UK 
public policy and the US copyright protection to obscene works. With respect 
to the former doctrine, there has been some case law in which reference was 
made to the inherent jurisdiction of the UK courts, which enabled them to put 
some restrictions onto copyright enforcement if it was contrary to ‘the policy 
of the law’.50 Such non-statutory policy-based restrictions can be applied to 
cases where the copyright works were immoral, detrimental to public health 
and safety or public interest.51 Therefore, this represents the ‘emergency brake’ 
doctrine operating within the UK copyright regime. 
The operation of the US doctrine also reflects the morality aspect of public 
policy grounds. The doctrine draws the line between copyrightable works and 
obscene materials. While the US copyright law generally guarantees that 
creative works are protected, the doctrine ensures that works with obscene 
                                                
48 Annekatrien Lenaerts, ‘The General Principle of the Prohibition of Abuse of Rights: A 
Critical Position on Its Role in a Codified European Contract Law’ (2010) 6 European Review 
of Private Law 1121. 
49 Ibid. 1138. 
50 Public policy and public interest were sometimes used interchangeably by the UK courts. 
See Glyn v Weston Feature Film Company [1916] 1 Ch 261 at 269 as cited in Spycatcher (n 
45) [128], ‘the courts in the United Kingdom have the right to refuse to enforce copyright 
where the publication would be contrary to the public interest’. 
51 Spycatcher (n 45) [293] (Lord Jauncey); ZYX Music GmbH v Chris King [1995] FSR 566, 
577. 
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features causing harm to the society are not what the law seeks to protect.52 
This illustrates the ‘emergency brake’ function of ‘the US copyright protection 
to obscene works’ doctrine available in US copyright law. 
The emergency brake role in the context of public policy grounds is recognised 
as a balancing doctrine to which the courts can have recourse when they find it 
necessary that the enforcement of copyright must be withheld. It can be 
devised into different forms, depending on domestic needs and priorities. 
Against this backdrop, this thesis uses the term public policy grounds as a 
reference to the basis of all related doctrines. 
2.2 The US copyright misuse doctrine 
Copyright misuse has long been recognised in the US copyright regime as a 
judge-made equitable defence against copyright protection and rooted in the 
equitable maxim of unclean hands.53 Its original rationale can be traced back to 
the evolution of copyright law, wherein copyright owners, through the use of 
licensing agreements, increasingly wielded their rights in illegitimate ways to 
the detriment of licensees.54 This later became one of the US courts’ rationales 
for establishing a doctrine used for deterring copyright owners from exercising 
exclusive rights beyond those granted by law.55 There are two grounds on 
which copyright misuse can be invoked – antitrust and public policy.56 
The antitrust aspect of copyright misuse originated from the patent misuse 
doctrine. The latter’s threshold was based on the violation of antitrust law, 
which is closely connected to the maxim of unclean hands.57 Under this 
doctrine: 
                                                
52 Seong Choul Hong, ‘Copyright Protection v Public Morality: The Copyright Protection 
Dilemma of Pornography in a Global Context’ (2013) 8(1) Asian J WTO & Int’l Health L & 
Pol’y 301, 303. 
53 Kathryn Judge, ‘Rethinking Copyright Misuse’ (2004-05)57 Stan L Rev 901, 902; Tom W 
Bell, ‘Codifying Copyright’s Misuse Defence’ [2007] Utah L Rev 573, 574-6. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Lydia Pallas Loren, ‘Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming 
Copyright Owner Contracting the Clickwrap Misuse’ (2004) 30 Ohio NUL Rev 495, 513, 514. 
57 Alcatel USA, Inc v DGI Techs, Inc 166 F 3d 772 (5th Cir 1999). 
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‘a claimant who has committed acts constituting a misuse of 
copyright will not be permitted to obtain the assistance of the 
courts in enforcing his copyright – copyright misuse prevents an 
unclean-hand claimant from claiming copyright infringement 
through the misuse of his copyrights’.58 
The public policy aspect of copyright misuse came from the judgment of the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lasercomb v Reynolds.59 In this case, not 
only did the court confirm the existence of a misuse defence inherent in 
copyright law just like its patent counterpart, it also extended the scope of 
copyright misuse to embrace the public policy aspect. Following the Fourth 
Circuit’s standpoint, the First,60 Fifth,61 Ninth,62 and Third63 Circuits have 
subsequently recognised legal authority of the defence based on public policy 
approach. This chapter will explore only the public policy approach, and the 
antitrust law approach is thus excluded from the analysis. 
2.3 US copyright misuse cases 
With copyright misuse, the doctrine of ‘unclean hands’ is at the heart of the 
discussion. The doctrine was first introduced into copyright law in Rosemont v 
Random64 as a deterrent to copyright enforcement, and the Eight Circuit which 
made an unclear reference to the possibility of applying patent misuse in 
copyright infringement cases in 1988 in United v Johnson.65 It was not until 
1990 that a clear judgment was made by the Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb v 
Reynolds. The Court held that the misuse doctrine was applicable to copyright 
cases where copyright protection was used by the claimant in a way that 
‘violated the public policy inherent in copyright law and, hence, rendered the 
claimant's copyright unenforceable’.66 This approach has since been widely 
adopted67 as a defence in copyright infringement cases.68 
                                                
58 Lasercomb America, Inc v Reynolds, 911 F 2d 970, 972 (4th Cir 1990). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Data General Corp v Grumman Systems Support Corp, 36 F 3d 1147 (1st Cir 1994). 
61 DSC Communications Corp v DGI Techs, Inc, 81 F 3d 597, 601 (5th Cir 1996). 
62 Practice Mgmt Info Corp v AMA, 121 F 3d 516 (9th Cir 1997). 
63 Video Pipeline, Inc v Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc, 342 F 3d 191 (3d Cir 2003). 
64 Rosemont Enters, Inc v Random House, Inc, 366 F 2d 303, 311 (2d Cir 1966). 
65 United Tel Co v Johnson Publ'g Co, Inc, 855 F 2d 604, 612 (8th Cir 1988). 
66 Lasercomb v Reynolds (n 58) 970. See also Judge (n 53) 902. 
67 Practice Mgmt v AMA (n 62); Alcatel USA v DGI (n 57); Video Pipeline v Buena Vista (n 
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2.3.1 Violation of public policy 
The leading judgment that firmly upheld the ground of public policy derived 
from Lasercomb, which involved a software licensing agreement made for the 
purpose of preventing licensees from developing competing products.69 The 
Fourth Circuit began its judgment by re-affirming that copyright did not protect 
the idea, but an expression of such an idea. It found that the clause at issue 
sought to restrict the licensee from implementing the idea from which the 
products at issue were made. This was beyond the scope of protection that 
copyright law conferred to the owner, and therefore anti-competitive.70 The 
Court also held that, to establish copyright misuse, the question was whether 
copyright was being exercised in violation of public policy embodied in the 
grant of copyright, not antitrust law;71 ‘[a] no-competing licensing provision is 
sufficient to constitute copyright misuse – it need not be a violation of antitrust 
law’.72 Having based the decision on this approach, the examination of the 
actual effect on competition became moot.73 Perhaps this change to a more 
robust and expansive basis of copyright misuse can be seen as the Court 
attempting to play a more broader role in dealing with concerns regarding the 
public interest, and tackling rightsholders’ misuse practices in copyright 
contracts. 
2.3.2 Justifications of copyright misuse on the basis of public policy 
There are three main justifications that can be developed from case law; 
anticompetitive licencing practices, fair use safeguarding and abuse of process. 
                                                                                                                            
 
63). 
68 Telecom Technical Servs v Rolm Co, 388 F 3d 820, 831 (11th Cir 2004). 
69 Lasercomb (n 58) 976. 
70 Ibid. 970-979. 
71 Lasercomb (n 58) 978. See also re Napster, Inc Copyright Litig, 191 F Supp 2d 1087, 1103 
(ND Cal 2002). 
72 Lasercomb (n 58) 978. 
73 Loren (n 56) 516. 
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 Anti-competitive licensing practices 2.3.2.1
Lasercomb America, Inc v Reynolds74 
In Lasercomb, the Fourth Circuit ruled that a clause in the licensing agreement 
had been made in a way that deterred the licensee from developing the 
underlying production idea, and that this was anti-competitive and constituted 
copyright misuse.75 Despite involving a consideration of competitive activities, 
the Court found that this competition-restricting justification was independent 
of the antitrust law approach. This is manifest from the fact that the Court 
focused particularly on the language used in the licensing agreement, and not 
on the actual effect on the claimant’s market power.76 
Three interesting implications can be drawn from this case. First, copyright 
misuse can arise whenever the owner exercises their right in anti-competitive 
ways, notwithstanding it not reaching the degree in which antitrust law is 
violated. Second, such anti-competitive action is deemed beyond the copyright 
boundary and fundamental to the finding of copyright misuse. Third, copyright 
misuse is closely associated with the guaranteed balance of the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the US copyright’s ultimate purpose of promoting the progress 
of science and useful arts.77 In the US copyright regime, such a purpose is 
achieved by granting limited monopoly to copyright owners to stimulate 
further creativity in society. Against this background, activities that prevent 
others from using ideas as a basis from which new creations can be developed 
are not uses that copyright law seeks to protect; in fact, they are counter-
productive to the greater end of public enrichment and thus contrary to the 
ultimate aim of copyright.78 
                                                
74 Lasercomb (n 58). 
75 Ibid. 977-79. 
76 Brett Frischmann and Dan Moylan, ‘The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright 
Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software’ (2000) 15(3) Berkeley Techn L J 
865, 888. 
77 US Const, Art I, sec 8, cl 8. The idea/expression dichotomy was elaborated by the US 
Supreme Court in Mazer v Stein (1954) 347 US 201, 217, by stating that ‘unlike a patent, a 
copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the 
expression of the idea—not the idea itself’. 
78 See also a similar judgment in Practice Mgmt v AMA (n 62), where it demonstrated an unfair 
clause adopted in anti-competitive manner and the use of copyright monopoly beyond the 
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Alcatel USA, Inc v DGI Techs, Inc79 
Alcatel made a licensing agreement requiring his licensee to use its 
copyrighted software only in conjunction with its uncopyrighted hardware.80 
By analogy, Alcatel desired to obtain a patent-like protection over its 
unpatented hardware. This would have deprived competitors of the right to 
create competing hardware.81 Such a licensing requirement clearly constituted 
anti-competitive behaviour and reached beyond the scope of copyright 
protection. By seeking to receive unfair protection for its hardware, it was also 
apparent that Alcatel sought to prevent others from copying its expression and 
the underlying idea. The Court held that Alcatel had crossed the dividing line 
of the idea/expression dichotomy, which forms the intrinsic balance inherent in 
copyright law. Failing to respect such balance may also amount to breach of 
copyright’s purpose. 
 Fair-use safeguard reasoning 2.3.2.2
Video Pipeline, Inc v Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc82 
This case involved the owner of copyrighted movies – Disney – requiring the 
licensee – Pipeline Inc – to only stream Disney’s movie trailers offline.83 Since 
the licensee broke that licensing agreement and streamed the trailers online, 
Disney accused the licensee of copyright infringement. Pipeline argued that 
Disney had misused its copyright by including a condition in the agreement for 
the purpose of restricting its licensees from making any critical comments on 
Disney’s movies.84 The Third Circuit held that a copyright owner's attempt to 
restrict critical speech directed against his copyrighted works would undermine 
                                                                                                                            
 
granted scope. 
79 166 F 3d 772 (5th Cir 1999). 
80 Ibid. 777. 
81 Ibid. 793. 
82 342 F 3d 191 (3d Cir 2003). 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 203. 
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the copyright’s public policy goal in encouraging the dissemination of 
creativity to the public.85 
Under this justification, viability of the right to exercise ‘fair use’ can be 
deemed one of the public policies that copyright intends to protect. The First 
Amendment to the US Constitution ensures that fair use is justified by the right 
to freedom of expression, which is intended for promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts for public benefits. 86  The contractual restriction 
imposed on the user’s right to exercise their freedom empowered by the fair-
use doctrine is thus contrary to public policy. Accordingly, this can be one of 
the bases of the finding of copyright misuse.87 
 Unprotected area of copyright or an abuse of process 2.3.2.3
DSC Communications v DGI Technologies88 
DSC manufactured phone switches, which came with the licensing requirement 
that any competing microprocessor card developed for use with the phone 
switches must be compatible with its copyrighted operating system 
software. DGI manufactured microprocessor cards, which were used with the 
DSC’s phone switches. In an attempt to develop its devices to be compatible 
with DSC’s licensing requirement, DGI became involved in a number of 
copyright infringements by making unauthorised copies of DSC’s copyrighted 
software. DGI argued that DSC misused its copyright in seeking to receive 
patent-like protection for its unpatented microprocessor, and the inclusion of 
such a condition amounted to misuse. If allowed, it would thus have prevented 
anyone from producing a competing microprocessor card even though the 
DSC’s card was not patented. 
The Fifth Circuit cited Lasercomb when considering about the copyright 
misuse defence raised by the defendant, particularly that the defence ‘forbids 
the use of the copyright to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not 
                                                
85 Ibid. 204. 
86 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
87 See Bond v Blum 317 F 3d 385, 397-98 (4th Cir 2003). The Fourth Circuit followed the 
Third Circuit’s judgment in ruling this case. 
88 DSC Communications Corp v DGI Techs (n 61). 
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granted by the Copyright Office’.89 Following this principle, the Fifth Circuit 
held that the defence operated to limit the exercise of copyright monopoly over 
microprocessor cards in a way that deterred the culpable DSC from relying on 
an action for infringement. The Court also established that a grant of exclusive 
rights to the authors went hand-in-hand with an inherent duty to protect public 
policy encapsulated in the US Constitution and laws. This upholds the well-
established concept that copyright not only promotes the progress of science 
and useful arts, but also prevents the use of limited monopoly beyond those 
conferred by the law. 
Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC v WIREdata Inc90 
The public policy approach was extended to cover misuse arising from a claim 
outside copyright scope. In this case, the defendant was restricted from 
accessing public information claimed by the claimant to have copyright 
protection. An injunction was issued by the against WIREdata’s request to 
access information regarding specific properties held by Wisconsin Tax 
Assessors for tax assessment purposes. However, WIREdata argued that, 
although the compiled computer-generated data developed by the claimant may 
be copyrightable, the requested data was not the compiled, but rather the raw 
data; thus, it was in the public domain and not copyrightable. The Seventh 
Circuit agreed with the defendant and held that the claimant may have had 
ownership in the compilation of data, but not in the data itself.91 This reflects 
the need to maintain the balance between ideas and expressions, one of the 
important principles underpinning copyright law. Therefore, the court 
established that a claim of copyright to prohibit others from obtaining publicly 
available data which was neither copyrightable nor copyrighted, was against 
the purposes of copyright. Such a claim constituted copyright misuse.92 
This third justification of abuse of process broadens the interpretation of 
                                                
89 Lasercomb (n 58) 972, 976. 
90 350 F 3d 640 (7th Cir 2003). 
91 Ibid. 641-42. 
92 Ibid. 647. 
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copyright misuse.93 This far-reaching aspect can be used when dealing with 
circumstances where copyright owners excessively claim copyright monopoly 
to the prejudice of the public. This widened ground could also embrace 
situations where the use of copyright subverts competition rules and rights to 
fair use. 
2.3.3 Summary 
Concerning the scope of copyright misuse based on public policy, the analysis 
suggests three main justifications whereby copyright can be found misused: 
anti-competitive practices, restriction of fair use, and copyright claim outside 
the granted scope. The anti-competition ground covers the situation where a 
copyright claim is used to prevent users from competing in the market by 
deterring them from developing the ideas behind the copyright-protected 
products. This reflects the idea/expression dichotomy, one of the concepts 
underpinning the US copyright L&Es regime. Copyright is also misused when 
it is claimed in a way that restricts others from dealing with the protected 
products in a fair-use manner. The misuse generally underlies an attempt to 
extend copyright infringement claims over its reach. 
Considering the objectives of each justification, although copyright misuse can 
be raised from different perspectives, they tend to converge towards ensuring 
that copyright protection is not used in a monopolistic way to the detriment of 
the US copyright policy – ‘to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts’.94 Entrenched at the constitutional level, US copyright’s ultimate goal 
calls for the widest dissemination of creations and innovation for the public 
good. One can then regard public policy as the balanced intersection between 
the two sides of the copyright spectrum – granted monopoly for individual 
interests and fair use for public interests. The issue is whether the rights 
granted to rightsholders are exercised beyond the scope of the limited 
privileges conferred by the law. If the answer is affirmative, the public policy 
embodied in copyright law is violated, and copyright misuse is deemed to have 
occurred. 
                                                
93 Ibid. 
94 US Const, Art I, sec 8, cl 8. 
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2.4 The prohibition of abuse of rights under EU law 
Unlike the US legal regime, there is no certain misuse doctrine specifically 
adopted in the EU legal regime to cope with the exercise of copyright in 
violation of public policy. However, the doctrine of abuse of rights, as 
recognised by member states, revolves around the circumstances where EU 
legal rights conferred to individuals are used ‘in a manner which is 
unreasonable, with consequent harm to another, whether there was an intent to 
harm or mere carelessness or indifference as to harm resulting’,95 or which 
deviates from underlying legal purposes. It is thus worth examining how the 
doctrine of abuse of rights can reflect the role of public policy grounds in the 
context of copyright misuse. 
Generally speaking, when something is abused, people would probably agree 
that the abuse deserves neither favourable outcome nor any benefits, but rather 
condemnation.96 This is implicit in law when an attempt is made to establish a 
dividing line between use and abuse of legal rights.97 The prohibition of abuse 
of rights (PAR) is derived from the German and French legal concepts.98 The 
German concept of the prohibition of chicanery was inserted into the German 
Civil Code in Section 226, which states that ‘the exercise of a right is not 
permitted if its only possible purpose consists in causing damage to another’.99 
Another root of the doctrine, which is more reflective to the modern principle 
of PAR, can be seen in French law with two different, but related, concepts:100 
1. Abus de droit; ‘the exercise by a person of his or her rights in an 
excessive manner which causes harm to another’;101 
2. Fraude à la loi – ‘person exercising his rights in a way that 
                                                
95 Lenaerts (n 48) 1128. 
96 Merike Saarmann, ‘Use Versus Abuse of Community Law – Where to Draw the Line?: 
Constructing the scope of abuse in the free movement of persons cases’ [2009] 3 
<http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/thesis-merike-saarmann.pdf> accessed 14 January 2015. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Michael Taggart, Private Property Rights and Abuse of Rights in Victorian England (OUP 
2002) 145. 
99 Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB, Federal Law Gazette) The German Civil Code in the version 
promulgated on 2nd January 2002 (I page 42, 2909; 2003 I page 738). 
100 See more detail in Pierre Schammo, ‘Arbitrage and Abuse of Rights in the EC Legal 
System’ (2008) 14 ELJ 351, 354-6. 
101 Cour de Colmar, 2 May 1855, DP 56.2.9. 
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places himself in a specific legal situation with the intent to 
avoid or to circumvent otherwise applicable mandatory 
provisions’.102 
Another source from which PAR may have originated concerns Article 54 of 
the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU). The 
provision corresponds to Article 17 ECHR, both of which prohibit any activity 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised in the 
documents, or application to a greater extent than is provided therein.103 That 
CFREU became legally binding as part of EU treaties on the entry into force of 
the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, which states that ‘in principle Article 54 may 
interact with all rights and freedom’.104 However, due to its restrictive wording 
and narrow scope of application, there has been a lack of European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) jurisprudence in relation to Article 54 precedents and 
development.105 Despite the similarity between the abuse of rights doctrine 
adopted at national level and Article 54 CFREU in terms of examining the 
original objectives of the rights abused, their ultimate goals are not necessarily 
consistent.106 It has been doubted whether Article 54 CFREU provides a 
legislative basis or is instrumental in constitutionalising and forming a 
universal acceptance of the general principle of EU law status of the judge-
made abuse of rights doctrine.107 
2.4.1 Entry and current application in EU law 
The question of whether or not the PAR doctrine has gained the status of an 
‘EU general principle’ is still equivocal; what is clear is that the doctrine has 
entered into the EU legal regime through two primary ways – adoption by 
                                                
102 Princesse de Bauffremont (Cour de Cassation, 1876) 78 S I-193. 
103 Although, according to Steve Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: A Commentary (Hart Publishing 2014) paras 54.02, 54.22, Art 54 CFREU derives from 
several sources, its explanations were originally prepared under the authority of the Praesidium 
of the ECHR who later drafted the CFREU. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Norbert Reich, General Principles of EU Civil Law (Intersentia 2014) 189-210. Most of 
relevant case law can nevertheless be found in ECtHR jurisprudence, mostly concerning 
restrictions justified by Art 17 ECHR against hate speech. See Peers and others (n 92) paras 
54.24-25, 54.30 and case law cited therein. 
106 Peers and others (n 103) para 54.45; Reich (n 105) 189-212. 
107 Ibid. 
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member states and recognition by the ECJ.108 It first appeared in the laws of 
member states both in the forms of codified provisions and non-statutory 
equitable doctrines. Despite those varied forms, they were primarily directed at 
combatting the situation where the exercise of EU legal rights by individuals 
had led to circumvention of national laws.109 It is this clash between EU laws 
and those of member states that had later become an issue which the ECJ has 
tried to reconcile in several cases brought before it. Against this background, 
there has subsequently been a uniform recognition of PAR by the ECJ as an 
‘emergency brake’ tool used to rectify circumstances where EU legal rights are 
abused in a way that constitutes an unintended outcome or is contrary to their 
underlying objectives.110 
2.4.2 The EU and ‘the prohibition of abuse of rights’ 
Before considering this doctrine through the lens of copyright, there should be 
a comprehensive understanding of the circumstances in which abuse of rights 
is deemed to have occurred. This part will therefore examine some prominent 
case law to explore how the ECJ has dealt with abuse of rights in different 
legal areas, and how each of its decisions helps to shape the scope and criteria 
of the doctrine. 
 Broad ambit of an abuse of rights in circumvention cases: Van 2.4.2.1
Binsbergen111 
Van Binsbergen was the first case where the alleged abuse of rights in the 
context of circumvention was brought into focus. The case revolved around the 
freedom to provide services guaranteed by Article 59 of the EEC Treaty112 and 
concerned the situation where, under Dutch rules, a national who had already 
moved to establish himself in another state (Belgium), was deprived of his 
                                                
108 Lenaerts (n 48) 1122-24. 
109 See, for example, cases concerning circumvention of national laws in Case 33/74 Van 
Binsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid (1974) ECR 1299; Case C-212/97 Centros 
Ltd v Erhvervsog Selskabsstyrelsen (1999) ECR I-1459. 
110 Key cases for this concept are Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke GmbH v Hauptzollamt 
Hamburg-Jonas (2000) ECR I-1569; Case C-321/05 Kofoed v Skatteministeriet [2007] ECR I-
5795; C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995. See also Saarmann (n 96) 3. 
111 Case 33/74 (n 109) para 13. 
112 The Treaty Establishing the European Community (as amended by subsequent Treaties, 
Rome, 25 March 1957) (The EEC treaty), Art 59 Part three, title III. 
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right to carry out his duty as a legal representative in the Netherlands. In 
solving this confrontation between the freedom granted under Article 59 and 
restrictive Dutch law, the ECJ confirmed that a member state was not 
prohibited to take any measures under ‘judicial control’ of an individual whose 
exercise of the freedom conferred by Article 59 was ‘entirely or principally’ 
destined for avoiding national regulations which would be applicable to him 
were he established in that state.113 
Although the word ‘abuse’ was not used in the ECJ’s judgment, it was evident 
that, firstly, the objective of freedom to provide services within the EU legal 
regime seeks to abolish national discrimination and guarantee the ability of 
businesses and professionals to move freely within the EU’s single market.114 
Secondly, it was apparent that the activity at issue was not intended to achieve 
such objective, but rather to avoid professional rules of conduct set out by 
Dutch law. There was an implication that, by giving a state the right to exercise 
judicial control and adopt national measures to combat circumvention cases, 
the ECJ viewed such circumstances as falling within the ambit of PAR. 
Furthermore, the phrase ‘wholly or principally directed towards its territory 
[...] for the purpose of avoiding’115 seems to be the only condition imposed on 
states when establishing national measures in cases of alleged circumvention. 
Accordingly, it indicates that the ECJ left considerable room for national 
authorities to adopt measures preventing abusive behaviour, i.e. 
circumventions of national laws.116 This broad proposition of the prohibition of 
abuse of rights laid down in Van Binsbergen was later followed by Knoors,117 
Leclerc118 and Lair119 in areas of free movement of establishment, goods and 
workers respectively, with slightly different terms used for abuse in different 
                                                
113 Case 33/74 (n 109) para 13. 
114 Mariusz Maciejewski and Kendra Pengelly, ‘Freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services’ [2016] 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_3.1.4.html> 
accessed 15 July 2015. 
115 Case 33/74 (n 109) para 13. 
116 See also Case 81/87 The Queen v H M Treasury and commissioners of Inland Revenue 
[1988] ECR 5483 para 23-24, which is supportive of Van Binsbergen. 
117 Case 115/78 J Knoors v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken (1979) ECR 399. 
118 Case 229/83 Leclerc and Others v `Au Blé Vert' and Others (1985) ECR 1 para 27. 
119 Case 39/86 Lair v Universität Hannover (1988) ECR 3161 para 43. 
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legal aspects.120 
 Weighing an abuse with objectives of EU law: Centros121 2.4.2.2
Centros is another milestone circumvention case, where the scope of PAR was 
nevertheless made subject to the objectives of EU law. It pertains to the 
situation where a Danish authority refused to register the company’s branch 
owned by a Danish national, who sought to exercise his freedom of 
establishment conferred by EU law. The authority argued that the exercise 
sought to avoid strict Danish rules of minimum share capital. Indeed, the 
company intended to obtain legal benefits regarding minimum share capital 
conferred by Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty by establishing its 
headquarters in the UK, whilst attempting to register its branch in Denmark. 
This was despite its primary trading presence in Denmark and an absence of 
trading activities in the UK. Hence, such circumvention of national rules 
constituted an abuse of rights. 
The question brought before the ECJ was whether the Danish authority was in 
breach of the Articles in refusing branch registration under the abuse of rights 
allegation, even though the exercise of such freedom seemed not to be in 
breach of the underlying objective for which freedom of establishment was 
granted. 
Having deviated from the firmly-recognised concept of national anti-abuse 
measures in Van Binsbergen, the ECJ had to consider this case ‘in the light of 
the objectives pursued by those EU provisions’.122 As an objective of freedom 
of establishment is justified by the principle of the EU single market,123 it held 
that choosing to establish the company in the UK where the relevant rules 
seemed more beneficial was permissible under the EU single-market objective 
encapsulated in Articles 49 and 54 TFEU.124 This is despite the fact that 
                                                
120 In Case 115/78 (n 117), the ECJ said ‘wrongly to evade the national law’, whilst in Case 
229/83 (n 118) and Case 39/86 (n 119), the phrase ‘for the sole purpose […] to circumvent’ 
was similarly used. 
121 Case C-212/97 Centros (n 109). 
122 Ibid. paras 24-25. 
123 Ibid. paras 24, 27. 
124 Ibid. 
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business activities were primarily conducted in Denmark where the rule of 
minimum share capital payment was strict and intentionally circumvented. 
Accordingly, there was no circumvention in this case. This case seems to 
constitute a restriction on the state’s right to implement anti-abusive measures 
as individuals are entitled to circumvent national rules as long as their conduct 
is in conformity with the objectives of EU provisions. 
Thus, although the ECJ has failed to identify definite criteria for PAR, it has 
established that the doctrine must be considered under the conditions of 
supremacy and objectives of EU law. 
 Establishment of the ‘abuse test’: Emsland-Starke125 2.4.2.3
PAR was of narrow scope until the judgment in Emsland-Starke, when it was 
expanded to cover not only circumvention of national rules, but also ‘the 
abusive or fraudulent exercise of rights conferred by Union law’.126 The 
judgment also provided certain parameters of the doctrine. 
This case relates to the alleged abuse of rights to obtain an export refund on 
agricultural products, conferred by Regulation 2730/79.127 The rationale behind 
this EU right aims to make Community products competitive in the world 
market. It does so by granting compensation to exporters in the form of a non-
differentiated export refund for the difference between product prices within 
the Community and international market prices.128 A German exporter sought 
to exercise this right by creating artificial transactions as though his products 
were exported to Switzerland, and as such eligible for the export refund. He 
was also cooperating with the importer to later ship the products back to 
Germany unchanged. This was described by the German authorities as an 
‘unduly granted refund’, which the exporter should not be allowed to seek. The 
fundamental question in this case was whether such unduly granted refund 
could be deemed permissible or abusive. 
                                                
125 Case C-110/99 (n 110). 
126 Lenaerts (n 48) 1133. 
127 Commission Regulation 2730/79/EEC of 29 Nov 1979 on the application of the system of 
export refunds on agricultural product [1979] OJ L317/1. 
128 Case C-110/99 (n 110) paras 70, 73 (AG Alber). 
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The ECJ established the two-fold test under for a finding of abuse.129 The test 
comprises objective and subjective elements. With regard to the objective 
element, the ECJ stated that this facet would be satisfied when, ‘despite formal 
observance of the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of 
those rules has not been achieved.’130 In other words, a comparison should be 
made between the purpose of EU rule and that of activity at issue to examine 
whether the latter is manifestly inconsistent with the former. In this case, the 
exporter adopted an abusive re-import strategy to exploit the conferred right for 
the mere purpose of gaining personal benefits. Thus, such adoption was 
contrary to the genuine purpose of the granted right.131 
With respect to the subjective element, there must exist ‘an intention to obtain 
an advantage from such EU right by creating artificially the conditions laid 
down for obtaining it’.132 In considering this aspect, the ECJ admitted that 
there was an intricacy in ascertaining a subject’s intent to obtain benefits from 
EU provisions, especially when it came to legal persons.133 Thus, instead of 
attempting to read an individual’s mind and establishing their motive, it sought 
to rely on ‘objective circumstances’.134 This concept examined the collusion 
between the exporter and the importer in the other country in light of genuine 
and artificial characters of economic activities to establish the subjective 
element.135 Nevertheless, the criterion of this subjective element was still 
subject to uncertainty. 
The Court in this case firmly recognises that abuse of rights can be established 
on the fulfilment of test, ‘provided that the effectiveness of Union law is not 
undermined’.136 It also enlarged the scope of the doctrine to embrace situations 
where not only national rules are circumvented, but also when the EU rights 
are used in a manner contrary to their objectives. 
                                                
129 Ibid. paras 52-53. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. paras 55, 59. 
132 Ibid. paras 52-53. 
133 Ibid. paras 51, 54. 
134 Case C-255/02 Halifax and others v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2006] ECR I-
1609. 
135 Case C-110/99 (n 110) para 53. 
136 Ibid. paras 54, 59. 
 
31 
 Further development of the test: Halifax137 2.4.2.4
In Halifax, the ECJ shed the light on an ambiguity in the scope of the 
prohibition of abuse of rights and its subjective element. This case concerns a 
UK banking company who relied on the right granted by the Sixth Council 
Directive to set up a scheme for which its genuine purpose was the recovery of 
the full amount of VAT incurred.138 The underlying question was whether the 
legal person involved in a series of artificial transactions was, under EU law, 
entitled to the input VAT deduction. 
In determining whether an abuse had occurred, the two-tier test set out in 
Emsland-Starke was adopted to consider, firstly, whether the transactions at 
issue led to ‘the accrual of a tax advantage, the grant of which would be 
contrary to the purpose of those provisions’.139 Secondly, it examined whether 
the aim of the said transactions was to obtain a tax advantage.140 The ECJ 
acknowledged that some circumventions could be deemed legitimate if the way 
in which corporate entities structured their business for limiting their tax 
liability did not consist of abusive practices. 
Of particular interest in this case was the slight difference in views given 
between Advocate General Maduro and the ECJ as regards establishment of 
the subjective element. Maduro was of opinion that such elements cannot be 
evaluated by reading subjects’ minds but only by ‘objective consideration’. 
This means that the practice in question cannot be grounded under any other 
aims than ‘solely’ relying on the application of the EU provisions in a 
contradictory manner to their purposes.141 The ECJ preferred to consider the 
‘essential aim’, which means that the threshold of an abuse of rights can be 
more easily triggered if one of the aims relied on was contrary to their 
purposes.142 
                                                
137 Case C-255/02 (n 134). 
138 Ibid. paras 12-29. Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the 
harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes. 
139 Case C-255/02 (n 134) para 74. 
140 Ibid. paras 74, 75, 81. 
141 Ibid. paras 70, 71 (AG Maduro). 
142 Ibid. para 81. See also later cases C-196/04 (n 110) paras 64-67; Case C-321/05 (n 110) 
paras 57-58. 
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Despite lack of clarity of the terms ‘solely’ and ‘essential’ used, this case 
contributes to several important conclusions. Firstly, it ensures that the 
prohibition of abuse of rights is applicable to other areas of EU law, including 
taxation.143 Secondly, it confirms the usability of the abuse test proposed in 
Emsland-Starke and further refines the criteria under which the motive can be 
objectively ascertained.144 Thirdly, it endorses the judgment in Centros that not 
every circumvention or activity that gives rise to personal benefits is 
illegitimate; in fact, gaining without abuse can be deemed lawful.145 
 Refinement of subjective element: Cadbury Schweppes146 2.4.2.5
This case clarifies an uncertain area of the subjective limb and upholds the 
Halifax proposition that the ambit of the doctrine has been widened to cover 
other areas of EU law, including the non-harmonised area of corporate 
taxation.147 It revolves around the situation where a legal person exercises their 
freedom of establishment conferred by Articles 43 and 48 of the EC treaty. 
Cadbury did so for the purpose of choosing the most favourable jurisdiction 
(Ireland) for their business establishment to circumvent more restrictive UK 
rules and a higher tax rate.148 Prior to this case, the behaviour may have been 
deemed abusive and amounted to an abuse of rights. This is because its aim 
was principally directed at obtaining personal gain by circumventing national 
rules regarding corporate tax, and fraudulently taking advantage of the EU 
right to freedom of establishment. As such, this was contrary to the purpose of 
Community law. 
However, following the guidelines from Centros and Halifax, the ECJ assured 
that the so-called ‘tax location shopping’ activity by a corporate entity ‘for the 
purpose of benefiting from the favourable tax regime which that establishment 
                                                
143 Case C-255/02 (n 134) para 70. See also Ana Bobic, ‘Prohibition of abuse of rights’ [2011] 
25 <https://www.pravo.unizg.hr/_download/repository/Bobic_thesis_final.pdf> accessed 18 
February 2015. 
144 Frans Vanistendael, ‘Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes: one single European theory of abuse 
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145 Ibid. 193; Lenaerts (n 48) 1136. 
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enjoys’ did not constitute abuse per se.149 Interestingly, the ECJ also ruled this 
case in a way that seemed to support AG Maduro in Halifax. It explained that, 
despite tax-avoiding motives and circumvention of national law, the UK anti-
tax avoidance measure cannot be applied to the activity in which it partially 
constituted ‘genuine economic activity’. In other words, the said activity could 
be deemed abusive only when it amounted to ‘wholly artificial arrangement 
(sole purpose)’.150 Evidently, there is a distinction between ‘partially’ and 
‘wholly’ artificial arrangement and only the latter type can fulfil the subjective 
requirement. 
This case illustrates that the subjective test is met when a party’s intention 
consists of the ‘sole purpose’ to obtain personal advantage from EU rules, 
without any genuine economic activity taking place. 
 Recognised status of a general principle of EU law: Kofoed151 2.4.2.6
The term PAR emerged for the first time in this circumvention case regarding 
the EU tax exemption regime. The case concerns the right conferred by Article 
8(1) of Directive 90/434,152 which allowed for income tax exemption on the 
exchange of shares between an acquiring company represented by Mr. Kofoed 
and shareholders in an acquired company situated in different member states. 
The exemption was subject to specific conditions laid down in Article 2(d) of 
the same Directive. The acquiring company attempted to fulfil those conditions 
by creating a commercial transaction within the meaning of Article 2(d) to be 
eligible for the tax exemption. 
The ECJ found that the commercial transaction was not properly conducted but 
intended to ‘fraudulently and improperly circumvent national rules of 
taxation’, in which case the party should not be entitled to tax exemption,153 
and that this tax-avoiding activity was prohibited by Article 11(1)(a) of the 
                                                
149 Ibid. para 58. 
150 Case C-196/04 (n 110) para 75. See also n 141 for AG Maduro’s proposition. 
151 Case C-321/05 (n 110). 
152 Ibid. Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation 
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Directive. The provision permits member states to refuse any tax exemption 
benefits obtained from Article 8(1) provided that the exchange of shares at 
issue gives rise to tax evasion.154 As the ECJ observed, such a provision 
suggested that the exercise of EU rights cannot embrace abusive behaviour and 
the transactions were made contrary to normal commercial operations with the 
sole purpose of fraudulently gaining benefits granted by EU law.155 So far, this 
is seen as a certain criterion for finding an abuse of rights. 
Another contribution of this case is that, by referring to such a principle 
preventing tax evasion, the ECJ regarded Article 11(1)(a) as a reflection of ‘a 
general Community law principle’ prohibiting abuse of rights.156 Therefore, it 
is now apparent that there is a formal recognition that, as one of EU general 
principles, the scope of PAR can be broadened to apply to all areas of EU law 
in the light of criteria provided above.157 
2.4.3 Summary 
The principle of PAR has two dimensions.158 It prevents circumstances where 
the EU right is exercised for the sole purpose of circumventing national rules 
or abusively taking advantage of EU law as opposed to its genuine purpose. 
With regard to scope and criteria, a firm recognition of its status as a general 
principle of EU law by the ECJ suggests that the doctrine containing the two 
aspects can be applied to all areas of EU law.159 Particularly, the finding of 
abuse is subject to the conditions that, firstly, the purpose of the EU right at 
issue has not objectively been achieved; and, secondly, the activity from which 
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the right derives is not aimed at pursuing the underlying aim of EU law, but 
solely at abusively acquiring personal benefits conferred by such rights. The 
latter element, if not manifestly ascertainable, can be evaluated on the ground 
of ‘objective circumstance’. All these criteria should however be 
counterbalanced with the effectiveness of EU law’s objectives in the light of 
the principle of freedom in the EU single market.160 This counterbalance is 
justified by the proposition that not every circumvention of national rules, nor 
every self-benefiting claim of EU legal rights is illegitimate. Only the ‘sole 
purpose’ of such gains or the ‘whole artificial arrangement’ can constitute 
abuse. 
Provided that these criteria are considered in the context of the EU copyright 
regime, PAR can be deemed as an EU version of copyright’s public policy 
doctrine in the ‘misuse’ sense. It should function to deter an improper exercise 
of copyright that goes beyond the ultimate copyright’s policy and purposes. 
2.5 The UK Public Policy Doctrine 
Unlike the two doctrines analysed above, the UK public policy doctrine 
conveys a strong sense of morality. It represents the principle that the courts 
may refuse to enforce copyright in works containing immoral or misleading 
material. It seeks to protect the society from destruction or detrimental effect 
caused by the exercise of copyright.161 The origin of this principle dates back 
to more than two hundred years ago when an English judge, who described 
himself as ‘a faultfinder’, regarded works offending public sensibilities inapt to 
deserve copyright protection.162 
However, this English doctrine is not statutorily provided, but inherent in the 
‘general equitable jurisdiction’ of the courts.163 Its development is thus subject 
                                                
160 See Case C-212/97 (n 109). See also 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index_en.htm>, the EU internal 
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162 Ibid. para 20.3. See also Southey v Sherwood and Others (1817) 2 Mer 435; Lawrence v 
Smith (1822) Jac 471. 
163 Spycatcher (n 45) 293 (Lord Jauncey). 
 
36 
to judicial discretion in accordance with the consideration of perceived public 
policy. Before 1988 – the year in which CDPA came into effect – there was no 
statutory public interest defence in English copyright law, and cases predating 
the 1988 Act relied on the common law doctrine of public policy. While the 
enactment of s 171(3) CDPA was not intended to make new law and, thus, 
allowed the public policy doctrine to be raised on a statutory basis, its scope is 
still incapable of precise definition and its application as a legal device to usurp 
statutory rights is still far from dependent on the legislative wordings, but 
rather the courts’ discretion. 164 Without a statutory basis, it has become 
uncertain in which circumstances the courts can invoke the public policy 
justifications to frustrate statutory copyright. 
2.5.1 UK cases on the grounds of public policy 
Hubbard v Vosper provides the first category of what could fall within the 
scope of public policy – ‘reprehensible nature of works’.165 This can be 
classified into two sub-categories; immoral and deceptive. 166  Spycatcher 
extended the scope to cover ‘reprehensible conduct’,167 and these categories are 
reflected in the structure of the following case law analysis. 
 Reprehensible nature of works – works offending public 2.5.1.1
sensibilities: immoral, irreligious and highly indecent 
Walcot v Walker, 168  Southey v Sherwood, 169  Murray v Benbow 170  and 
Lawrence v Smith171 
Lord Eldon, who provided judgments in all of these pioneering cases regarding 
public policy grounds, rendered the works at issue offensive to public 
sensitivities as the first two were libellous, and the others were irreligious.172 It 
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was also of his opinion that the dissemination of those types of works was 
liable to injure the public, and the works were of such a nature that the authors 
could maintain no legal action.173 In other words, his proposition implies that 
the author would have as much chance of success to retain his right to property 
on such works as ‘the proverbial snowball in hell’ and copyright protection is 
denied as such.174 
Stockdale v Onwhyn175 
The work in question – the memoirs of Harriette Wilson – depicted some 
lustful and immoral episodes from a prostitute’s life. The Court held that 
neither the printer nor the publisher of such work was entitled to any legal 
benefits, i.e. printing costs or damages caused by piracy, arising from copyright 
protection.176 This was because ‘the dissemination of such obscene work 
violated the law’.177 In this case, the Court seemed to tie copyrightability of 
creative works with morality, and based this concept on the so-called principle 
of unclean hands.178 
Glyn v Weston179 
The work in question was the novel Three Weeks by Eleanor Glyn. It was the 
story of young Englishman who had a clandestine affair for three weeks with 
the Ruritanian queen, who bore his child. After the murder of the queen, the 
king was assassinated, and the child became his successor. The claimant 
claimed interim injunction and damages on the ground that her literary work 
was substantially reproduced in a film called Pimple’s Three Weeks. The film 
was then commercialised by the defendant without authorisation. Younger J. 
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held that the ‘claimant’s novel representing free love and justified infidelity 
was of grossly immoral tendency and the film contained incidents of an 
indecently offensive character’.180 Therefore, neither of them was entitled to 
copyright protection.181 This case evidently endorses the proposition that the 
work’s reprehensible aspect deprives it from receiving any assistance of the 
courts. 
 Fraudulent works – extending public policy to cover 2.5.1.2
misrepresentation 
Wright v Tallis182 
This case concerns the religious book Evening Devotions, written by Christian 
Sturm, a German national. The argument arose between the claimant who sued 
for copyright infringement due to unauthorised copies, and the defendant who 
contended that the claimant deceived the public by fraudulent 
misrepresentation. In particular, he argued that the claimant intentionally 
misrepresented the book to be an original version by Sturm. Judgement was 
made for the defendant and the claimant’s claim of copyright piracy due to 
misrepresentation was dismissed. 183  The case extended the public policy 
justification to include misrepresenting or fraudulent works. 
This proposition was again manifest in Slingsby v Bradford,184 in which the 
Court rejected the claimant’s petition for equitable remedies conferred by 
copyright law, as ‘the work made false statements with an intention to deceive 
the public’.185 
 Reprehensible conduct – turpitude and iniquity 2.5.1.3
It was not until 1988 that the English courts were faced with the situation 
where, despite the acceptable nature of works, the author’s conduct was 
condemnable. 
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Spycatcher186 
This case involved a former British secret service officer, Peter Wright, who 
wrote the book Spycatcher, in which he revealed many events from his service 
which threatened national security. Although the confidentiality claim was 
frustrated due to the publication of the book in Scotland, Australia and 
elsewhere, the Court held that not only current employees, but also former 
employees of security services had a life-long duty of confidentiality owed to 
their employer, in this case the British government. This duty obliged them to 
keep matters regarding intelligence services in confidence.187 Hence, breach of 
such obligation would reek of turpitude, and thereby be contrary to public 
policy in preventing national security from harm. In such case, it would, as the 
court opined, be incomprehensible if the author or subsequent publishers were 
afforded ‘any protection in relation to any copyright which either of them may 
possess in the book’.188 
Despite an inapplicability of the breach of confidence claim, the Court had 
recourse to the equitable doctrine of public policy inherent in copyright law to 
maintain justice and fairness in favour of national interests. It therefore took 
the position that the author of copyrighted work was not entitled to any benefits 
under copyright law if their conduct was so reprehensible that it was likely to 
pose any threat or harm to national security, as to hold otherwise would have 
violated public policy. Unlike in Glyn v Weston, rather than the reprehensible 
nature of the work itself, it was the author’s reprehensible conduct regarding 
the acquisition of the information that precluded him from receiving any 
court’s assistance. Nevertheless, it was still unclear whether copyright in the 
work was totally denied or just unenforceable. 
A-G v Blake189 
Like the author of Spycatcher, Blake was a former British intelligence service 
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officer; he was later found to have been spying for the Soviet Union. After his 
escape from prison, he wrote a book narrating his treacherous activities against 
Britain which was published in many countries. The Attorney-General, acting 
as claimant on behalf of the government, firstly resorted to a claim of breach of 
the fiduciary duty to prevent him receiving any profits from his previous 
position. The claim was rejected by the court of first instance on the ground 
that the fiduciary duty only covered the employment period, not thereafter. 
The Court of Appeal had recourse to the public law approach with the aid of 
criminal law in holding that the author’s activity was contrary to public policy 
on the grounds that criminals should not benefit from their misconduct, 
including any form of profit resulting from writing a book.190 Again, this 
illustrates the situation where the Court sought to uphold justice by relying on 
the doctrine of public policy. 
ZYX Music v Chris King and Others191 
This case denotes an interesting exercise of the court’s discretion to 
dismiss copyright enforcement at the other end of the ‘immorality’ spectrum. 
The claimant sued for copyright infringement against the defendant who had 
copied his arrangement of a musical work. The defendant argued that in light 
of section 171(3) CDPA the claimant’s copyright should not be enforceable 
because he had committed a technical copyright infringement against the 
original song from which his arrangement derived. The defendant also 
contended that the decision of the House of Lords in Tinsley v Milligan 
suggested that ‘the court will not enforce transactions tainted by illegality’.192 
Lightman J. began his judgment by acknowledging that it is well-established 
that the Court may decline to grant relief awarded by copyright on public 
policy grounds when the work was ‘dishonest and misleading’,193 ‘grossly 
immoral’,194 ‘reeking of turpitude involving public interest in maintaining the 
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secret of security services’. 195  Yet, Lightman J. stated that it was also 
established in case law that the fact that the claimant’s work infringed 
copyright in another work may nonetheless not preclude him from enjoying his 
copyright. 196  In this regard, he viewed that the claimant’s technical 
infringement of the original author’s copyright was of incidental and innocent 
nature and there existed no sufficient basis to invoke the public policy grounds 
into play.197 He thus held that the claimant could not reasonably be debarred 
from enforcing his copyright i.e. injunction and damages, to restrain the 
defendant’s piracy.198 In other words, the claimant’s wrongdoing in this case 
did not reach the level of reprehensibility which would otherwise violate the 
public policy grounds and render his copyright unenforceable.199  
In brief, Lightman J was explicit in confirming the UK courts’ jurisdiction in 
applying the public policy grounds to copyright owner’s reprehensible 
conducts. In my view, nevertheless, it can be argued that, although the 
claimant’s infringing practice was accidental, he should still be condemned and 
deprived of some legal benefits. Lightman J, seemed to be lenient in having 
granted both injunctive and monetary reliefs to the claimant. Considering the 
claimant’s unclean hands, the judge could have applied the public policy 
grounds in determining what reliefs should or should not be made available to 
the reprehensible claimant. 
                                                
195 Ibid. 577, citing Spycatcher (No 2) (n 45) and Sa’id Mosteshar, Copinger and Skone James 
on Copyright (13th edn, International Bar Association 1992) paras 3.44-3.48. 
196 ZYX Music v King (n 51) 576, citing Redwood Music Ltd v Chappell & Co Ltd [1982] RPC 
109, 120; British Leyland Motor Crporation v Armstrong Patents Co Ltd [1982] FSR 481, 502. 
197 ZYX Music v King (n 51) 577. 
198 Ibid.   
199 See also the UK Court of Appeal’s judgment in a trademark case - The Football Association 
Premier League Ltd v Luxton [2016] EWCA Civ 1097, and the Supreme Court’s judgment in a 
copyright case - Oracle America Inc (formerly Sun Microsystems Inc) v M-Tech Data Ltd 
[2012] UKSC 27. Despite being misuse/competition cases and both deciding in favour of 
intellectual property rightsholders, the courts imply that there may exist a UK equivalent of the 
EU prohibition of abuse of rights and the US copyright misuse vis-à-vis enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, inter alia, in anti-competitive or abusive ways. Having observed 
the defendants’ reliance on the EU defences based on the EU anti-competition and free 
movement rules, judges in both cases had recognised that ‘in some circumstances an 
intellectual property right may become unenforceable because what lies behind it is an attempt 
to divide up the market in the EU contrary to the provisions on free movement’. However, 
sufficient connections between the exercise of the right and the allegedly unlawful attempt 
must be duly scrutinised and firmly established; otherwise, there is a risk of ‘litigation 
devaluing the enforcement of intellectual property rights’.   
 
42 
Hyde Park200 
This case concerns an argument between the claimant’s right to copyright 
protection and the media’s right to be exempted from infringing that copyright 
by claiming the common law defence of public interest.201 The claimant was 
the security company which owned the copyright to the videotape on which 
was recorded the visit of Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed to the Villa Windsor 
prior to their death. A set of printed photographs from the video was handed 
over to The Sun newspaper, which published them without authorisation. 
Of particular relevance to the public policy grounds was when Jacob J at first 
instance identified that the public interest defence raised by the defendant 
could be classified into two types. The first was of those recognising the 
defence as an exception to copyright infringement, which was applicable to 
this case. The other was of the so-called ‘public policy, which was a 
remarkable tool for the courts in appropriate circumstances to usurp statutory 
right given by the parliament’.202 Although these two equitable doctrines exist 
to serve disparate purposes with different characters,203 both are seen as 
judicial tools based on the same objective – safeguarding the interests of the 
public. As such, both are used to overrule copyright enforcement by ways of 
equipping the courts with the power to use the relevant remedies – monetary 
and injunctive relief. While the legislative authority of the former type of 
defence was denied in the Court of Appeal,204 Aldous LJ supported Jacob J’s 
proposition regarding the public policy grounds. He confirmed that English 
courts had ‘equitable inherent jurisdiction’ to refuse copyright enforcement on 
the grounds of public policy, where the work in question was immoral, 
scandalous or harmful to the public, security or justice system.205 Therefore, 
this case confirms the English courts’ discretionary power in having recourse 
to the content-based approach called public policy to refuse copyright 
enforcement when it is detrimental to public order and morality. 
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2.6 US copyright protection for obscene works 
A conflict between copyright protection and public morality in the context of 
obscenity has been an ongoing issue in many countries. 206  Despite no 
provisions in the US Constitution articulating the relationship between the two, 
US courts in the early 1960s first appeared to take a position that pornography 
was subject to censorship; thus, copyright protection would only be conferred 
to an author whose creative work was clear from obscene and indecent 
material.207 However, the judgment in Mitchell Brothers stipulated otherwise. 
The Court held that obscenity could not be used as a defence to a copyright 
infringement claim.208 This case was a starting point after which a flood of 
litigation regarding not only issues about defining obscene works, but also 
arguments about copyright in such works, have been brought before the US 
courts. 
2.6.1 Copyright protection to obscene works 
Martinetti v Maguire209 
This case lays down an adaptation of the ‘moral principle’ doctrine for dealing 
with copyright protection in obscene works.210 The work at issue, called Black 
Crook and owned by Maguire, was a notorious Broadway musical play and 
involved a number of scenes during which women removed their clothes.211 
Later, a forged version with identical scripts called Black Rook was created and 
sold to Martinetti. 
The Court had to decide which was more illegitimate: the forgery or the 
original. Although the court admitted that Maguire had the right to his original, 
an injunction against Black Rook was denied on the grounds that the story was 
                                                
206 Hong (n 52) 323-26. 
207 Schneider (n 176) 692. 
208 Mitchell Brothers Film Group v Cinema Adult Theater (1979) 604 F 2d 852, 863. 
209 Martinetti et al v Maguire et al (1867) 16 F Cas 920, 922. 
210 Kurt L Schmalz, ‘Recent Development: Problems in Giving Obscenity Copyright 
Protection: Did Jartech and Mitchell Brothers Go Too Far?’ (1983) 36 V and L Rev 403, 410. 211 Sid Venkatesan and Anthony Tartaglio, ‘Martinetti v. Maguire: The Sordid Story Behind 
One of Northern California’s First Reported IP Cases’ (Norcal IP Blog, 
1014)<http://blogs.orrick.com/norcal-ip/2014/01/27/martinetti-v-maguire-the-sordid-story-
behind-one-of-northern-californias-first-reported-ip-cases/ > accessed 15 September 2016. 
 
44 
considered ‘grossly indecent’ and corrupting to the morals of society and so he 
was not entitled to receive any benefits from the protection.212 The judge went 
on, stating that all courts had a duty to maintain public morality by way of 
discouraging the work which ‘neither promotes the progress of science nor the 
useful arts.’ 213  Therefore, it can be deduced that the court in this case 
recognised that the morality of the works was a prerequisite for granting 
copyright protection. 
Roth v United States214 
The US Supreme Court had ruled this milestone case on the relation between 
obscenity and the First Amendment protection of free speech. Samuel Roth 
was convicted for breach of the US federal law prohibiting the publishing, 
advertising, selling and mailing of obscene materials.215 What made this case 
interesting was the fact that the so-called ‘contemporary community standard’ 
test was introduced as a legal test for obscenity in the US.216 Justice Brennan 
established a criterion defining obscene works as materials whose ‘dominant 
themes taken as a whole appeal to the prurient interest to the average 
person’.217 
Although lack of social importance of obscene works did not seem to attract 
First Amendment protection, a distinction should be made between 
pornography and sex within art and literature.218 The latter aspect was not 
obscene per se, but inclusive of more social values,219 which implies that the 
threshold level of what constitutes obscenity is higher. In other words, artistic 
or literary works whose features are grossly immoral or explicitly sexual as 
described in Martinetti do not necessarily arouse the prurient interests of the 
average person. The constitutional significance of freedom of speech enables 
the judges to pay more respect to artistic, literary or scientific values of the 
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works, not focusing only on their unpleasant parts. This concept underpins the 
concept of ‘acceptable obscene works’. However, as this is not a copyright 
case, it remains unclear whether or not such work was copyrightable. 
Miller v California220 
Mr. Miller was involved in a pornographic mail-order business and later 
accused of violating Californian obscenity laws by mailing a brochure 
advertising his pornographic books and films. The question before the US 
Supreme Court was whether or not the distributed materials were protected by 
the First Amendment. In the ruling, the Court laid down certain criteria of the 
‘contemporary community standards’, which was left unclear in the previous 
case. The ruling reaffirmed that a demarcation between obscene and non-
obscene materials must be clearly established before deciding whether or not to 
grant legal protection permitted under the First Amendment.221 
In laying down the standards for determining what was obscene, the Court 
suggested two significant changes. Firstly, a test was adopted in lieu of the 
‘utterly without socially redeeming value’ test222 to redefine obscenity. It was 
also intended to give more account to materials that ‘had serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value’, notwithstanding the prurient content, and 
became known as the SLAPS test.223 Secondly, a one-for-all national standard 
was substituted by local community standards, simply because it would be 
unreasonable to apply one single rule to the entire US jurisdiction, where local 
perceptiveness towards obscenity were divergent.224 It should be up to each 
community to classify what appealed to prurient interest and, thereby was not 
entitled to legal protection. 
Again, although this is not a copyright case, the Court focused on the free 
speech elements in the materials at issue as the law must not curtail, generally 
speaking, an author’s right to freedom of speech because some of their 
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creations might contribute to scientific and artistic values. However, this 
individual’s freedom should not be afforded as much protection as that of the 
general public. The recognition of the value of free speech, particularly in 
relation to objectionable or immoral parts of the individual’s creations, should 
be subject to the public interest scrutiny as a matter of balance. Implicitly, the 
Supreme Court is seen to have upheld the concept of such balance by 
establishing that any material in its entirety ‘appealing to prurient interest of 
the average person’ without SLAPS values was considered obscene and, 
therefore not protected by the First Amendment. However, the question about 
the material found to be appealing to prurient interest, but having SLAPS 
value, still remained unanswered. 
Mitchell Brothers Film Group v Cinema Adult Theater225 
A copyright infringement suit was brought before the court by Mitchell 
Brothers group, the copyright owner. The defendant counterclaimed on the 
basis of the unclean hands doctrine and argued that the claimant’s work was 
obscene and thus barred from any remedies.226 After examining the film, the 
district court found the work obscene and subsequently refused to grant any 
remedies on the basis of the unclean hands doctrine.227 It held that copyright 
materials with immoral, fraudulent or misleading content caused injury to the 
public. The concept of public injury became the key to which the district court 
referred in invoking the doctrine of unclean hands against obscenity in this 
case.228 
Despite recognising the public injury caused, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with 
the district court’s refusal to grant copyright remedies. It observed that one way 
of exercising congressional power in promoting the progress of science and 
useful arts was to grant the protection to all works, regardless of their 
obscenity.229 Therefore, such refusal of copyright protection was contrary to 
the congressional and legislative purposes. 
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2.6.2 Summary 
The starting point for these decisions was the belief that copyrighting obscenity 
was a corruption of public morality. The criteria for what can be deemed 
obscene have been developed from grossly indecent and immoral to matter 
appealing to prurient interest. It was not until the 1970s that the importance of 
constitutional and statutory protection of the author’s free speech became well-
recognised and increasingly evident in the courts’ decisions. This raises 
another doubt as to whether copyright exists in obscene materials and, if so, 
how its enforcement should be controlled to satisfy all parties’ interests. This is 
another matter to be considered later. 
2.7 Summary of the substantive legal analysis 
Each of the case law analyses of the four public policy-related doctrines 
reflects public policy grounds in different ways, according to their prioritised 
domestic concerns. They illustrate divergent approaches in implementing the 
emergency brake to achieve the convergent end – putting some limits on the 
exercise of exclusive rights. The term public policy conveys two different, but 
related, dimensions – misuse and immorality. 
The misuse aspect is represented by the US doctrine of copyright misuse. This 
doctrine considers situations where rightsholders exercise their exclusive rights 
beyond those granted by copyright law as violating the public policy. Such 
situations include claims of copyright in anti-competitive manners, against fair 
use230 and in monopolistic manners causing abuse of process, although all 
aspects above primarily seek to prevent copyright monopoly. Public policy 
grounds in US copyright misuse serve to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, and such a purpose cannot be achieved by copyright monopoly, but 
a fair balance between statutory copyright and First Amendment protection. 
The EU doctrine of PAR also echoes the misuse aspect. Despite there being no 
specific doctrine dealing with the copyright regime,231 the role of PAR reflects 
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public policy performing its emergency brake function. This general doctrine 
allows national authorities to rectify situations where EU legal provisions are 
abusively exercised for the sole aim of either circumventing national rules or 
obtaining personal benefits contrary to the purpose of law. The finding of such 
abuse is based on the conditions that the objective and subjective standards are 
met. National autonomy in resorting to such public policy doctrine is not 
absolute, but contingent on the effectiveness of EU law’s objectives concerning 
the forming of the EU single market. In other words, not every circumvention 
gives rise to the abuse; only those conducted with the ‘whole artificial 
arrangement’ without seeking to fulfil the EU law’s objectives to any extent. 
The UK public policy doctrine is a prominent illustration of the public policy’s 
immorality aspect. The doctrine is based on the proposition that there is public 
interest in protecting society from harm caused by the exercise of copyright. 
The case law analysis reveals that the UK courts have resorted to the doctrine 
when they render the work per se or the manner in which the work is created as 
reprehensible. The work is of reprehensible nature when it is immoral to public 
sensibilities, obscene, deceptive or harmful to national security, and the latter 
ground consists of situations where the authors’ behaviour or the circumstances 
surrounding production or publication reek of iniquity. In both cases, adopting 
the public policy doctrine is justified on the grounds that any copyright works 
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or conducts harming the public need to be suppressed for the sake of public 
interest. 
In addition to the copyright misuse, there is a non-statutory defence to 
copyright infringement based on obscenity in the US copyright system. Its role 
denotes the immorality sense of public policy grounds. Regardless of how this 
doctrine operates against copyright enforcement, the doctrine’s rationale 
echoes that of the UK’s public policy doctrine – protecting the public from any 
harm caused by reprehensible nature of obscene materials. As for the criteria, 
the case law analysis illustrates that the work is deemed obscene if it appeals to 
the prurient interest of the average person without the work having serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific (SLAPS) values attached. As compared 
to the UK approach, however, the criteria adopted by the US courts notably 
requires a higher threshold in defining obscenity, in the sense that grossly 
indecent or immoral nature of obscenity does not necessarily appeal to the 
prurient interest of all people. This might be an effect of the increasing 
importance of the creative and constitutional free speech values in some types 
of obscene materials in light of the First Amendment protection. 
2.8 Concern of public policy grounds 
Having established what can fall within the ambit of public policy grounds in 
different jurisdictions, attention will now be drawn to the question of its legal 
operations in copyright subsistence, enforceability and remedies. This section 
will examine the operations and subsequent effects of each doctrine to 
determine the most appropriate approach for public policy doctrines operating 
against copyright protection. 
Generally speaking, there are two principal theories which underpin grant of 
copyright protection: economic incentive and natural right.232 Both seek to 
promote wider dissemination of intellectual works for the public interest.233 
The restrictive limitations to copyright operate to protect the public from 
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harmful creations.234 It is this proposition that the public policy takes in the 
proposed public interest defence. Of particular concern is how such a 
restrictive role of public policy grounds operates to deal with copyright 
subsistence and existing remedies. 
2.8.1 Legal operations in different public policy-related doctrines235 
 The UK  2.8.1.1
The UK approach delineates the deprivation of copyright subsistence in the 
protected works deemed contrary to public policy. ‘There is a strong line of 
authority in the UK supporting the proposition’. 236  One of the leading 
authorities of this approach is Glyn v Weston.237 The work in debate was a 
novel authored in a way that could have misrepresented to the public, 
particularly young ladies, that an easy life of sin and debauchery can be 
pursued without causing harm to others. The Court opined that ‘copyright 
cannot exist in a work of grossly immoral or indecently offensive tendency’ 
and in such case ‘the claimant was entirely debarred from obtaining any relief 
in this Court’. 238 It further explained that such precluded relief included 
damages, account of profits or any legal protection to which the author was 
entitled with respect to copyright infringement claim. 
This approach was later supported by the majority of House of Lords in 
Spycatcher.239 The Court held that, in appropriate circumstances, the courts had 
discretion to deny copyright subsistence to works containing deceiving 
statements240 or grossly immoral tendency,241 as they were against public 
policy.242 In particular, Lord Keith shared Lord Jauncey’s viewpoint that ‘it 
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was inconceivable that a UK court would afford to authors or publishers any 
protection in relation to any copyright which either of them may possess in the 
book’ made in breach of the duty of confidence.243 Both Lords Brightman and 
Griffiths rejected the suggestion that the author owned copyright in the 
book.244 
Jacob J in Hyde Park accepted that the UK courts had discretionary power or 
the so-called public policy grounds to usurp what has been given by 
Parliament.245 This means that such grounds can, in extreme circumstances, be 
used to entirely deny copyright. On appeal, Aldous LJ supported Jacob J by 
elaborating that the circumstance referred to arose where the copyrighted work 
causes prejudice to principles of public order (illegal works) and morality 
(immoral works).246 The courts in such a case would thus have inherent 
jurisdiction to give no legal protection to them.247 As can be seen, the UK 
judges tended to play a morality-safeguarding role in denying copyright 
subsistence in the work deemed contrary to public policy. They relied on the 
ground that any legal benefits arising from tainted works were also tainted and, 
thereby, regarded as fruit of the poisonous tree.248 By analogy, it would be 
incomprehensible to afford criminals any legal benefits arising from their 
crimes. 
However, there were some intriguing obiter dicta that casted doubt on this 
approach. Although Lord Eldon refused to grant an injunction to stop further 
publication of a book of a seditious nature called Wat Taylor, he admitted that 
the denial approach may conflict with the policy of law.249 He explained that in 
some circumstances the denial could lead to an increasing number of copies of 
such harmful work.250 Similarly, Abbot CJ argued that copyright law did not 
intend to encourage the dissemination of highly indecent works or to allow 
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free-riders to do so and, thus, opined that an injunction should be granted to 
restrain any further pirated publication.251 In brief, despite the majority of UK 
judges upholding the denial approach, Lord Eldon and Abbot CJ’s opinions 
expressed concerns about the operations and the aftermaths of such approach 
and, thus, called for careful considerations on copyright subsistence and 
enforceable remedies and on a need to safeguard the public from harm. 
 The US 2.8.1.2
In the US copyright regime, two very different approaches have been adopted 
to deal with obscenity. Most early cases took the denial approach to refuse 
copyright subsistence in obscene materials until the 1970s. Thereafter, the so-
called ‘content-neutral approach was adopted to ensure enforceability of 
copyright and all existing remedies of the qualified works regardless of their 
contents. 
Denial approach through an assertion of public moral defence 
Under this approach, the courts’ rationale in rejecting copyright protection in 
obscene materials is underpinned by various theories. Having originated from 
the English case of Walcot v Walker,252 ‘the general moral principle’ was the 
first theory to which the judge in Martinetti v Maguire resorted in dismissing 
injunctive relief claimed by both parties against the other. The court began its 
ruling by finding that the works at issue were of immoral and indecent 
character; as such, neither of them contributed to any scientific or artistic 
progress to the public. In other words, they did not reach the level at which 
they could be deemed to have sufficient literary character to be protected by 
law. The courts were bound to safeguard public interest by repulsing whatever 
had tendency to undermine it.253 The fundamental premise underlying this 
judgment was that the US Congress was empowered to legislate copyright law 
to ‘promote the progress of science and useful arts’254 and: 
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‘Such constitutional clause does not seem to authorise the 
protection of work which is grossly indecent, calculated to 
corrupt the morals of the people or designed to facilitate the 
commission of crime’.255 
Judge Martin in Devils Films v Nectar held that videos at issue depicting 
lesbian and trans-sexual matters were clearly obscene materials and thereby 
uncopyrightable.256 In doing so, he re-affirmed the proposition laid down in 
Bullard v Esper257 that no court would use its equitable power to assist a 
claimant whose hands were unclean. Hence, this case indicates an invocation 
of a moral-based equitable defence in the form of the unclean hands principle 
for denying copyright in obscene materials as it was harmful to public morality 
and contrary to the purpose of copyright under the US Constitution. 
Content-neutral approach – at the other end of the operation spectrum 
In Mitchell Brothers,258 there was an essential shift in the way the US courts 
coped with an issue regarding copyright in obscene materials. The Fifth Circuit 
based its decision on grounds very different to the denial approach, finding that 
the district court erred in recognising obscenity as an affirmative defence to 
copyright infringement.259 In deciding that obscenity was not excluded from 
copyright protection and subsequent remedies, the court justified its 
proposition with three reasons. Firstly, as far as the language expressed in the 
copyright statute was concerned, there was nothing suggesting that obscene 
works were any less entitled to copyright protection than other content. 
Secondly, the court held that, absent any specific statutory language, it was the 
legislature’s intention to leave all works equally protected. Thirdly, the 
constitutional protection of original creations as ‘free speech’ took precedence 
over moral values. 
The court went on, enumerating some drawbacks in support of its opposition to 
a defence based on obscenity: 
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1. legal uncertainty due to ever-changing moral standards; 
2. non-uniform local standards on what is regarded as obscene; 
and 
3. lack of authority and judicial grounds in implementing the 
doctrines of public morality, 260  no-property 261  and unclean 
hands.262 
The judgment provides the US mainstream viewpoint on the clash between 
copyright and moral values, and it took a completely different stance from its 
UK counterpart. 
This precedent was followed by the Ninth Circuit in Jartech Inc v Clancy,263 
when the Court refused to accept the defence of obscenity by the defendant, 
who had allegedly reproduced the claimant’s adult movies. The Court 
emphasised that original works, notwithstanding being characterised as 
‘obscene or illegal’, could still be entitled to copyright protection.264 It was 
confirmed that copyright protection should be available to obscene works, 
regardless of any morality breach. 
The shift from denial to a content-neutral approach has some implications. 
First of all, it reflects the way public perception towards immorality changes 
over time.265 Hard-core pornography, for instance, may not undermine the 
moral values as severely as it did prior to the emergence of the pornography 
industry.266 Also, an objection to the defence implies that under the US regime, 
statutorily constitutional copyright protection is best served by avoiding 
content restriction and ‘allowing all creative works to be accorded copyright 
protection regardless of subject matter or content’; its importance somehow 
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prevails over moral virtues.267 This may be incidental to, not only artistic and 
intellectual importance, but also the economic value inherent in obscene 
material which has increasingly been accepted. However, despite having been 
recognised as the mainstream approach in the US copyright regime, the 
extreme operation of this content-neutral approach in granting the full extent of 
copyright privileges denotes that the question of moral values or public injury 
is still left unresolved. 
 The US Copyright misuse doctrine 2.8.1.3
Under the US copyright system, the judge-made copyright misuse doctrine can 
be invoked as an equitable defence to copyright infringement if a rightsholder 
is engaged in any misconduct in the course of exercising his exclusive rights. 
Having established what constitutes copyright misuse, this section will 
consider how the doctrine operates to cope with copyright enforcement and 
relevant remedies in relation to the work at issue during the misuse period. 
Unlike the two doctrines which, in their operations, reflect two different 
extreme approaches, the operation of this misuse doctrine focuses on what 
should happen with the remedies available to the rightsholders during the 
misuse. In particular, it considers the temporary transformation of property 
right in copyrighted works into a liability right when the misuse occurs. The 
proposition behind this transformation is that, while an injunction to stop 
further copyright misuse is still granted as a matter of routine, it seems 
undesirable for the courts to afford to the rightsholder during the misuse period 
as much legal benefit under copyright protection as is conferred during the no-
misuse period.268 The concept of liability rules deals with remedies granted to 
the rightsholder in the protection period, misuse period, post-misuse period and 
post-protection period.269 It provides flexibility in allowing different rules to 
govern different circumstances in which legal rights are affected. It employs 
the property rules to cover the protection period, and the zero-liability rules to 
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govern the post-protection period, with the purpose of avoiding all-or-nothing 
decisions. It also aims to ensure that the beginning and the end of copyright 
protection spectrum are not left unregulated.270 Nevertheless, with respect to 
the misuse and post-misuse period, there is debate over whether the liability 
rules, borrowed from the doctrine of patent misuse,271 can be implemented to 
govern those periods. The issue becomes more complicated when it involves 
the questions of free-riding activities and market competition. To address these 
issues, there are two different approaches, the Liability and Napster rules. 
Liability rules 
This approach was proposed by Judge Kozinki and subsequently recognised as 
a dominant rule applying in copyright misuse cases.272 The scope of its 
operation is closely associated with the creation of derivative works. The 
operation provides protective measures to the economic interests of copyright 
holders and the public interest in engaging in free expression.273 In the period 
of misuse, this approach employs the rule of zero liability as ‘no party would 
have any right to compensation for infringement that occurs during such a 
period’.274 This implies that a claimant who misuses their exclusive rights 
cannot enforce such rights and subsequent remedies. Others are allowed to use 
the claimant’s work freely to promote free expression. In the post-misuse 
period, it safeguards the rightsholder’s economic interests by allowing the 
claimant to claim compensation for any damage that occurred after the 
elimination of misuse. This approach means that the courts render copyright 
and available remedies unenforceable during the misuse period until such 
period is ended, after which they become enforceable again. 
However, the operation during the misuse period does not provide the outcome 
which copyright law, copyright misuse and competition rules seek to achieve. 
Unrecoverable damages during the misuse period fails to satisfy copyright’s 
purpose to reward the author’s creativity. Second, the misuse defence is not 
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designed to leave a free-of-charge loop during the misuse period to incentivise 
further misuse of copyright by free-riders. Third, fair competition in the market 
cannot be achieved by allowing those free-riders to exploit the work without 
any production costs, to the detriment to their competitors. All these concerns 
may be solved by the approach proposed in Napster. 
Napster approach 
In Napster,275 the liability rules were replaced with the so-called deferred rules 
to solve the concerns addressed above. In this case, the copyright misuse 
defence was raised by the defendant, an internet service facilitator called 
Napster, against copyright infringement suits. It was held that the record 
companies misused their copyright in preventing Napster from entering into 
licensing agreements, which constituted anti-competitive activities. 276 
Nevertheless, the point was made about the rightsholder’s ability to recover the 
remedies during the misuse period, and that the main operation of the doctrine 
was intended to suspend the right to recover, not to totally deny it.277 It was 
also stressed that the monetary remedy should be retrospectively retrievable as 
it provided desirable outcomes. Firstly, the rightsholder would be incentivised 
to end the misuse activities as soon as possible in order to recover the benefits 
they should have obtained had copyright misuse not occurred. Thus, the 
copyright’s purpose in rewarding the author for their intellectual creation is 
guaranteed. Secondly, the idea that all damages and profits occurred are 
recoverable by the rightsholder after the end of the misuse period would 
impose liability to pay for remedies against free-riders or infringers. This 
would accordingly discourage them from engaging in any further infringement. 
This concept, along with the availability of injunctive relief, satisfies the 
purpose of the doctrine to put an end to copyright misuse. Thirdly, the 
disincentive to free-riding activities leads to a protection of the rightsholder’s 
competitors in the market, who may suffer from the substitution effect. This 
approach helps restore a fair competitive condition in the market whereby the 
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misused work is less likely to be freely consumed as a substitution product.278 
Essentially, merely because the rightsholder is temporarily not eligible for 
copyright enforcement does not automatically allow others to take advantage 
of the situation. 
A major difference between the two approaches is the monetary remedy 
available to rightsholders. Under the Napster approach, such a remedy can be 
retrospectively retrievable even from the misuse period. The rationale behind 
this deferred rule is that there should be a fair balance between safeguarding 
the public policy and ensuring availability of economic incentives to 
rightsholders. Leaving copyright and remedies unenforceable during the 
misuse period may otherwise undermine such balance. 
 The prohibition of abuse of rights in EU law 2.8.1.4
Having considered the far-reaching scope of PAR, its legal operation varies 
according to the area of law to which it is applied. Although there is a lack of 
legal precedent in EU copyright law, the operation of this doctrine on other 
areas of EU law can also be applied to copyright cases in the future. 
In general, when the exercise of EU legal rights is found abusive, the doctrine 
operates to retract legal benefits conferred by the abused rights to the 
rightsholder.279 However, as the application of this doctrine has an impact on 
the way in which legal rights protected under EU law is exercised,280 whether 
the rights abused fall within the scope of EU law, and what remedies are 
available during the abuse and post-abuse period are matters to be clarified. 
Pre-emption approach: a replica of denial approach 
Most early cases suggest the adoption of the classic approach, in which PAR 
operates as a pre-emption in determining the scope of EU law281 as the ECJ 
renders an abuse of EU legal right as outside the scope of EU law. 
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In the area of free movement of goods, two cases are of particular relevance. 
The first case, Leclerc,282 concerned the exercise of the publisher’s right to 
artificially export books to another member state for the sole purpose of re-
importing them. The activity was intended to avoid the restrictive national 
requirement of fixed retail price. French law No 81-766 of 10 August 1981 
provides that ‘all publishers or importers of books are required to fix a retail 
selling price for the books that they publish or import’, but this national 
requirement has no effect on the export of books to other member states. 
Leclerc claimed his EU right for free movement of goods to export books 
published in France to another member state and re-import. As they would be 
considered as exported books, they would not be subject to the domestic retail 
price-fixing requirement. Before the actual ruling, the ECJ differentiated two 
following situations in question: 
‘first, that of books published in another member state and 
imported into the member state concerned and, secondly, that of 
books published in the member state concerned and re-
imported, following exportation to another member state’.283 
The ECJ was aware that the French retail price-fixing requirement could 
undermine the legitimacy of the EU right claimed ‘unless it is established that 
those books were exported for the sole purpose of re-importation to circumvent 
the legislation in question’.284 It ruled that the publisher’s practice at issue was 
contrary to the purpose of free movement of goods and thereby constituted an 
abuse of the EU right, and observed that EU law did not intend to regard such 
intended circumvention conduct as falling within its EU scope.285 
The language used in the ruling by no means delivered a sufficiently clear 
answer as to whether the ECJ denied the availability of such right to the 
rightsholder, and this went unresolved until General Milk.286 General Milk 
Products GmbH was a company marketing the dairy products of New Zealand 
in Europe. They brought the case before the ECJ against the ruling given by the 
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German Customs Office in refusing compensation.287 The company argued 
that, as its imports were not subject to minimum rules or negative 
compensatory amounts, the monetary grant conferred by the EU regulations 
should be applied to its exports. Dismissing the company’s argument, the ECJ 
deemed the import and re-exportation of the products as bogus and intended to 
exploit the EU regulations for benefits derived from the compensatory grant. It 
further established the general proposition that the traders of any goods who 
engaged in any business activities which cannot be recognised as anything 
based on bona fide behaviour were not embraced by the scope of EU law.288 
In the area of free movement of persons, Liar was a French worker who 
exercised her EU right to freedom of movement to enter into Germany with the 
sole intention of benefiting from the student assistance system.289 She was later 
refused any benefits arising from the claimed EU right since her abusive 
conduct ‘[was] not covered by the Community provisions in question’.290 The 
ECJ based its decision on the grounds that the freedom of movement was not 
unconditionally granted to all the member states’ nationals; in fact, any 
purposes other than facilitating the mobility of workers within the Community 
were not those for which such freedom was designed.291 The fact that the 
claimant undertook studies and sought student assistance took away her status 
as a worker. Accordingly, this led to the situation where she lost the right of 
free movement guaranteed by the EU law.292 
This pre-emptive operation of PAR is similar to the UK denial approach. It 
requires that both subsistence and enforcement of the right being abused are 
denied, since allowing them would otherwise be beyond the scope of the law 
and contrary to the public policy. 
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Justification approach: justifying the subsistence of EU rights during 
abuse period 
The ECJ has recently changed its position to endorse the justification approach, 
particularly in cases concerning freedom of establishment and direct taxation 
beginning with Centros293 which concerned an abuse of the right to freedom of 
establishment by a Danish national who established his business in the UK 
solely for the purpose of evading Danish rules on minimum share capital 
requirement.294 The ECJ set out the distinction between the scope of freedom 
of establishment and the Danish law to combat an attempted circumvention of 
national requirements,295 and the grounds under which an abusive practice can 
fall within the scope of EU law. Whether or not the anti-abuse measure 
imposed by national authorities was sufficiently justified and proportionate to 
undermine the EU principles was another question.296 
The concept was later clarified in Inspire Art297 which involved a clash 
between the EU right to freedom of establishment and Dutch rules on foreign 
companies. A Dutch national claimed his EU right to freedom of establishment 
to establish Inspire Art as a company under English law. The fact that the 
company performed its main business activities exclusively in the Netherlands 
suggests that the freedom was claimed to enjoy the benefits of the more 
favourable rules regarding disclosure obligations.298 Referring to Centros, the 
ECJ held that the fact that the company was formed under UK law for the 
purpose of circumventing the stricter Dutch company law did not prevent the 
claimant from exercising his right to freedom of establishment,299 and the 
request for its branch’s registry in the Netherlands was still permissible under 
EU law.300 What became prominent in this case was when the ECJ set out the 
three-step criteria for resolving the conflict between the application of EU 
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provisions and national anti-abuse measures. The ECJ emphasised that the first 
step was the determination of the scope of the EU provision in question. Then, 
the consideration of the legal reasoning for imposing national anti-abuse 
restrictions on such EU freedom would follow. Third, examination of whether 
such legal reasoning was sufficiently justified to override the importance of EU 
law took place. 
The justification approach provides that, despite the finding of an abuse of 
rights conferred by EU law, such rights are still exercisable within the scope of 
EU law, assuming the conditions are met. However, questions about its 
enforceability and remedies during the abuse and post-abuse period are still 
unexplained. 
Justification approach: justifying recoverable benefit during the abuse 
period 
In Halifax,301 an interesting point was made in relation to the benefits conferred 
by the EU right at issue. The debate was raised by the UK banking company, 
which relied on the right conferred by the Sixth Council Directive to deduct 
input VAT. In doing so, some artificial transactions were created with the sole 
purpose of avoiding VAT liability. 302  The ECJ ruled that the abusive 
transactions must be removed to ‘re-establish the situation that would have 
prevailed in the absence of such abuse’,303 and suggested two ways of restoring 
the normal situation. The ECJ could order Halifax to retrospectively repay the 
amounts of VAT deducted from each transaction abusively made, or: 
‘it must allow Halifax as a taxable person who, in an absence of 
transactions constituting an abusive practice, would have 
benefited from the first transaction not constituting such a 
practice, to deduct, under the deduction rules of the Sixth 
Directive, the VAT on that input transaction.’304 
Under the latter option there exists, by analogy, similarity between the legal 
operations under this approach and those of Napster (remedial) approach. Both 
agree on allowing individuals to benefit from recoverable monetary relief after 
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the purge of abusive or misuse practices, and so by extrapolation the 
justification approach is applicable in the context of abuse of EU copyright. Its 
legal operation means that, first, copyright exists in the work insofar as it is 
original and satisfactory of all relevant requirements, and second that legal 
benefits conferred by the EU right, particularly in terms of monetary remedy, 
can be retrospectively recovered when the abuse is ended. Having adopted this 
approach, the ECJ attempted to strike a balance between permitting national 
autonomy to protect public policy and safeguarding the importance of the EU 
legal regime. 
2.8.2 The proposed remedial approach applicable to all doctrines 
As far as legal operations of the four doctrines are concerned, there are two 
types of operations – the denial and remedial approaches305 – employed along 
with the implementation of each doctrine. The term ‘denial’ denotes the 
situation where the public policy-based doctrines operate to deny copyright 
existence and enforcement. The use of this uncompromising term had emerged 
in the UK jurisprudence within the context of its public policy doctrine 
operations, with the claimed objective of protecting society from immorality or 
indecency caused by the nature of the works or circumstances surrounding 
them.306 In such circumstances, it would be inconceivable for the court to 
afford the authors or publishers any damages, account of profits or any legal 
protection. 
This approach appears in the US copyright regime in the form of the public 
moral defence.307 It operates to deny copyright protection to obscene material 
based on the proposition that the US Constitution was not intended to protect 
nor confer copyrightability to works that contribute little scientific or artistic 
value, some of which include obscene, immoral and indecent works.  
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In the context of the US copyright misuse, the concept of liability rules also 
reflects how the denial approach operates. After the finding of misuse 
behaviour, it replaces the property rules to render copyright and existing 
remedies unenforceable. This is based on the grounds that no one could claim 
any compensation arising out of the misused right during such period. 
As for the doctrine of PAR under the EU legal regime, the ECJ seems to mirror 
the operations of the denial approach through the so-called pre-emption 
approach. In general, the scope of EU law does not intend to cover abusive 
conduct, particularly when the exercise of EU rights involves circumvention of 
national laws or activities contrary to the purposes of EU provisions. This 
approach operates to pre-empt further abusive conducts and refuse to grant any 
benefits to the rightsholder. The pre-emption approach confirms that neither 
the right in question nor remedies are enforceable after the finding of abuse. 
Having summarised the operations of the denial approach that appear in 
different jurisdictions, one may find it justifiable to punish the rightsholder 
through deprivation of the rights and remedies arising in connection with his 
reprehensible works or conduct. However, it may be too harsh to resort to those 
non-statutory doctrines to sabotage statutory copyright, as copyright’s purpose 
in rewarding the author’s creations by grants of exclusive rights will be 
significantly undermined. Furthermore, recognising copyright works as 
protected creative expression, the granted exclusive rights can also be seen as 
guaranteeing the rightsholder’s freedom to enjoy his expression. Therefore, to 
entirely strip him of such freedom by adopting the denial approach would be 
contrary to the fundamental principle of human rights and would trigger much 
debate about the legitimacy of the public policy ground.308 Another concern is 
that denying enforceability of injunctive and monetary relief in relation to 
reprehensible works may encourage free-riding and public injury. Thirdly, such 
free-riding activities in connection with the harmful works may also have a 
detrimental effect on substitution products in competitive markets and 
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competitors, particularly in the light of the misuse-related doctrines. None of 
these outcomes reflects the purposes pursued by the public policy-related 
doctrines, but these concerns can be resolved through the proposed adoption of 
the remedial approach. 
 The remedial approach 2.8.2.1
The term ‘remedial’ is borrowed from the Canadian copyright case, Aldrich v 
One Stop Video309 which concerned a defendant who allegedly copied obscene 
films and videotapes without the claimant’s permission. Although the Court 
admitted that there was no such statutory ground giving it the power to deny 
copyright to obscene materials, it was not precluded from the right to enforce 
or refuse existing remedies derived from such privileges.310 The Court ruled 
that an injunction should be granted to suppress the piracy of such harmful 
work and that monetary relief should not be available during the reprehensible 
period, but recoverable thereafter. Interestingly, this proposition is implicitly 
supported by the UK passing-off case of McDonald's Hamburgers Limited v 
Burgerking (UK) Limited,311 where it was held that a grant of injunction did 
not necessarily establish an automatic award of damages. In fact, ‘the court had 
discretion to refuse an enquiry if it was satisfied that such an enquiry would be 
fruitless’.312 It is perhaps the importance of public morality and copyright value 
that underpin this standpoint. 
By taking this Canadian judgment as an elucidatory prototype of the remedial 
approach, some doctrines have given a hint of, or even adopted, parallel 
approaches in coping with undesirable operation of public policy grounds. 
Despite no explicit explanation of the remedial approach being found in UK 
copyright case law, it was tacitly introduced through obiter dicta with the 
realisation that the denying copyright subsistence in an immoral work may 
increase its infringing copies and, as such, constitute public injury. 
As in the UK, there is no judicial precedent advocating the remedial approach 
                                                
309 Aldrich v One Stop Video Ltd (1987) 17 CPR (3d) 27. See also Pasickniack v Dojacek 
[1928] 2 DLR 545, [1923-28] MCC 423 (Can). 
310 Aldrich v One Stop Video (n 286) [56]-[60]. 
311 [1987] FSR [112], [113] (CA). 
312 Ibid. 
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in the area of US copyright protection of obscene works. However, the 
rationales behind the adoption of the content-neutral approach appear to 
provide implicit support to the remedial approach, and the statutory status of 
copyright and its artistic, intellectual and economic values should also be borne 
in mind when weighing them against public virtues. 
The justification approach adopted by the ECJ in cases concerning PAR is also 
reflective of the remedial approach. This is manifest in its operation, in which 
the finding of abuse does not take away the subsistence of EU rights, provided 
that certain conditions are satisfied. The doctrine also operates to ensure 
recoverable legal benefits as a matter of restoring the normal situation that 
would otherwise have occurred without the abusive practices. 
The Napster approach concerning US copyright misuse is a facsimile of the 
remedial approach. Although each represents different facets of public policy 
grounds, they take a similar viewpoint that copyright still exists in the works 
regardless of violation of public policy. This is seen as a way to keep injunctive 
and monetary remedies enforceable where necessary. 
 Operation against immorality 2.8.2.2
Once the use of copyright is found in violation of public policy, particularly in 
the immorality sense, the remedial approach will operate to allow copyright to 
subsist and remedies to be available for the following reasons. 
Copyright subsistence 
As for the doctrines reflecting the immorality aspect of public policy, the 
operation that allows for copyright subsistence helps minimise the risk that the 
doctrines would subvert statutory copyright protection and helps the law 
develop in parallel with ever-changing public moral values. Providing its 
reprehensible character has been removed or has become acceptable to the 
public, a work that was once contrary to public policy can be republished and 
the author will again be entitled to all enforceable remedies conferred. This 
will help fulfil the underlying copyright’s objective of awarding limited 
privileges to the author. 
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Available injunction 
The grant of an injunction is necessary when the situation concerns claims of 
copyright protection for what can be described as immoral or reprehensible 
works. In such a situation, an enforceable injunction will function to prevent 
further dissemination of the work to the public and deter the proliferation of 
pirating or free-riding activities. As the public policy grounds aim to protect 
the public from harm, the availability of injunctive relief helps provide 
desirable outcomes. 
Although the merits of injunctions against immoral works are important, there 
appears to be a growing concern raised by indecent activities captured on live 
video-streaming platforms such as Facebook live and Periscope, which demand 
swift legal responses from many areas of law, including copyright. The live-
streaming of videos showing, for example, people being murdered by 
extremists has reflected both a legal and an ethical dilemma generated by users 
of this type of service. The service enables anyone to broadcast any events live 
using their smartphones, and thereby creates newsworthy internet content. 
However, it also allows violent and disturbing content to continue undermining 
public values on an unprecedented scale. 
While there are other rules governing the showing of this content and obliging 
the service providers to comply with standard terms of service,313 copyright 
could also play an important role in scenarios in which those violence-
aggravating contents generated live by users qualify as individuals’ own 
original creations and are thereby copyright protected.314 In fact, the afore-
mentioned ‘emergency brake’ function of the public policy doctrine that equips 
courts with the power to impose an injunction against objectionable materials 
                                                
313 Especially those regarding privacy, confidence and defamation standards. See Periscope’s 
terms of service in <https://www.periscope.tv/tos> and Facebook’s in 
<https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms>. 
314 See brief explanations of copyright’s eligible subject-matter requirements in light of user-
generated content in Will Clark, ‘Copyright, Ownership, and Control of User-Generated 
Content on Social Media Websites’ (2009) 
<http://www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/papers%202009%20fall/Jerry%20clark%20fi
nal%20Copyright,%20Ownership,%20and%20Control%20of%20User-
Generated%20Content%20on%20Social%20Media%20Websites.pdf> accessed 1 September 
2017. 
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will not only prevent other users from sharing the violent content online, it will 
also provide a legitimate basis for which live-streaming service providers are 
required to have proper policing and filtering mechanisms in place. The 
doctrine should also allow the providers to take further steps in developing 
more immediate and proactive injunctive measures than those available to 
traditional broadcasters to pre-empt such a public threat. While traditional 
broadcasters are highly regulated and typically subject to licence conditions to 
use mechanisms when live broadcasting such as a short delay in their 
broadcasts, during which the authority can block or cut away the problematic 
parts, a live-streaming service has no such ‘red-button’ facility. Since 
Facebook does not yet have plans in place to algorithmically filter out nudity 
and violence, it is largely counting on its own users to report objectionable 
content to trigger a review and take-down process.315 
Available monetary relief or damages 
This component is of particular importance in the remedial approach where its 
ex post facto recoverable character helps restore the normal situation and helps 
fulfil the underlying objectives of copyright law and public policy grounds. 
Firstly, the rightsholders would be incentivised to remove reprehensible 
elements from their creative works to be able to recover damages they should 
otherwise have obtained in normal situations. Secondly, retrospectively 
retrievable damages would caution prospective free-riders not to engage in any 
further infringing activities because they would have to reconsider damages 
and profits arising in the frozen period, to which they would be liable once the 
author becomes entitled to them again after the purge of reprehensible 
elements. 
 Operation against misuse 2.8.2.3
In addition to the merits of the remedial approach’s operation in the context of 
immorality, there are some other benefits to be considered in the context of 
                                                
315 Steve Masters, ‘Live Video and the Law – What You Need to Know’ (2016) 
<https://www.vertical-leap.uk/blog/live-video-and-the-law/> accessed 1 September 2017; 
Jacob Brogan, ‘Facebook Live’s Big Problem Isn’t Porn. It’s Copyright’ (2016) 
<http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2016/04/12/facebook_live_video_has_a_problem_w
ith_copyright_not_porn_despite_rights.html> accessed 1 September 2017. 
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copyright misuse. With respect to the injunctive relief, not only is it granted to 
protect the public from further harmful publication of the work, but also to put 
an end to abusive manner under which copyright is exercised, i.e. anti-
competitive licensing agreements or copyright monopoly. In regard to 
retrospectively recoverable damages, this would pre-empt the subversive effect 
of substitution products caused by an inability to retrieve any damages arising 
during the misuse period. In essence, such inability may adversely increase a 
number of free-riders and customers who can freely use the product without 
any liability. Due to the low cost, they would in turn substitute such product for 
other copyright products in the competitive market. Making the remedies 
recoverable during the misuse or abuse period will therefore protect the 
competitors in relevant market from unfair competition caused by such 
substitution effect. 
These nuances can be justified by the two different, but related, tasks of public 
policy prioritising different matters in different jurisdictions. The doctrines 
reflecting the immorality aspect place their focus on the public liability to 
which copyright should have regard. The doctrines representing the misuse 
aspect are more engaged in the situation where exclusive rights are claimed 
beyond the granted scope primarily for commercial benefits. Therefore, the 
finding of misuse or abuse is sometimes justified by the competition rules, 
instead of morality rules. 
The shift from the denial approach to the remedial approach in terms of its 
legal operation might stem from an attempt to diminish the likelihood that 
public policy grounds would operate to cause prejudice to statutory law 
because, ultimately, the paramount objective of copyright law lies in a fair 
balance between rewarding short-term copyright monopoly to the author and 
safeguarding the long-term public interest by limiting such monopoly within an 
appropriate level. 
2.9 Conclusion 
Different forms of limitations to copyright are designed to balance the 
copyright spectrum by delimiting the way an exclusive protection over 
copyright work is exercised. This is to ensure that the social cost in granting a 
 
70 
short-term monopoly to rightsholders is not overreaching to the detriment to 
long-term public benefits. 316  Giving full monopoly to the works which 
constitute prejudice in the context of immorality or injustice to the public can 
be seen as contrary to copyright’s objectives. When there exists such prejudice, 
all the national authorities examined in this chapter seem to adopt what is 
described as the doctrine performing an emergency brake role or public policy 
grounds to restore such balance. Although this doctrine is recognised 
differently in different jurisdictions, such divergent recognitions converge 
towards the same end – putting some limits to the enforcement of copyright in 
particular cases. This represents the restrictive aspect of what operates as a 
limitation to copyright. 
The underlying concern is legal uncertainty caused by the non-statutory and 
non-uniform character of the public policy grounds in international copyright, 
which is responsible for national judicial authorities’ reluctance to rely on the 
doctrine. There has been a call for a statutory basis to which those authorities 
can have recourse with more clarity and certainty.317 
A statutory public interest defence should be introduced into international 
copyright law with an incorporated aspect of grounds of public policy. In doing 
so, the principles and scope of how the public policy grounds could operate in 
copyright law must be provided in an elaborate, comprehensive and certain 
manner (section 5.1 below). Although it is impractical to throw the net over all 
divergent aspects of public policy, the principles proposed should perform two 
roles; safeguarding and corrective. 
Safeguarding role 
Established principles of public policy provide a certain and valid set of 
minimum standards for authorising courts to resort to the doctrine. Those 
principles also suggest the limited scope of the doctrine’s operation against 
statutory copyright in terms of injunctive and monetary remedies. This 
                                                
316 Harper & Row Publishers Inc v Nation Enters (1985) 471 US 539; Mazer v Stein (1954) 
347 US 201, 219. 
317 Dworkin (n 46) 148. ‘Public policy has always been likened to an unruly horse. On balance, 
unless courts are statutorily invited to ride it, it is more prudent for judges to steer clear of 
using it’. 
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guarantees that the underlying purposes of copyright and public policy can be 
fulfilled when applying such doctrine to particular cases. Briefly, this role 
warrants that the court can rely on the established public policy grounds with 
certainty when exercising its valid, but limited, discretion. 
Corrective role 
This proposed ground also allows some breathing space for courts to perform 
their discretionary gap-fulfilling role whenever there exists new emerging 
circumstances deemed as falling within the scope of public policy grounds. 
Particularly in the context of immorality, such flexibility will enable the court 
to cope with gradual moral changes perceived by the public. 
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Chapter 3. Freedom of Expression 
3.1 Introduction 
Copyright is by its nature not an absolute right, but subject to restrictive and 
encouraging limitations. While the first chapter explored the scope and 
operations of the former type of limitations, this chapter focuses on the latter 
type, which is largely shaped by freedom of expression. The right is regarded 
as a fundamental human right, performing the role of allowing everyone to 
freely express, seek, receive or impart information and ideas of all kinds.318 
This chapter examines the interface between copyright, exclusively rewarded 
to the author’s creations, and freedom of expression, vested in every member 
of the society to have access and enjoy the benefits arising from such creative 
expression. 
Freedom of expression has been widely recognised not only at the 
international level, but also at regional and national levels in the forms of legal 
provisions in treaties, conventions and domestic legislation.319 Internationally, 
the right is recognised as giving rise to obligations to guarantee to everyone the 
right to hold and express their opinions, and to seek, receive, and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of boundaries, without unjustified 
disruption. The right is said to constitute a fundamental basis for a free and 
well-functioning democratic society where the utmost attention is paid to the 
principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. It also serves to 
heighten the level of transparency and accountability in such a society.320 For 
these reasons, the right to freedom of expression is one of the essential 
conditions in ensuring a healthy democracy and the full enjoyment of other 
                                                
318 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Art 19; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art 19. 
319 For example, at the international level, see UDHR, Article 27(1); ICCPR, Article 19; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ICESCR), Article 15(1)(a), 
(b). At the regional level, see ECHR, Article 10(1); American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR), Article 13. At the national level, see Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), Schedule 1, 
Section 1(3), Article 10; The First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
320 See also the US rationale of strongly protected free speech in Embassy of the United States 
of America, ‘Freedom of Expression in the United States (2013) 
<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/pamphlet/2013/04/20130416145829.html#axzz3u1f
b5MKY>accessed 12 October 2015. 
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human rights.321 
3.1.1 Scope of protection and interface with copyright 
Freedom of expression protects the interests in expressing, seeking, receiving 
and imparting information and ideas.322 There are therefore two dimensions to 
freedom of expression – individual and public. The right to hold and express 
opinions conveys an individual dimension, as this right belongs to every 
individual who shall not be unreasonably restrained from expressing their own 
views.323 The public dimension reflects collective benefits that a society could 
receive from individual expressions, especially those provided by 
intermediaries, such as newspapers and the media.324 In this chapter, ‘freedom 
of expression’ refers to this wider public dimension. When fully implemented, 
it not only forms the cornerstone behind an individual’s exercise of the 
freedom, but also intersects with the way in which other fundamental rights, 
such as copyright, are exercised by other individuals, especially in the wake of 
technological development. 
The protection of freedom of expression encompasses two aspects: the 
substantive expressions and the receipt of expressions. In protecting the 
former, freedom of expression protects content of expression, including 
political, civil, artistic and commercial.325 With the receipt of expressions, 
freedom of expression may come into a conflict with copyright law when its 
scope goes further to protect means in expressing the information or ideas, 
such as books, leaflets, posters, video, paintings or printed papers. Protecting 
means of expressions is based on the justification that an individual is entitled 
‘to freely choose whichever modality is deemed most appropriate to convey his 
expressions to attract the widest possible audiences’,326 and copyright law also 
seeks to protect the originally expressed representations of the authors’ creative 
                                                
321 The UN Human Rights Committee on ICCPR, General Comment No 34, CCPR/C/GC/34, 
paras 2-4. Handyside v UK App no 5493/72 (ECHR, 7 December 1976) para 49. See also 
David Harris and others, Law of the European Convention of Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 
2014) 613-14. 
322 See the text of UDHR, Article 19 and ICCPR, Article 19. 
323 HRC General Comment No 34 (n 321) para 13. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Harris and others (n 321) 629-635. 
326 See, for example, Women on Waves and others v Portugal hudoc (2009) para 38. 
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works, not the ideas or facts from which such works are made. Therefore, there 
may well exist circumstances in which the author’s creative expression, which 
is copyright protected, needs to be imparted in its original form to satisfy the 
wider public whose interests can be collectively justified by the right protected 
by freedom of expression to receive information. In such situations, copyright 
protection may be prevented from performing its restrictive role in prohibiting 
such expressions from being copied and imparted in original forms. The 
author’s interest is subordinate to that of the societal interest in freedom of 
expression. Having noted that neither of these legal disciplines is of an absolute 
nature,327 overprotecting one right can come at the expense of the other.328 This 
may then require a mechanism to maintain or restore the balance between these 
two areas of law. 
3.1.2 Chapter aim and outline 
The interface between copyright and freedom of expression is one of the most 
debated areas of law,329 in which the problem of inadequate protection of the 
latter in the former regime occurs due to an imbalance of interests and legal 
uncertainty in international copyright law. These drawbacks are primarily 
rooted from lack of certain copyright rules protecting freedom of expression 
and inconsistent exercise of courts’ discretion in deciding cases. This chapter 
will attempt to establish certain criteria that can be used to determine how far 
copyright can override freedom of expression concerns, and vice versa. Such 
certainty may in turn help retrieve the lost balance of interests between 
rightsholders and users. Indeed, the proposition is that, because a manifest 
guarantee of freedom of expression in the copyright regime can create an 
important mechanism from which the public value is securely warranted, the 
extent to which freedom of expression with its certainty of principles can be 
brought under the scope of the proposed public interest defence can be 
conducive to the trade-off between the two interests in the international 
                                                
327 Each is subject to justified interference. See ECHR, Article 10(2) and copyright’s L&Es. 
328 Jehoram Herman Cohen, ‘Copyright and freedom of expression, abuse of rights and 
standard chicanery: American and Dutch approaches’ (2004) EIPR, 275, 276. See also Harper 
& Row v Nation (n 316) 539. 
329 Krisjanis Buss, ‘Copyright and Free Speech: The Human Rights Perspective’ (2015) 8(2) 
Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 182, 189-193. 
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copyright system. 
This chapter begins with an examination of some of the philosophical theories 
underpinning intellectual property rights (IPR), to determine which philosophy 
can be best used to describe the original legislative purpose of the IPR. There 
will be an examination of the relationship between IPR and human rights in 
which the cultural rights framework, which comprises the right to cultural 
participation, the right to science and the protection of authorship,330 will be 
scrutinised to find out in what sense it offers a strong ground for the 
relationship between both rights to be accommodated. The answer will allow 
us to understand the relationship between IPR and human rights in the 
international sphere as either conflicting or reinforcing. By placing the 
emphasis on the latter view, some provisions in both international and regional 
human rights instruments will be brought into the discussion to illustrate how 
IPR and human rights can live together untroubled with built-in balancing 
mechanisms. In the context of copyright law, there is a general recognition that 
the internal balance between IPR and human rights appears in the form of 
L&Es or the so-called internal controls through several principles, namely 
originality, idea-expression dichotomy, terms of protection and copyright 
exceptions. These principles will be examined to establish whether they are 
sufficient to maintain the balance between copyright and the public interest, 
given the increasing demand for highly-protected copyright materials 
accelerated by the influence of international trade and technological 
advances.331 A negative answer may require the use of an external control, 
such as freedom of expression, to which judges can resort with certainty to 
rectify the balance in the copyright system. 
This chapter attempts to determine whether or not establishing particular 
criteria of the external balancing control is necessary for protecting the public 
interest in international copyright regime, and, if so, to what extent this can be 
                                                
330 UDHR, Art 27; ICESCR, Art 15. 
331 Peter Drahos and Herchel Smith, ‘The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights: Origin 
and Development’ (2014) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_unhchr_ip_pnl_98/wipo_unhchr_ip_pnl_98_1.
pdf> accessed 15 September 2015. 
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done. A particular focus will be placed on elaborating the built-in balance 
encapsulated in Article 10 ECHR and to explore to what extent this provision 
and its case law can be fleshed out in detail and adopted as an international 
balancing tool to safeguard the public interest in the copyright regime. The 
analysis will also take into account the relationship between freedom of 
expression and the media, wherein the latter can be a supportive vehicle to the 
exercise of the right in the information society. The consideration will 
particularly attempt to justify why and to what extent the media and journalists 
as a public watchdog should be conferred some privileges by freedom of 
expression because their work yields benefits to the public. It will also explore 
if the enjoyment of freedom of expression will more likely be upheld against 
other competing rights, including copyright. 
3.2 The interface between copyright and freedom of 
expression 
3.2.1 Intellectual property rights 
Although the interface between copyright and freedom of expression is the 
main subject of this chapter, a broader picture of this discourse is reflected in 
the interaction between IPR and human rights and this relationship has been 
debated extensively over the last two decades.332 As IPR and human rights are 
the foundations in which copyright and freedom of expression exist 
respectively, it is important to understand how these categories of rights 
interact with each other. To examine this relationship, it is important to first 
have a comprehensive insight into different justifications for IPR and, second, 
to be able to determine under which theory IPR can be best justified, given its 
original legislative purpose in fulfilling individual interests, social functions 
and a human rights dimension. 333  Three philosophical justifications are 
primarily of relevance: natural rights, utilitarianism and human rights. 
                                                
332 Estelle Derclaye, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Coinciding and 
Cooperating’ in Paul L C Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Enhanced 
Edition of Copyright and Human Rights (Kluwer Law International 2008) 133-134. 
333 UNGA ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights: Copyright policy 
and the right to science and culture’ 28th session A/HRC/28/57 (2014), para 90. 
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 IPR as natural rights 3.2.1.1
The natural rights justification is author-favouring. It establishes that any 
creative or innovative works made by an individual are fruits of the author’s 
own labour; therefore, as the creator of such work, they naturally have 
exclusive rights to enjoy both the moral and economic interests derived from 
their own intellectual property.334 The enjoyment of the moral interest is based 
on the proposition that an absence of the recognition of one’s right to 
intellectual property is an attack on their moral value.335 As an advocate of this 
theory, John Locke held the view that the right to property is a natural right.336 
Ownership is justified by the creator’s labour employed to produce it, and by 
the fact that the property is a representation of their personality. Given this 
unique personal link between the creator and their contribution to the creation 
of property, they have certain dominant rights to use that property.337 While it 
is too nuanced to conclude that individuals’ interests take precedence over any 
other competing interests under this justification, and Locke himself stated 
that, as property rights are legitimately acquired only if ‘there is enough and as 
good left in common for others’,338 it has been accepted and adopted by some 
civil law-based countries339 but it is at odds with the utilitarian justification. 
 Utilitarianism 3.2.1.2
The utilitarian justification asserts that IPR are justified by their instrumental 
benefits in promoting broader societal value.340 As such value is prioritised, a 
firm guarantee of intellectual property protection incentivises novel creations. 
These can in turn be enjoyed by public users, who, by using the ideas, systems 
                                                
334 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (P. Laslett, ed, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), Second Treatise, Sec 27. 
335 Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (Signet 1986), chapter 11: Patents and 
Copyrights. 
336 Karen Vaughn, ‘John Locke and the Labour Theory of Value’ (1978) 2 (4) Journal of 
Libertarian Studies 311, 326, The word ‘property’ was used in both narrow and broad sense. It 
therefore covers not only material goods, but also a wide range of human interests and 
aspirations, such as intellectual property. 
337 Ibid. See also, Stephen R Munzer and Kal Raustiala, ‘The Uneasy Case for Intellectual 
Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge’ (2009) 27 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment 37, 59. 
338 See Locke (n 334) Second Treatise, Sec 27. See also Adam Mossoff, ‘Saving Locke from 
Marx: The Labour Theory of Value in Intellectual Property Theory’ (2012) 29(2) Social 
Philosophy & Policy 283, 294. 
339 The UNGA Report (n 333) para 30. 
340 Fisher (n 8). 
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and facts conveyed in such works, are deemed to be future creators.341 Hence, 
property rights are granted to creators as a way in which the public interest can 
be best served and developed in terms of science and arts. This approach has 
been adopted in the US, as seen in its copyright and patent clause of the US 
Constitution which provides that Congress is granted power ‘to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing to authors and inventors for a 
limited time the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries’.342 
It is further accepted that rewards given to intellectual works in terms of legal 
protection to the creators are regarded as an instrument or vehicle in the form 
of commercial regulation, destined to achieve another greater end: to benefit 
society with scientific and artistic progress.343 
 Human rights justification 3.2.1.3
Using human rights to justify the compromise settlement between IPR and its 
limitations is a recent phenomenon. Its starting point was sketchily derived 
from some legal instruments and case law.344 Some important points regarding 
this approach are worth considering. First, classifying IPR as a human right is 
viewed as a combination of the two justifications considered above, because 
human rights can embrace the values of both natural law and utilitarian theory. 
Not only may human rights be seen as natural rights,345 they can also uphold 
the pursuit of the social welfare goal to promote the well-being of the larger 
public, following the utilitarian view.346 Secondly, the interdependent and 
indivisible nature of human rights suggests that a balance can be achieved 
between the enjoyment of human rights through the balancing mechanisms and 
                                                
341 Scott M Martin, ‘The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind 
Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection’ [2002] 36(1) Loyola Law Review 280. 
342 US Const, Art I, sec 8, cl 8. It is not necessarily always the case that Utilitarianism is the 
dominant justification of US IP laws, see Adam Mossoff, ‘Why Intellectual Property Rights? A 
Lockean Justification’ (2015) <http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/why-intellectual-
property-rights-a-lockean-justification/> accessed 2 September 2017. 
343 Derclaye (n 332) 136; UNGA Report (n 333) para 30. 
344 Derclaye (n 332) 138. 
345 Even though this view is not the universal theory of human rights, the natural law tradition 
is the precursor of human rights discourse dated back in the aftermath of World War II and the 
Holocaust. See Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd edn, 
Cornell University Press 2003) 13-14. 
346 This view signifies the exercise of a particular human right to protect larger societal 
benefits, rather than individual ones. See Derclaye (n 332) 137. 
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limitations entrenched in human rights instruments.347 The recognition of such 
mechanisms stems from the realisation that human rights in the context of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its two subsequent 
Covenants are perceived as both an individual and societal interests, which 
need to be balanced and ‘retained within the objective of realising the core 
rights recognised in international human rights law’.348 It has been suggested 
that IPR and their limitations, which are still subject to concerns of imbalance 
in the context of natural law and utilitarian justifications, can be better 
balanced by looking through the human rights lens. Thirdly, as most of the 
limits to IPR are linked to the enjoyment of the author’s creations or 
innovations by others, there is the suggestion that IPR inherently pay respect to 
human rights through their L&Es regime in which some breathing space is 
reserved for other competing fundamental interests to be weighed up against 
those of authors. In fact, the aims in common between IPR and human rights 
can be viewed as attempting to address the same challenge: how to strike a fair 
balance between two divergent goals – ‘rewarding human creativity and 
innovation and simultaneously ensuring public access to the fruits of those 
endeavours’.349 These two goals are balanced and assigned to work in tandem 
within the framework of cultural rights, which are protected by international 
human rights regimes.350 
Given the merits elaborated above, the human rights approach is a 
contemporary and reconciling way of justifying the existence of IPR. The 
individual and public aspects of human rights can be used to justify IPR and its 
limits. Both serve to enhance each other and share the same aspiration of 
promoting the overall well-being of humans, by way of addressing a trade-off 
between individual and public interests.351 Other than rights regarding freedom 
                                                
347 Ibid. See, for example, both Article 10 ECHR and Article 13 ACHR have limitations in 
their second paragraphs. 
348 See UDHR, Art 29; ICESCR, preamble para 5; ICCPR, preamble para 5. 
349 Laurence R Helfer and Graeme W Austin, Human rights and intellectual property: 
Mapping the Global Interface (CUP 2011) 507. See also the UNGA Report (n 20) para 4. 
350 The UNGA Report (n 310) para 4. See UDHR, Art 27; ICESCR, Art 15. 
351 For further discussion regarding this approach, see Derclaye (n 333) 133-146; Daniel 
Gervais, ‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Learning to live together’ in Torremans P 
(ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human 
Rights (Kluwer Law International 2008) 3-24. 
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from torture, slavery and servitude, human rights instruments contain a 
balancing mechanism, and this is mirrored in the IPR regime, appearing in the 
forms of the built-in, both statutory and non-statutory, L&Es system. 
 Strengthening the human rights justification 3.2.1.4
In addition to the aforementioned advantages, there are two notable arguments 
in support of the adoption of the human rights approach to justify IPR and its 
intimate relationship with human rights. First, the implicit guarantee of 
intellectual property protection under the framework of cultural rights is a tacit 
reflection that IPR is part of human rights. Cultural rights are recognised in 
some international human rights instruments, such as Article 27 UDHR and 
Article 15 ICESCR.352 Generally speaking, cultural rights relate to interests in 
art and culture, which are protected by two implied safeguards working 
alongside each other: the right to culture and science and the protection of 
authorship.353 There are three aspects to these interests: (1) the right to take 
part in cultural life; (2) the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
its applications; and (3) the rights of authors and inventors to the protection of 
their moral and material interests. The latter safeguard ensures the protection of 
the moral and material interests of creators arising from their own scientific, 
literary or artistic production, and this is the basis of the protection of IPR in 
human rights. 354  The guarantee of cultural and scientific participation is 
reflected in the intellectual property L&Es system,355 which can be seen in the 
fact that the drafters of Article 27 UDHR originally wished to protect 
intellectual and artistic activities, which included all forms of creativities of 
individuals or groups to be freely expressed for the full development of their 
lives and society. 356  IPR confer on creators the right to attribution and 
integrity357 and the right to have an adequate standard of living through the 
                                                
352 Julie Ringelheim, ‘Cultural Rights’ in Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International 
Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 288. 
353 Ibid. 287. 
354 Ibid. 297. 
355 See UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘Human rights and 
intellectual property’ E/C 12/2001/15, Geneva, November 12–30, 2001. According to the 
Committee, L&Es are there to ensure that other human rights, namely the right to benefit from 
cultural and scientific progress, are duly respected in the IPR regime. 
356 Ringelheim (n 352) 288. 
357 Berne Convention, Art 6bis. 
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receipt of subsequent financial benefits. This corresponds to one of the 
fundamental principles of cultural rights protection: safeguarding the creator’s 
moral and material interests. The CESCR also acknowledges that the close 
connection between material interests and right to own property implies that 
IPR may well be justified using human rights.358 
Another supportive basis of the human rights justification can be viewed 
through the lens of the right to property. A firm recognition of this view can be 
found in the EU fundamental rights regime where intellectual property is 
protected under the rubric of right to property guaranteed in Article 17 
CFREU. 359 Accordingly, the property that is intellectually created by an 
individual should also deserve to be recognised within the purview of human 
rights concerns. 
3.2.2 Intellectual property rights and human rights: conflicting foes or 
co-existing friends 
Despite the human rights approach justifying the original underpinning of IPR, 
this section will consider how IPR conflicts with some human rights. In 
particular, it will focus on the extent to which the influence of trade on IPR 
under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) could destabilise the peaceful relationship between IPR and human 
rights. It will then consider the argument that both bodies of rights do not 
actually conflict, but rather coexist and are mutually reinforcing. 
  Conflict 3.2.2.1
The human rights theory endorses the view that IPR can fit into the human 
rights framework, by which the balance of interests between one person and 
others is provided for in human rights instruments. This view can be 
particularly understood if considered in light of the protection of cultural rights 
by human rights law. Here the right to intellectual property is preserved by the 
protection of creator’s moral and material interests from his productions, 
                                                
358 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No 17, 
E/C 12/GC/17 para 15. 
359 The second paragraph reads ‘Intellectual property shall be protected’. See also The UNGA 
Report (n 333) para 52. 
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embedded in Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR. Meanwhile, other human rights 
aspects, which may also appear in the form of L&Es in the IPR system, are 
protected by the public-oriented right to culture and science, enshrined in the 
same provision. The CESCR supports the view of internal balance360 by 
acknowledging that the interests protected by Article 15 are ‘intrinsically 
linked, mutually reinforcing and reciprocally limitative’.361 
However, there has been an ongoing concern about an imbalanced IPR regime, 
and in particular the issues of inadequate protection of authorship and 
overprotected IPR for commercial interests. These have occurred as a result of 
the evolution of IPR in response to market economy concerns.362 This external 
influence has shifted the way in which the relationship between IPR and 
human rights was originally perceived. It has led to the failure of IPR to keep 
its human rights component intact. The emergence of the TRIPS agreement is 
the most salient manifestation of how IPR development has started to move 
away from its human rights orbit. As much as it is explicit in its name as a 
trade and IP-related agreement, TRIPS is the most comprehensive multilateral 
intellectual property agreement to date. Its major contribution is an imposition 
of high standards of IP protection on all World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
members and its strong enforcement mechanism. Under the administration of 
the WTO, this agreement is understood as the process through which 
intellectual property law has for the first time been introduced into the 
international trade regime. Accordingly, the scope of IPR protection recognised 
in TRIPS is circumscribed by the prevailing aim of ensuring that there is no 
prejudice to international trade.363 This influence has led to the concern that 
human rights, as safeguarded within the IPR regime, have been stifled and 
inadequately protected. 364  The influential trade aspect of IPR places an 
excessive focus on the commercial sense of intellectual goods in a way that 
allows ‘commercialisation of the products between real authors and 
                                                
360 The CESCR report (n 358). 
361 Ibid. para 3. 
362 Ringelheim (n 352) 290. 
363 See TRIPS, preamble. 
364 Brodi Kemp, ‘Copyright’s Digital Reformulation’ (2003) 5 (1) YJLT 141, 153. 
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corporations’.365 Therefore, it is likely that the balance is tipped in favour of 
the rightsholders.366 This is evident in the TRIPS drafting approach, where all 
the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention and Paris Convention have 
been incorporated by reference and subject to strict compliance between WTO 
members, except the provisions concerning moral rights.367 Under the current 
IPR regime, this controversial exclusion tends to favour the situation where 
moral rights, which are non-transferrable and inseparable from the real creators 
in a human rights perspective,368 may be waived or signed away by means of a 
contract to other rightsholders such as corporations, investors or publishers.369 
This may result in the common practice where the real authors seeking to 
commercialise their works may be forced negotiate a licensing agreement with 
financially powerful corporate rightsholders. Although this might not have a 
significant effect on the real authors’ interests in general, it may weaken them 
in decision-making where the inextricable moral interests in their intellectual 
works can be taken away. 
A greater influence of the trade-oriented aspect of IPR over other human rights 
values can be evident from an expansion of copyrightable subject-matter, new 
exploitation rights and low threshold of protection.370 The protection of IPR is 
increasingly driven towards the economic affluence of rightsholders. This 
affects the threshold of the protection in a way that requires ‘less significant 
efforts than any other underlying reason for protection, be it creativity, 
inventiveness or even good will or origin’371 for the sake of promoting free 
trade of IP goods. As a consequence, this may explain why copyright law, for 
instance, begins to see some emerging expressive forms such as digital music 
and films, online materials and computer programs as an extension of 
                                                
365 The UNGA Report (n 333) para 19. 
366 Kemp (n 364) 153. 
367 See TRIPS, Art 9, Berne Convention, Art 6bis. See also The UNGA Report (n 333) para 25. 
368 The UNGA Report (n 333) para 28. 
369 Article 19, ‘The Right to Share: Principles on Freedom of Expression and Copyright in the 
Digital Age’ (2013) < https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/3716/13-04-23-right-
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copyrightable subject-matter.372 
Another obvious example is the emergence of the three-step test incorporated 
in Article 13 TRIPS and its negative effect on the intellectual property L&Es 
system.373 Here the balance between IPR and human rights that should be 
struck within the former system through its L&Es regime has been undermined 
by the influence of trade law. This concern is closely associated with the 
interpretation of Article 13 TRIPS by the WTO Panel.374 Under TRIPS, the test 
has been subject to trade considerations. This has resulted in the situation 
where the test is interpreted in a way that overemphasises the rightsholders’ 
economic interests, as such L&Es becoming optional and other human rights 
interests thereby disregarded.375 This situation has a negative effect on the 
enjoyment of other human rights. This is particularly so in relation to users’ 
rights to have access to scientific and artistic progress,376 and the CESCR is 
right to argue that theory that intellectual property protection reflects the 
protection of human authorship recognised in Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR is 
fallacious when ‘contemporary intellectual property laws go beyond what the 
right to protection of authorship requires, and may even be incompatible with 
the right to science and culture’.377 Despite the intrinsic balance between IPR 
and human rights explained through the cultural rights perspective, there may 
be a conflict between both bodies of rights when moral interests of authorship 
are under-protected, and the economic interests of corporate rightsholders are 
overvalued.378 Both of these issues are caused by the influence of trade in 
TRIPS and it is this type of conflict that potentially causes harmful effect to 
other human rights values and so requires an external tool to restore the 
balance. 
                                                
372 Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright (3rd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2017) Section 2.7. 
373 See other similar provisions in Art 9(2) Berne Convention. 
374 United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (WT/DS160/R) report of the Panel, 
adopted 27 July 2000. (WTO Panel-Copyright (2000) hereinafter). See more considerations on 
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 Reinforcing 3.2.2.2
Despite the concerns expressed above, many human rights advocates argue that 
recognising the IPR-human rights relationship as reinforcing is a more 
constructive approach in solving the problem of the overprotection and 
imbalance of certain interests in the IPR regime.379  This can simply be 
achieved by retrieving the human rights value of IPR through the firmly-
recognised perpetual nature of real human creators’ moral interests in the 
international IPR system. When such interests become inalienable and safe 
from abusive activities by subsequent rightsholders,380 this salvaged human 
rights character will ensure that IPR are equally recognised as fundamental 
human rights. IPR will then share the same goals as human rights: to not only 
promote the moral and material interests of one particular individual, but also 
to encourage artistic and scientific progress through the social, economic and 
cultural participation of others. Having taken this approach, there are, by 
implication, two key points. 
First, to suggest that IPR are part of human rights is comparable to what can be 
identified as a ‘quasi-instrumental view’, whereby both bodies of rights 
reinforce and sometimes learn a great deal from each other.381 As far as the 
instrumental view is concerned, it suggests that IPR exist merely to be 
instrumental rights, which help pursue the greater end of human rights for 
societal benefits. It thus characterises human rights as having primacy over 
IPR, based on the principal aim of social welfare.382 However, the quasi-
instrumental character balances such goal against the value of individuals’ 
moral and material interests. Hence, seeing IPR through the lens of human 
rights paves the way for fulfilling the human rights obligations both in the 
public and individual aspects. 
Secondly, the method by which the fair balance between the two human rights 
goals – both the individual and public – can be achieved is already set out in 
provisions of international human rights instruments, namely Article 27 UDHR 
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and Article 15 ICESCR.383 The internal balancing mechanism is even more 
identifiable in the area of freedom of expression, which usually intersects with 
copyright, as implicitly recognised through some international and regional 
human rights provisions such as Article 19 ICCPR and Article 10 ECHR. The 
following sections will therefore examine what these human rights balancing 
provisions provide, and to what extent they are, either adequately or otherwise, 
reflected in the context of copyright internal mechanisms. 
3.2.3 Unfolding the built-in balancing of human rights 
Article 27 UDHR and Article 15 ICESCR establish the general balance 
between copyright and human rights through the protection of authorship and 
the guaranteed enjoyment of artistic and scientific advance. The protection of 
an author’s moral and economic rights derived from any of their scientific, 
literary or artistic works is guaranteed by both Article 27(2) UDHR and Article 
15(1)(c) ICESCR. The rationale for these protections stem from two divergent 
justifications for copyright that underpin two important aspects of authors’ 
rights:384 the moral rights tradition delineates the right to be recognised as an 
author of intellectual creations, and an author’s honour and reputation emanate 
from the personal link with his work and should be protected from distortions, 
mutilation or modification; and second, the utilitarian tradition endorses the 
right to enjoy an adequate standard of living by claiming financial rewards 
from personal contributions.385 These provisions are seen as having an author-
favoured character, which resembles what copyright law is intended to 
protect.386 At the same time, given that they are entrenched in human rights 
instruments, the human rights status of these concerns is recognised.387 
Article 27(1) UDHR and Article 15(1)(a)(b) ICESCR reserve some breathing 
space for the public in general to exercise their rights to participate in cultural 
                                                
383 Helfer and Austin (n 349) 31-33; Paul Torremans, ‘Copyright as a Human Right’ in Paul 
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life by enjoying the benefits of scientific and artistic progress that result from 
such intellectual creations. This proposition has been developed from the view 
that it is unfair to other individuals if human rights rules benefit only minor 
groups of people.388 Ideally, everyone should equally share the benefits of 
intellectual property.389 
Cultural rights can be enjoyed and promoted through the guarantee of the right 
to freedom of expression,390 and the balance in the enjoyment of the former is 
explicitly set out in freedom of expression provision.391 The right of everyone 
to hold opinions, seek, receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference can enhance the public enjoyment of artistic and scientific 
progress, and the allowance for interference with the enjoyment of these rights 
for the legitimate aim of protecting the rights or reputations of others reflects 
the guarantee of moral and material interests of authorship. The balancing 
mechanisms in human rights instruments that protect cultural rights and 
freedom of expression thus appear to recognise individual interests in the 
context of copyright protection. They also include such interests in their 
fundamental safeguards to be a precondition to the full enjoyment of cultural, 
scientific and artistic progress of society.392 
When viewing this balance of interests, it is unclear how it is treated in the 
copyright instruments. Some claim that the built-in copyright L&Es system 
provides for reconciling exclusive rights with the public interest and is a proper 
reflection of this balance. The following sections thus consider how far and 
how well the copyright L&Es system can reflect the balance between 
individual and public interests.  
3.2.4 Principles determining the copyright protection threshold 
The no-conflict situation elucidated above suggests that the balance between 
the protection of authorship and the enjoyment of cultural participation and 
scientific progress in international human rights instruments exists in the 
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international copyright regime through the balance between copyright 
protection and its built-in L&Es. While copyright protections aim to protect 
individual interests, the L&Es system is seen as the basis under which the 
obligation to ensure the right to freedom of expression is fulfilled through the 
recognition of the originality requirement, idea/expression dichotomy, term of 
protection, and exceptions principles. These copyright L&Es are also expressly 
recognised in international copyright instruments, namely of the Berne 
Convention and TRIPS.393 L&Es create room for public users to freely enjoy 
the benefits of creative ideas, non-original expressions, works in the public 
domain and even unauthorised uses of protected works in certain 
circumstances, and the balance between copyright and freedom of expression is 
reflected in some leading cases. 
US cases  
Harper & Row v The Nation394 
The judgment in this case represents the US Supreme Court’s conception of the 
relationship between copyright and the First Amendment protection of free 
speech. The Court recognised that both rights are protected at the constitutional 
level, and that US copyright law had already internalised freedom of 
expression values into its own system. It also asserted that copyright legislators 
viewed copyright as a legal artefact395 and desired it to be the engine of 
freedom of expression. Copyright provides secured fair returns for authors’ 
creations in terms of marketable rights and economic incentives as a way of 
achieving the objective of promoting the progress of useful scientific and 
artistic expressions for the public benefit. In light of all of these considerations, 
there was no conflict between the two regimes.396 The Court acknowledged 
that the internal balance between copyright and freedom of expression is 
guaranteed by the two built-in free speech protections in copyright law: the 
                                                
393 Berne Convention, Arts 2(3) and 14bis(1) for originality principle; Berne Convention, Art 7 
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idea/expression dichotomy and the fair-use doctrine. The first provides a 
definitional balance between the two rights by ‘permitting free communication 
of facts while still protecting an author’s expression’,397 whilst the fair-use 
doctrine is tailored to quash copyright when the works at issue are determined 
to be of public interest.398 In essence, the judgment simply suggests that in the 
US copyright regime free speech concerns are given strong recognition and are 
sufficiently protected by the two internal doctrines. 
Eldred v Ashcroft399 
In recognition of the shared goal argument in Harper & Row v Nation, Justice 
O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in Eldred v Ashcroft 
that, in general circumstances where copyright traditions had not been changed 
to a more expansive protection,400 it was reasonable to take a no-conflict 
approach. It was also sensible to assume that the two built-in free speech 
protections sufficiently guarantee the balance with copyright.401 However, the 
Court does suggest that there may exist circumstances where the expansion of 
copyright protection does not allow internal tools to protect free speech 
adequately. Therefore, external tools may be required to recalibrate the 
situation. Thus, while upholding the internal balancing approach, this case also 
established a new platform whereby the interaction between copyright and free 
speech can be viewed from an external perspective. 
UK cases 
Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd402 
Despite the final judgment dismissing the defendant newspaper’s appeal based 
on the defence of fair dealing enshrined in s.30 CDPA and the right to freedom 
of expression protected in s.12 HRA, the Court of Appeal ruled this important 
UK copyright case in a way that confirms that the latter right is protected 
within the UK copyright law. The Court agreed with Sir Andrew Morritt that 
                                                
397 Harper & Row v Nation (n 316) 560, 562. See also Helfer and Austin (n 349) 244, 245. 
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such protection was reflected in the L&Es regime, which allowed 
circumstances where: 
‘freedom of expression was recognised and confirmed. In effect 
they were circumstances where freedom of expression trumped 
copyright protection’.403 
In the present case, two of those circumstances were of particular relevance – 
the statutory provisions of fair dealing provided by s.30 CDPA and the 
common law defence of public interest permitted by s.171(3) of the same Act. 
Regarding the former, the Court admitted that: 
 ‘these provisions reflect freedom of expression in that, in the 
specific circumstances set out and provided that there is ‘fair 
dealing’, freedom of expression displaces the protection that 
would otherwise be afforded to copyright.’404 
The other circumstance, as the Court implied, involved a public interest 
defence, which was also used to protect freedom of expression and maintain 
the balance with copyright. The Court acknowledged that in rare circumstances 
where the conflict between freedom of expression and copyright was not 
covered by the statutory exceptions:405  
‘there is the clearest public interest in giving effect to the right 
of freedom of expression in those rare cases where this right 
trumps the rights conferred by the 1988 Act. In such 
circumstances, section 171(3) of the Act permits the defence of 
public interest to be raised.’ 406 
It can be noted that the Court established an important consideration of an 
impact of freedom of expression on CDPA, thus disagreeing with the decision 
in Hyde Park that there was no room beyond the scope of section 30 CDPA for 
freedom of expression to be accommodated within the Act, especially under 
the scope of the public interest defence.407 Even so, the Court in this case 
implies that such impact that the Convention right has on the UK copyright law 
– especially on the balanced relationship between copyright protection and 
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L&Es – can still be dealt with by the internal mechanisms, namely fair dealing 
and the public interest defence. 
 Originality 3.2.4.1
International recognition 
Returning to the principles of the copyright protection threshold, originality is 
one of the key requirements for copyright protection, which is, despite its 
unclear definition, is generally recognised in both legislation and case law. The 
term was first used in Articles 2(3) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention in the 
context of cinematographic works, and was later clarified in the WCT 
preamble.408 Within the EU regime, the preamble of Directive 93/98/EEC also 
refers to how photographic works can be regarded as ‘original’.409 This has 
been followed by the ECJ’s recognition that ‘copyright is liable to apply only 
in relation to a subject-matter, such as a photograph, which is ‘original’ in the 
sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation’.410 At national level, this 
requirement is also evidently articulated in both the UK and the US copyright 
Acts and their interpretation by the courts.411 
General concept 
This mechanism is used to distinguish the works that are original enough to 
deserve copyright protection from those that are not. Despite divergent 
determinations of the level of originality required between different 
jurisdictions,412 the mainstream concept recognises originality as something 
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copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects’. 
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that reflects and originates from the author’s own intellectual creations.413 
There is, therefore, some linkage between his personality and his own work, 
rather than something novel that has never existed before. This concept is 
similarly embraced by US copyright case law, where the originality test 
requires only the author’s independent selection or arrangement with a 
modicum of creative originality, not akin to novelty.414 This implies that the 
works such as news headlines from online news articles that may have scraped 
the contents from different sites may not be original enough to be eligible for 
copyright protection.415 This principle can be understood as to guarantee the 
public interest and strike a balance in the copyright system by ensuring that 
some works that do not meet this originality threshold are not entitled to 
copyright protection. They will be left to the public domain where all public 
users can have free access and legitimately appropriate the works without 
being subject to infringement allegations. 
Drawbacks 
The low threshold of what determines the author’s own intellectual creations 
and copyright infringement may debilitate the function of the originality test 
that leaves some room for exercise of freedom of expression. The effect of the 
ECJ’s interpretation on the UK originality test can be demonstrated as an 
example of such concern. While the ECJ originality test has arguably raised the 
threshold of the traditional UK version, 416  it has also changed the UK 
infringement test in a way that has made it easier to establish copyright 
infringement.417 As the originality test is used at the infringement stage, 
copyright is infringed when the defendant reproduces the work or a part that 
expresses the author’s own intellectual creations, not that presenting his 
                                                
413 See the use of the phrase ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ in the ECJ jurisprudence in 
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414 Feist Publications (n 411). See also Eleonora Rosati, ‘Originality in US and UK Copyright 
Experiences as a Springboard for an EU-Wide Reform Debate’ (2010) IIC 524, 532-533. 
415 This is however not always the case. See Newspaper Licensing Agency v Meltwater Holding 
BV [2011] EWCA Civ 890, for an opposite proposition by the UK Court of Appeal. See also 
Infopaq (n 410). 
416 SAS Institute V World Programming (n 411) [37]. 
417 Estelle Derclaye, ‘Assessing the Impact and Reception of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union Case Law on UK Copyright Law: What Does the Future Hold?’ [2014] 240 
RIDA 5, 14. 
 
93 
‘sufficient skill, judgment and labour’ anymore.418 
The ECJ’s judgment in Infopaq has also made it clear that it is possible that 
very short works such as titles and headlines can be original and thereby 
copyright protected. 419  Therefore, as long as the protected author’s own 
intellectual creation is found in the defendant’s work, the infringement occurs, 
regardless of profit-driven motive.420 If this originality concept continues to 
favour authors, it may reduce public users’ opportunity to exercise their 
freedom of expression for developing future creative works. 
 Idea-expression dichotomy 3.2.4.2
International recognition 
The principle of the idea/expression dichotomy is firmly imbedded in the 
international copyright regime through the identically-worded provisions in 
TRIPS and WCT.421 They state that copyright does not protect ideas nor 
intangible concepts, but the expressions made thereof. This principle has also 
been adopted by judges in the US and UK.422 
General concept  
An underlying idea behind this principle is that the expression of an author’s 
creativity is protected, but not the ideas or facts from which such expression is 
derived. The ability of individuals to appropriate ideas and facts suggests that 
they are left with sufficient room to exercise their freedom of expression, but 
the principle that copyright only protects expressive forms of such ideas or 
facts is seen as one of the approaches in which an appropriate balance is 
achieved between copyright and freedom of expression. This means that the 
idea/expression dichotomy allows copyright law to take into account freedom 
of expression obligations and therefore ward off most of the cases susceptible 
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to clashes between both rights.423 As a creator of the dichotomy, the US 
Supreme Court has prominently supported this no-conflict approach between 
copyright and freedom of expression through its dependence on the adoption of 
this idea/expression divide.424 For instance, the Court clearly affirmed in both 
New York Times Co v United States 425  and Feist Publications v Rural 
Telephone Service426 that facts and ideas were not copyrightable, only their 
compilations. 
Drawbacks 
The inherently nebulous character of this principle has several important 
drawbacks. First, an unmapped demarcation between ideas and their 
expressions hinders the effective functioning of the principle. This concern has 
been identified by US judges in copyright cases. They have noted that, 
although there is a boundary separating the expression from what was 
expressed to ensure that not everything that can be drawn from the creations 
can be copyrighted and that something should be left in the public domain, no 
one has been able to determine exactly where this boundary lies.427 The line is 
even more difficult to draw when it comes to finding copyright infringement, 
when the question to be asked is what has been copied – the expression itself or 
the idea for which the expression is presented. While the former scenario could 
lead to an apparent infringement, the copying of the idea underlying the 
expression can sometimes be infringing copyright if the idea represents a 
degree artistic skill and labour of the original author.428 Although this blurred 
line does not seem to affect the threshold of what separates ideas from 
expressions, it may, if not carefully determined, undermine the freedom of 
others to express ideas and information. 
Judicial concern on pre-empting misappropriation also tends to affect the 
                                                
423 Cohen (n 328) 277. 
424 Derclaye (n 332) 142; Helfer and Austin (n 349) 248. See also Harper & Row (n 316) 
(Justice Ginsburg). 
425 (1971) 403 US 713, 726: no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates. 
426 (1991) 499 US 340. 
427 Nichols v Universal Pictures 45 F 2 119 [1930]; Guthrie v Curlett, 36 F (2d) 694 (CCA 2). 
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courts’ interpretations of what is regarded as expression in a way that widens 
its scope. This therefore narrows down an area of available ideas and 
information on which the public could have relied to voice their opinions.429 As 
a result, these concerns minimise the opportunities of the public to benefit from 
any future creations which could have been built on such available ideas and 
information. This may thereby constitute a detrimental effect on the internal 
balance between copyright and freedom of expression. 
 Terms of protection 3.2.4.3
International recognition and general concept  
Embedded in Article 7 of the Berne Convention, this principle generally makes 
known to both authors and the public the period of time during which the 
expressions are protected by copyright. While firmly guaranteeing the creators 
a time-limited monopoly, this principle also signals when such expressions are 
automatically available in the public domain for public use. It therefore signals 
when the public may freely appropriate such works and thereby exercise their 
right to freedom of expression without risk of violating copyright. Against this 
background, this principle can be seen as one of the classic illustrations of how 
copyright and freedom of expression are internally reconciled in the copyright 
regime. 
Drawbacks 
However, there have been some questionable extensions of the ‘term of 
protection’ that have undermined the balance between copyright and freedom 
of expression. The first remarkable extension of copyright terms was within the 
EU through Council Directive 93/98/EEC harmonising the term of copyright 
protection for authors within the EU by changing from life plus fifty years to 
life plus seventy. The Directive was later repealed and replaced by Directive 
2006/116/EC. Which also updated Directive 2011/77/EU and extended the 
term of protection for performers and sound recordings to 70 years to be in line 
with that given to authors. This was followed by the US enactment of the 
                                                
429 Patrick Masiyakurima, ‘Fair Dealing and Freedom of Expression’ in Paul Torremans (ed), 
Copyright and human rights: Freedom of expression –Intellectual Property – Privacy (Kluwer 
Law International 2004) 92. 
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Copyright Term Extension Act 1988 (CTEA) to extend the coverage of 
copyright protection to seventy years after the author’s death, to be in line with 
EU law. 430  Congress had been influenced by a number of corporate 
rightsholders, including the Walt Disney Corporation whose copyright on 
Mickey Mouse was about to run out.431  
In Eldred v Ashcroft, 432  the defendants claimed that this extended legal 
protection arbitrarily conveyed greater benefits to a company rightsholder than 
the public and was therefore unconstitutional because it breached the First 
Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression.433 However, this argument 
was not sufficient to convince the Court to disregard the view that the extended 
term of copyright protection did not cause any detriment to freedom of 
expression. In the Court’s view, the extended period of protection was 
intentionally calibrated to work in tandem with the First Amendment 
guarantee, whose main purpose was, in fact, more concerned with protecting 
one’s own speech than others’ right to use one’s speech.434  
The decision in Eldred v Ashcroft upholding the Congress’s power to lengthen 
the terms of copyright protection was confirmed in Golan v Holder,435 in which 
the US Supreme Court reiterated that the Copyright Clause ‘empowers 
Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that 
body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the clauses’.436 In addition, the Court’s 
ruling in this case suggests that the Congress also has the legislative authority 
to put works that had been available in the public domain back under copyright 
protection.437 And doing so, as the Court upheld, would not violate the 
Copyright Clause’s purpose, nor the First Amendment right of the users who 
                                                
430 Gendreau (n 412) 224. See also Eldred v Ashcroft (n 399). 
431 Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, ‘Eldred v Ashcroft: Term Extension and 
Congressional Authority’ [2003] 1 
<http://www.pbwt.com/pubs/uniEntity.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=406> accessed 24 
September 2015. 
432 (2003) 537 US 186. 
433 Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP (n 431). 
434 Ibid. 2. 
435 Golan v Holder (the US Supreme Court, 18 January 2012) No 10–545. 
436 Ibid. 222. 
437 Ibid. 226-7. See also Section 514 of the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act 1994, 
implementing the 1994 Marrakesh Agreements into the US law. 
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had previously used such works for free.438 
The approaches of the Supreme Court in both Eldred v Ashcroft and Golan v 
Holder can be criticised on a number of grounds. Firstly, given that the US 
copyright regime is based on the utilitarian approach, it would be better for all 
concerned parties to state that the guarantee of freedom of expression is 
equally delivered to both rightsholders and the public users with the ultimate 
aim of promoting artistic and scientific progress. Secondly, it cannot 
convincingly be said that the longer period of monopolistic control over 
creative works will help promote more meaningful societal benefits than 
putting them into the public domain, where public users would be incentivised 
to create new or derivative works. Unless the prolonged term of protection, 
such as that allowed in Eldred v Ashcroft, is of genuine value to the public, 
inappropriate implementation, interpretation or legislative actions regarding 
this principle can pose a significant threat to the First Amendment’s purposes. 
Coupled with the proposition in Golan v Holder where the Court seems to 
agree with the Congress’s practice in shrinking the public domain sphere, US 
copyright law-making can be seen moving towards creating copyright 
monopoly. These misperceptions can significantly undermine the inherently 
placid relation between copyright and freedom of expression. This undesirable 
situation may presuppose a call for an external mechanism capable of 
warranting a careful review of all relevant factors and interests to ensure that 
any internal imbalance is remedied. 
 Exceptions to copyright 3.2.4.4
Regarded as the most obvious safeguards to freedom of expression in copyright 
regimes,439 the underlying idea behind the implementation of copyright L&Es 
is to excuse unauthorised appropriations under the guise of freedom of 
expression. Examples of L&Es that play a prominent role in protecting the 
freedom of expression of others are fair dealing and fair use.440 Their functions 
                                                
438 Golan v Holder (n 435) 27; Lyle Denniston, ‘Opinion recap : the Public Domain Shrinks’ 
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of exempting some socially valuable uses of protected works may reflect the 
claim that copyright law in theory takes into account human rights value 
through its L&Es regime. However, as technological advancement further 
facilitates free flow of information in society, there might be some situations 
where the balance between copyright and freedom of expression is shifted in a 
way that is driven more towards favouring the latter right for the sake of 
societal interests. For instance, it may be of interest of the wider public to go 
beyond the boundary line initially set by L&Es in reproducing the protected 
material in substantial part, or even in its entirety. When coupled with the 
influence of trade on IPR, it may be necessary to reconsider L&Es to find out if 
they are sufficiently comprehensible to deal with the current situation where 
the freedom of expression increasingly needs to be protected. Some noteworthy 
L&Es are analysed below to determine whether there are any significant 
loopholes in the shifting balance which need to be rectified by external 
mechanisms. 
Fair dealing for criticism and review 
Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism and review enhances individuals’ 
ability to participate in the democratic process, discovery of truth and self-
actualisation by allowing them to re-examine, review or criticise specific 
materials in the light of social and moral implications.441 Despite the generally 
recognised and attractive functions of L&Es considered above, the ill-defined 
character of this principle at the international level has led to inconsistent 
interpretations at the regional and national levels. The EU copyright system 
can be taken as a prominent illustration of a restrictive approach at the regional 
level. The system requires that the implementation of criticism and review is 
subject to conditions that there must not only be sufficient acknowledgement, 
but, that the works must also be lawfully made available to the public.442 UK 
copyright law takes a similar approach in recognising the two conditions as 
decisive factors for fulfilling the fair dealing criteria.443 However, even though 
there is a public interest in knowing the truth and making fair comments on a 
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442 See Copyright Directive, Art 5(3)(d). 
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political, but confidential, report of the government about corruption or 
iniquity, this unpublished information can only be communicated to the public 
by way of authorised dissemination.444 These two conditions imposed on the 
criticism and review exception may, instead of balancing the two competing 
interests, restrict the communication of such important information to the 
public debate. This undermines the public right to freedom of expression. 
Fair dealing for reporting current events 
The underlying purpose of this aspect of fair dealing is to propagate the 
dissemination of ideas and information relating to social and political discourse 
necessary for the maintenance of a democratic society.445 The reporting current 
events exception is a tool usually used for conveying news and information to 
the public at large. Thus, the exercise of this exception reinforces the right to 
freedom of expression. Although its international recognition can be found in 
Article 10bis of the Berne Convention, the wording, especially the term 
‘reporting current events’, is imprecise. This becomes problematic when it 
comes to national adoption and interpretation.  
For example, despite both adopting this principle from Article 10bis of the 
Berne Convention, the US and the UK take different stances when 
incorporating the principle into their own copyright laws. While US copyright 
law seems to take a wider view by recognising news reporting within the ambit 
of its flexible doctrine of fair use with no particular conditions attached,446 the 
UK courts have tended to interpret such exceptions narrowly in a way that 
excludes past events and photographs from the scope of reporting current 
events.447 The exclusion of past events seems to overlook the circumstance 
which may be currently of public interest, but is in some ways linked to events 
in the past.448 This is also the case for photographs, where it may be necessary 
                                                
444 See Fraser v Evans (n 6); Hubbard v Vosper (n 6), in which the publications claimed under 
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to reproduce and publish a photograph to convey important messages in a more 
credible, vivid and compelling way. 449  Dealing with photographs may 
sometimes become inevitable when an image should not be separated from the 
message which it carries, to maintain the accuracy and truthfulness of the 
underlying information.450 In Hyde Park v Yelland,451 the stills from the CCTV 
camera depicting the late Princess Diana’s whereabouts before her death were 
evidence of what happened and, despite copyright protection, disclosing them 
was better for establishing the truth in what many saw as an issue of public 
concern than merely describing it using words. These sorts of exclusions may 
lead to an internal imbalance in the copyright regime, at the expense of 
freedom of expression and the public interest. 
Fair use 
Unlike the precisely-defined and narrow L&Es system as used in the EU 
regime, the underlying objective of US copyright law seems to mostly reflect 
the extent to which its built-in mechanisms ensure a sufficient balance between 
copyright and freedom of expression.452 Fair use is one of the free speech 
protections embodied in the US copyright system. In Harper & Row,453 it was 
held that: 
‘the immediate effect of [US] copyright law is to secure a fair 
return for an author’s creative labour; but the ultimate aim is, by 
this incentive, to stimulate [the creation of useful works] for the 
general public good’.454 
The fair use doctrine exists to ensure that the ultimate US copyright goal of 
promoting arts and sciences for the public benefit is achieved without arbitrary 
interference against the author’s incentive.455 This may explain why the US 
fair-use doctrine is equipped with four non-exhaustive statutory factors laid 
down in Section 107 of the US Copyright Act: (1) the purpose and character of 
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the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used; and (4) the effect of the use on the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work. None of these is capable of exact 
definition or tailored to cope with specific unauthorised uses. Each of the 
factors is applied on a case-by-case analysis to retain its broad and flexible 
character. The fair use doctrine with such abstract criteria is claimed to make 
the US copyright law compatible with the First Amendment.456 
There are two major concerns of fair use’s lack of capability to be the 
safeguard of freedom of expression: uncertain scope and inability of some 
factors to appropriately fulfil free speech values.457 The former criticism 
involves legal uncertainty that is ingrained in the very nature of open-ended 
character.458 With little guidance provided by its wording, this renders the 
doctrine too vague to allow users to predict with certainty when fair use can be 
successfully claimed.459 This may dissuade users from engaging in infringing 
activities which may otherwise contribute to valuable derivative works.460 
Corruption of some free speech considerations renders the doctrine incapable 
of functioning as an adequate First Amendment protection.461 The first factor’s 
emphasis on non-commercial uses as fair use amounts to discrimination against 
those with a profit-seeking purpose.462 The courts’ view that uses of copyright 
work for monetary profit receive less respect and thus tend towards 
infringement disadvantages most non-commercial but profit-related speech, 
such as scholarly works and newspapers.463 Such a view would be contrary to 
the fundamental nature of free speech:  
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‘in principle, speech does not lose First Amendment protection 
solely on the basis of the existence of a profit motive of or other 
commercial advantage to the speaker’.464  
As for the second factor, although the statutory provision confirms that dealing 
with an unpublished work does not necessarily render the use unfair,465 US 
courts have taken the view that dealing with the published ones is more likely 
to constitute a finding of fair use.466 Such a proposition has thus drawn 
criticism concerning an inordinate focus on the unpublished nature of a work, 
which would sometimes come at the expense of the public interest in having 
access to the work’s underlying facts and ideas.467 Furthermore, while the third 
factor requires the test of substantiality, there is no connection between such a 
test and what qualifies for free speech protection.468 Lastly, while the fourth 
factor looks into the extent to which the use financially affects the protected 
work, such consideration is irrelevant to First Amendment considerations.469 
All in all, those criticisms suggest that there is a lack of freedom of expression 
safeguards in the US copyright system. 
Technological protection measures 
To give a complete picture of inadequate freedom of expression protection in 
copyright, technological protection measures (TPMs) must be addressed.470 
These are technical measures designed to manage or control access to, and to 
restrict unauthorised uses of, protected work.471 Although copyright cannot be 
exercised effectively in the digital environment without support from those 
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measures,472if adopted in an unfair or abusive manner, they may proscribe 
legitimate use permitted by L&Es and thereby undermine the copyright’s 
internal mechanisms protecting freedom of expression. There has been 
growing concern that the Copyright Directive and CDMA provide anti-
circumvention rules that go beyond those detailed in Article 11 WCT, and thus 
tend to create a copyright monopoly in favour of rightsholders, notwithstanding 
existing exceptions to by-pass those rules.473 In the EU, Article 6(4) of the 
Copyright Directive is very problematic as it allows the law of contract to 
prevail over copyright L&Es in on-demand services.474 In other words, the 
rules of voluntary agreements entitle the rightsholder in the digital era to 
contract out L&Es that may otherwise have permitted the unauthorised use of 
his online works.475 
In the US, s.1201 CDMA is viewed as excessively broad and likely to create a 
digital lockup to copyright works476 because it provides rightsholders with 
access and copy control technologies which enable them to prohibit not only 
initial and subsequent circumvention of technologies, but also the trafficking in 
devices used to do so, regardless of actual copyright infringement taking 
place.477 Once the situation falls close to rightsholders being able to determine 
their own scope of copyright protection through TPMs, even permissible non-
infringing use may be ruled out and the need to promote free flow of 
knowledge and information will thus be significantly damaged. This 
constitutes a chilling threat to freedom of expression safeguards within 
copyright law. 
 Concluding remarks 3.2.4.5
Although freedom of expression interests are accommodated by existing 
copyright mechanisms as demonstrated above, there are some difficulties with 
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these internal balancing tools that give rise to inadequate protection for 
freedom of expression. These derive from various influential factors, including 
technological advances, the influence of trade, arbitrary judicial interpretations, 
the disincentive of overprotected TPMs and, most significantly, the optional 
and inharmonious character of the international copyright L&Es regime. An 
absence of adequate freedom of expression safeguards in copyright law can put 
the public interest at jeopardy and may thereby require an external tool to 
recalibrate copyright’s balance. 
3.2.5 Shift from internal to external mechanisms 
Having considered the situation of internal freedom of expression safeguards 
above, there is a need for the re-establishment of a fair balance between rights 
and the authorities should reconsider the human rights framework within which 
the no-conflict approach is guaranteed, and then resort to the intrinsic 
balancing mechanisms available in that framework. Such mechanisms could 
provide useful guidance to the copyright regime on how to strike a fair balance 
between fundamental rights in wake of an incremental demand to safeguard the 
right to freedom of expression. 
This section will discuss some prominent cases where courts, both at national 
and regional levels, have either implicitly or explicitly acknowledged that the 
human rights framework can sometimes be used as an external safeguard to 
regain human rights value and fair balance in the copyright regime. Although 
all the cases revolve around the effect of a fundamental rights approach to 
copyright law, not all are supportive of a shift to external control and some of 
them resulted in unsatisfactory outcomes from the public users’ perspective. 
This is perhaps because, without clear authority, the courts are reluctant to 
adopt an external approach to fix the internal imbalance of interests. Some 
cases give a hint of the copyright over-protection issue, under-protected 
freedom of expression concerns, or an adoption of external measures by 
national courts to solve problems and restore the balance. The discussion will 
examine to what extent a particular emphasis should be placed on Article 10 
ECHR as a starting point from which an external balancing instrument with 
precise, certain and detailed criteria can be elaborated. 
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 Judgments of domestic courts in EU Member States 3.2.5.1
Biblo v Index478 
The relationship between copyright and freedom of expression has been 
considered by the Belgian Supreme Court against the backdrop of the 
fundamental freedom of expression framework. The copyright owner of two 
tax-law reviews alleged that a legal database called Index illegally reproduced 
his published summaries of court decisions. Despite the dismissal of the 
citation exception on the appeal,479 Index argued that the decision made in 
favour of the claimant constituted a violation of freedom of expression as 
protected by Article 19 ICCPR and Article 10 ECHR. 
This case was eventually heard by the Supreme Court, whose final judgment 
delivered both supportive and unsupportive messages to the introduction of an 
external freedom of expression protection in copyright. The Court delivered a 
separate consideration of the freedom of expression claim and confirmed that 
this fundamental right was afforded to everyone so that they may defend their 
opinions and disseminate information and ideas without interruption. The 
Court then went on to accept that ‘copyright forms one of the limits to this 
freedom’, as it falls within the scope of ‘protection of right of others’.480 The 
Court’s view echoes the balancing provisions in the international human rights 
instruments that protect freedom of expression, including Article 10 ECHR.481 
However, the Supreme Court failed to fully apply the necessary in a 
democratic society test offered by Article 10 ECHR. Having considered the 
balance of interests provided by internal copyright provisions, the Supreme 
Court agreed with the lower court’s observation that the Belgian Copyright Act 
already contained internal instruments (L&Es) that function to balance 
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copyright and freedom of expression.482 It is unfortunate that the Court did not 
take this opportunity to clarify how the proportionality test in Article 10 ECHR 
could be applied to the copyright case before it. It also failed to address the 
circumstance where an unauthorised use giving rise to copyright infringement 
has freedom of expression and public values. 
Utrillo483 
A similar proposition to the Belgian approach was taken by the French courts 
in the case concerning Maurice Utrillo’s paintings. The national television 
station France 2 reproduced a short report consisting of footage of Utrillo’s 
paintings for the purpose of informing viewers about a forthcoming exhibition. 
It was then required by the court of first instance to make remuneration. The 
station’s refusal was grounded on two main arguments: the quotation 
exception484 and the public right to information as protected by Article 10 
ECHR. Surprisingly, it was the latter ground on which the Court based its 
decision that the reproduction of the paintings was justified by the viewers’ 
right to be properly informed about matters regarding public events. The 
decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal485 and, later, by the Court of 
Cassation. 486  The latter held that the Intellectual Property Code already 
provided proportionate limits to the author’s legal monopoly to the peaceful 
enjoyment of their creative works.487 Such limits were set out in Article L. 122-
5 (exceptions) and in Article L. 122-9 (abuse of rights) of the French IP 
Code.488 This judgment implies that the balance between copyright and right to 
freedom of expression was already struck within the copyright law, and there 
was no need to resort to the balancing mechanisms recognised in Article 10 
ECHR. As with the previous case, the courts failed to adopt the external 
solution offered by Article 10 to restore the balance between individual 
interests and the broader public interest in connection with artistic expression. 
                                                
482 Ibid. See Belgian Copyright Law (n 532) Art. 21-23. 
483 District Court of Paris, 3rd Ch., 23 February 1999, Case 98/7053 (unpublished). See also 
Christophe Geiger, ‘Copyright’s Fundamental Rights Dimension at EU level’ in Estelle 
Derclaye (ed), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright (Edward Elgar 2009) 44. 
484 See Code de la propriété intellectuelle (French IP Code), Art L122-5 (3)(a). 
485 Cour d’Appel, 30 May 2001, [2001] Dalloz 2504. 
486 Cour de Cassation, 13 November 2003, JCP, 19 May 2004, no 21-22, 955. 
487 Ibid. See also Macmillan (n 371) 37, 38. 
488 Ibid. 
 
107 
Medienprofessor489 
The Austrian Supreme Court had an opportunity to take an external view of the 
relationship between copyright and freedom of expression in the 
Medienprofessor case. Sixteen newspaper articles criticising an individual were 
reproduced on a website owned by the defendant. He argued that that his act of 
reproduction was protected by Article 10 ECHR. Although the Supreme Court 
was dubious that such reproduction without annotation could be covered by the 
quotation exception, it took an unconventional approach in analysing the 
reproduction in light of the freedom of expression framework. The Court ruled 
that, as the reproduction enabled the website’s owner to demonstrate that he 
was targeted by a massive media campaign, such activity was justified by the 
right to freedom of expression. The reproduced articles also carried some 
social benefit in that the public should be properly informed, and this overrode 
the newspapers’ pecuniary interest. Despite no statutory provision in Austrian 
copyright law exempting such unauthorised reproduction, the judges resorted 
to an external freedom of expression framework on the ground that copyright 
should be neutralised by public values. 
Scientology v Karin Spaink/ Xs4all490 
The litigation in this Dutch court arose from an unauthorised online publication 
of confidential documents owned by the Church of Scientology. The quotation 
right enshrined in Article 15a of the Dutch Copyright Act was not applicable to 
this case because the publication was of unpublished documents. Nevertheless, 
the Dutch Court of Appeal vindicated the publisher by explicitly invoking 
Article 10 ECHR. The Court noted that such provision guaranteed the public 
the right to be adequately informed about matters of public interest and the 
right to criticise the controversial ideas and behaviour of the Church of 
Scientology.491 This view was endorsed by the Dutch Supreme Court, but it 
failed to clarify how the freedom of expression functioned as an external 
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control in the copyright system. Despite that, this case leaves some room for 
further elucidation of how the external freedom of expression framework can 
be calibrated to close loopholes in copyright law. 
 Judgments of the ECtHR 3.2.5.2
Ashby Donald and Others v France492 
In this case the ECtHR provided some clarification on freedom of expression 
as an external control on the application of copyright law. Copyright was 
viewed through a human rights lens. The case concerned three photographers 
who published photographs taken at the Paris fashion show online without the 
permission from the event’s hosting company. The French Court of Cassation 
upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal dismissing the defendants’ 
argument that their publication was covered by an exception in French 
copyright law493 or by Article 10 ECHR. The defendants applied to the ECtHR 
claiming that the verdict violated their right to freedom of expression protected 
by Article 10 ECHR. Despite deciding in favour of the French authorities, the 
ECtHR accepted that such copyright measures constituted an interference with 
the right to freedom of expression; therefore, they must be tested against the 
three requirements for a legitimate interference stipulated in Article 10(2) 
ECHR. This has been seen as the creation of a new constitutional platform 
where ‘an external human rights perspective is added to the justification of 
copyright infringement’.494 The judgment also suggests that the intersection 
between copyright and freedom of expression is no longer unaffected by an 
external review by the 2-tier requirement provided in Article 10 ECHR, and the 
ECtHR has recognised the applicability of Article 10 ECHR to national 
copyright regimes.495 
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Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi v Sweden (The Pirate Bay)496 
A few weeks after Ashby Donald, the ECtHR restated its view that the 
application of copyright laws is subject to Article 10 scrutiny. The co-founders 
of one of the world’s largest file sharing service providers – The Pirate Bay – 
claimed that their criminal convictions violated their right to freedom of 
expression. Their facilitating service provided a platform on which people 
could exchange and share digital files, including protected materials such as 
music, films and computer games, through online torrent file-sharing. The 
ECtHR had to consider the balance between the applicants and internet users’ 
interests to enjoy freedom of expression and the rightsholders’ interests to 
protect their materials. 
The ECtHR held that the scope of freedom of expression included the right of 
everyone to impart or receive information, and covered not only the content, 
but also the means of communication. The ECtHR went on to acknowledge 
that the file-sharing service provided a means by which individuals could 
exercise their right to freedom of expression and therefore the convictions 
constituted an interference with that right, but the type of expression at issue 
was not deserving of such a high level of protection as political expression; 
thus, the Swedish authority would be accorded a wide margin of appreciation 
when regulating such activity.497 Regardless of the final decision, what should 
be noted here is the ECtHR’s re-affirmation of the applicability of an external 
fundamental right framework in the national copyright regime. 
 Conclusion 3.2.5.3
It is evident from these cases that insufficient safeguards for freedom of 
expression through internal copyright L&Es have been identified. Numerous 
courts across Europe have had many opportunities to address such a concern 
by pronouncing on the relationship between copyright and freedom of 
expression. The general trend is that, where it is found that the public right to 
                                                
496 App no  40397/12 (ECtHR, 19 February 2013). See also Dirk Voorhoof and Inger Høedt-
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have access to copyright materials is superior to individuals’ copyright 
interests, they have in most cases made reference to an external mechanism, 
namely the fundamental right to freedom of expression, and subsequently had 
recourse to the balancing test recognised in Article 10 ECHR. 
Examining copyright within an external human rights constitutional framework 
(freedom of expression) has certain benefits: a guarantee of non-arbitrary 
protection of one right over the other and a recognised constructive mechanism 
to recalibrate copyright’s balance in the changing environment.498 This may 
suggest that emerging unauthorised use of protected materials following rapid 
technological advances has externalised the relationship between both sets of 
rights onto a new platform where a human rights balancing mechanism, well-
represented by Article 10 ECHR, plays a crucial role in restoring the fair 
balance between them. 
3.2.6 Justification of the dominant European jurisprudence 
consideration 
Compared to all the regional and international human rights bodies, the ECtHR 
has the most developed and sophisticated jurisprudence regarding the 
protection of freedom of expression. This is evident from the large number of 
freedom of expression cases,499 in which the ECtHR has decided in such a way 
that reflects the high standard of freedom of expression protection to what 
contributes to a public debate. 500  Therefore, a focus on the European 
jurisprudence can provide a more argumentative discussion with sufficient 
material to be presented. 
Another worthwhile character of the ECtHR derives from the approach, in 
which its protection of free speech is subject to an open discussion where the 
balance of interests takes place.501 This approach has become a cornerstone of 
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the ECtHR, which accordingly entails a flood of litigations and meaningful 
legal considerations concerning the Court’s balancing task along with the 
criteria and principles established therein. 
3.3 Scope and principles of Article 10 ECHR 
In the information era, when the internet is a means of exchanging knowledge 
and ideas, there is a global trend that online communication has become the 
sphere in which copyright and freedom of expression increasingly intersect. 
There have been a growing number of cases brought before the courts,502 and 
courts across Europe have resorted to an external fundamental rights 
framework, that enshrined in Article 10 ECHR, to reconcile copyright and 
freedom of expression. This practice reflects an emerging inclination towards 
introducing an external regime into copyright discourse to preserve, or even re-
introduce, the balance and flexibility that has been lost during the course of 
copyright overprotection.503 
It is therefore worthwhile examining the scope and conditions of Article 10 
ECHR and more detailed criteria on its application in the copyright context. 
Article 10(1) protects the right to freedom of expression, and Article 10(2) sets 
out when interferences with the enjoyment of this right are permissible. Article 
10(2) also provides that freedom of expression can be restricted for specified 
legitimate aims when the restriction is prescribed by law and necessary in a 
democratic society. One of the aims set out in Article 10(2) is ‘the protection 
[…] of the rights of others’, where such rights include copyright. 
3.3.1 Article 10(1): right to freedom of expression 
Freedom of expression is considered to be a fundamental characteristic of a 
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democratic society.504 The ECtHR has accordingly paid ‘utmost attention to the 
principles characterising a democratic society’,505 and relevant doctrines in its 
jurisprudence. In particular, the enjoyment of freedom of expression is an 
essential prerequisite for a presence of broadmindedness, pluralism and 
tolerance.506 These are all features of a democratic society which exist to 
ensure that people respect the exercise of other’s civil and political rights. The 
fact that freedom of expression is understood to protect not only substantive 
expressions of information and ideas, but also diverse methods of 
communication,507 is essential for the functioning of democracy. This is an 
underlying basis of the broad interpretation and high level of protection 
conferred to such fundamental right, despite causing detrimental impact against 
particular individuals, groups or even other areas of law.508 ‘Persons exercising 
the right under Article 10 are entitled to choose the modality, free from state 
interference, which they consider most effective in reaching the widest possible 
audiences’ and therefore a broad range of forms of expression are protected.509 
Given that copyright law also seeks to protect methods under which ideas are 
expressed, not ideas themselves, it is likely that copyright law will intersect 
with freedom of expression protection. It is thus important to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the scope of protections afforded by the right 
to freedom of expression. 
Taken together, Articles 10(1) and 10(2) can be understood to spell out the 
right that individuals have in freely expressing information and ideas, and the 
necessary balance that must be achieved between the enjoyment of this right 
and other competing societal interests.510 The balance to be struck will depend 
on the content of information disseminated and the means of expression.511 The 
analysis below will outline what the ECtHR has held to be expression 
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protected by Article 10(1) ECHR. 
According to Mowbray, 512  that there are three categories of protected 
expression: political, artistic and commercial. This thesis seeks to consider 
another two emerging types, namely, civil and hybrid commercial expression, 
as independent categories of protected expression. 
 Protected expression 3.3.1.1
Political expression 
Political expression is defined as expression that comments on governmental, 
rather than individual, action. It includes criticism of politicians or officials 
whose conduct is capable of triggering political debate.513 Due to the benefits 
of such expression to public accountability and transparency in government, 
the ECtHR has confirmed that political expression deserves the highest level of 
protection.514 In Surek v Turkey (No 1)515 the ECtHR established that: 
‘in a democratic system the actions or omissions of the 
government must be subject to the close scrutiny, not only of 
the legislative and judicial authorities, but also of public opinion 
[…] the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to 
the government than in relation to a private citizen’.516 
It was held that the contribution of political dialogue towards the debates of 
public interest guarantees its peremptory character when weighed against other 
competing rights.517 In light of its importance, the ECtHR has laid down some 
important principles regarding political speech. 
In Ahmet Sadik v Greece,518 Mr Sadik, a practising Muslim, was a member of 
the Greek parliament. During his election campaign as a candidate for the 
Guven political party representing the Muslim population, he circulated 
communiqués in which the words ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkish Muslim’ were 
                                                
512 Alastair Mowbray, Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on 
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repeatedly used to refer to the Muslim minority. The Greek court was of the 
opinion that, by doing so, Mr Sadik provoked discord among citizens, 
particularly on the Muslim side. He was therefore convicted of ‘deceiving the 
electors’ and ‘disturbing the public peace’ contrary to Articles 162 and 192 of 
the Greek Criminal Code. Mr Sadik applied to the ECtHR, claiming that his 
conviction was an interference with his political expression. He argued that the 
statements made were protected as expressions within the meaning of Article 
10(1) ECHR. Although it was not explicitly held whether such statements were 
categorised as political expression, the ECtHR acknowledged that the 
expressions at issue were of such a nature that constituted important national 
legal issues since they affected the cultural identity of the entire Muslim 
minority in Western Thrace.519 Since they were made by a politician in his 
political discourse, the ECtHR implicitly recognised the importance of the right 
of individuals to declare one’s ethnic origin.520 
In Lingens v Austria,521 the ECtHR stated that ‘freedom of political debate is at 
the very core of the concept of a democratic society which prevails throughout 
the Convention’.522 It also accepted that political expression could contribute 
towards resolving a country’s problems through an open and pluralistic 
political debate.523 For these reasons, it was held that the national convictions 
amounted to an infringement of the right to freedom of expression.524 
Civil expression 
Civil expression is another protected form of expression. In the ECHR regime, 
civil expression is broadly referred to as expression capable of triggering 
meaningful public discussion and, accordingly, closely associated with certain 
public interest matters.525 For example, a copy of an internal report regarding 
manufacturing defects of breathalysers used by the police in a drink-driving 
case or the publication of an article revealing corruption by national authorities 
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have each been held to be civil expression.526 Needless to say, these are kinds 
of information to which the public should have access in light of freedom of 
expression. 
The ECtHR has interpreted the concept of civil expression through its case law 
in a way that also embraces social, economic and cultural aspects of protected 
expression.527  As civil expression contributes to a democratic society by 
promoting the public right to be informed about such important matters, the 
level of protection afforded to this expression should be no less than that 
afforded to political expression. 
Handyside v UK528 concerned the publication of a book called the Little Red 
Schoolbook, which allegedly contained pornographic messages. In 1971 the 
British authorities had seized copies of the book and brought the proprietor of 
the book, Mr. Handyside, into criminal proceedings. Despite the ECtHR’s 
ruling that this was a legitimate interference with freedom of expression,529 it 
was accepted that the book was expression protected by Article 10(1). The 
Court confirmed that the scope of Article 10 protection is broad, and: 
‘applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the 
State or any sector of the population’.530  
Although the applicant’s book contained some elements that conflicted with 
public morals of the day, the civil expression character may have derived from 
the fact that it may have been useful teaching material, not only for children 
but also for general readers, about sex. Here, the content of the book becomes 
socially important for the public knowledge. Therefore, this case illustrates 
another aspect of expressions protected under Article 10 ECHR. 
Sunday Times v UK (No 1) 531  concerned the publication of a series of 
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newspaper articles criticising the testing and manufacturing history and the 
aftermath of the taking of a drug called Thalidomide, which was later found to 
have caused malformation in children whose mothers had taken it during 
pregnancy. While the publication by the Sunday Times was intended to provide 
to the parents a full account of the drug’s after-effects, a preliminary injunction 
was issued to prevent publication. Having failed to have the injunction lifted by 
the domestic courts, application was made to the ECtHR claiming that this 
injunction was an illegitimate interference with freedom of expression. The 
ECtHR paid particular attention to the merits conveyed by the articles at issue 
to a democratic society regarding the adverse effects of a drug on public 
health.532 Given this contribution towards keeping the public properly informed 
about matters affecting their general interest,533 the articles were recognised as 
civil expression and thus afforded a high level of protection. 
Commercial expression 
According to ECtHR case law,534 commercial expression is also protected 
expression under Article 10 ECHR. However, the protection afforded to this 
form of expression is less than that afforded to political or civil expression 
because it is only made for competitive reasons and member states are thus 
granted a wider margin of appreciation to put restrictions on it.535 In the 
European regime, the term commercial expression is described as the 
dissemination of information, ideas or images, commonly in the form of 
commercial advertising to consumers, for the pursuit of economic interests and 
the corresponding right to be informed about such matter.536 This statement, 
especially in the latter part, is understood to determine the underlying concept 
that as much regard should at least be paid to consumers’ interests in receiving 
the free flow of information as that of informers.537 Hence, the latter should not 
be precluded from obtaining Article 10 protection, even though solely 
                                                
532 Ibid. 
533 Ibid. para 65, 66. 
534 See, for example, Colman v United Kingdom App no 16632/90 (ECtHR, 28 June 1993); 
Casado v Spain App no 15450/89 (ECtHR, 26 January 1994); Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG 
(no3) v Austria App no 39069/97 (ECtHR, 11 March 2004).  
535 Maya Hertig Randall, ‘Commercial Speech under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Subordinate or Equal?’ (2006) 6 HRLR 53, 84-86. 
536 Harris and Others (n 321) 635. 
537 Ibid. 636. 
 
117 
motivated by an economic purpose.538 
In Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v Germany,539 the ECtHR confirmed that, 
although some published articles and letters contained some derogatory 
comments about trade practices, they were still protected expressions. Also, in 
the recent case of Ashby Donald v France,540 the ECtHR held that photographs 
taken in a fashion week event and published online were still protected 
expression under the meaning of Article 10(1) despite a profit-making purpose 
and the absence of the rightsholder’s permission. This was also the case in The 
Pirate Bay, 541  where the service in question put in place the means of 
communication to allow internet users to share and transfer information and 
ideas online. Such activity was considered to be protected commercial 
expression within the scope of Article 10. 
Hybrid commercial expression 
The ECtHR jurisprudence also suggests that there exists another aspect of 
commercial speech, which includes a public interest element. This category, as 
may be called ‘hybrid or category crossover expression’542, represents the 
combined characters of commercial and civil expressions. In particular, it is 
seen as a way in which the subordinate status of purely commercial speech can 
be fine-tuned to embrace a greater degree of protection by its non-commercial 
facet that contributes to a debate of general interest. In Barthold v Germany,543 
the expression at issue concerned an article published in a local newspaper 
containing an interview with a veterinary surgeon (Barthold) and his criticism 
about ‘the absence of veterinary service at night’. While the German court 
regarded the published speech as purely commercial and conducted with unfair 
competitive manners against his fellow veterinarians, the ECtHR found it 
unacceptable to disregard the contribution that a profit-driven publication could 
have made towards a public debate of general interest. This proposition of 
recognising the hybrid commercial expression as protected expression was 
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repeated in Hertel v Switzerland.544 The subject-matter was a published article 
in a health journal alleging that microwave ovens caused cancer. Although it 
was acknowledged that the author’s expression was profit-driven and 
prejudicial to manufacturers’ and suppliers’ interests, the ECtHR placed more 
focus on ‘his participation in a debate affecting the general interest, for 
example, over public health’.545 
In short, a fairly clear distinction between purely commercial and hybrid 
commercial speech has been made in ECtHR case law. Despite both being 
regarded as protected expressions under Article 10, various degrees to which a 
particular expression receives protection afforded by Article 10 will have a 
significant effect to the legitimacy of interferences with such expression. 
Artistic expression 
Artistic work can be defined as a form of expression that illustrates literary 
creations such as novels, books, poetry and other arranged creative productions 
of objects, such as images, photographs, sculptures, carvings, posters, 
paintings, theatrical works, sounds and words.546 Artistic freedom is vital to a 
variety of human values and human development due to its importance in 
promoting pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness as preconditions to a 
healthy democracy.547 The prominent ECtHR’s dictum with regard to the 
protection of artistic works can be found in Muller and Others v Switzerland.548 
This case concerned three paintings, which explicitly depicted sexual activities, 
namely fellatio, sodomy and sex with animals. The ECtHR acknowledged that, 
in spite of an unclear differentiation between various forms of protected 
expression, Article 10 protection extends to: 
‘freedom of artistic expression – notably within the freedom to 
receive and impart information and ideas – which affords the 
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opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural, 
political and social information and ideas of all kinds’.549 
As is also evident in the consideration of civil expression, the scope of 
protection afforded to freedom of expression extends not only to inoffensive or 
indifferent information or ideas, but also those having an offensive, shocking 
or disturbing nature.550 Artistic expression that contributes to the exchange of 
information and ideas, such as the paintings in Muller, is believed to open up 
the public space and the boundaries of public sensibilities are pushed out to 
embrace and promote debate about controversial issues.551 This is despite them 
being obscene, offensive or challenging to some. These merits can in turn lead 
to the formation of a plural, tolerant and broadminded society, which are 
prerequisites for democracy. Therefore, the considerations above suggest that 
pursuant to the meaning of Article 10(1) the paintings at issue are regarded as 
protected expression, though it was later concluded that the interference 
imposed by the Swiss authority against the applicant was deemed proportionate 
and necessary in a democratic society in light of Article 10(2).552   
In Vereinigung Bildender Kunstler v Austria,553 satirical paintings of public 
figures in sexual postures were also considered to be protected expressions 
because the ECtHR recognised that ‘satire is a form of artistic expression and 
social commentary and, by its inherent features of exaggeration and distortion 
of reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate’.554 
The case law considered above suggests that the contribution of artistic 
expression to the freedom to exchange ideas and opinions and the promotion of 
social criticism in a democratic society justifies its protection. This is 
regardless of its reprehensible character in the copyright context, such as 
obscene painting, offensive film and novels inciting hatred and violence.555 
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Copyright infringements in terms of ‘type of expression’ 
Considering what is included under the definition of protected expressions, the 
scope of protection embraces art, music, films, print media and anything that 
allows the transfer of information. As copyright protects original and fixed 
forms of literary, artistic, dramatic, musical and some other derivative 
works, 556  this indicates that all copyright-protected works including their 
copies are also recognised as protected expressions. They are most likely to be 
considered commercial or artistic rather than political expression. Copyright 
law provides authors with exclusive rights to have control over the use of the 
work in which they have bestowed their skills and labour, to allow them to 
make a living out of their creations. Therefore, any use or reproduction of such 
copyright-protected works without the author’s permissions under the exercise 
of the right protected by Article 10 ECHR will trigger an interface between 
copyright and freedom of expression in which a balancing of rights is required. 
The level to which such commonly overlapping areas of works receives 
protection from each right in the balancing exercise is dependent on various 
factors. 
 Means of communication 3.3.1.2
The protection afforded by Article 10 ECHR is not restricted to particular types 
of expression. It covers different means of communication, such as newspapers 
and other forms of print and electronic media such as internet.557 Journalism 
has perhaps attracted the most judicial attention. Although there is no universal 
definition or recognition of journalism, the relevant ECtHR jurisprudence 
suggests that it is the activity of gathering, assessing, creating, and presenting 
news and information with a distinguished identifiable characteristic and 
practice. 558  Due to its vital purpose of providing people with verified 
information through systematic journalistic process, journalism can be 
regarded as a means by which information is communicated. 
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Following the development of the ‘information society’, journalism is one of 
the primary means whereby information, news and ideas are exchanged and 
shared among individuals and the public, either spoken, printed or using 
electronic media.559 Freedom of expression can be enhanced through the 
capability of journalists to freely convey information to society, and it is 
perhaps this merit that has reserved a strong presumption for the principle of 
journalistic freedom to stand securely in the scope of Article 10 protection. 
When the exercise of freedom of expression in the context of journalism is 
interfered with by other competing interests, especially those exercised by 
copyright holders, the publicly valuable aspect of journalistic activities is one 
of the factors for balancing freedom of expression and copyright.560 
 Excluded expressions 3.3.1.3
Given the degree to which each type of expression is protected by Article 10 
ECHR is determined by the level of contribution it makes towards a 
democratic society, hate speech sits at the opposite end to political speech and 
may fall short of the scope of protection completely. As far as the ECtHR 
jurisprudence is concerned, it has been a contentious issue for national courts 
to confer protection to expressions that advocate ‘violence, hatred and 
discrimination against individuals or groups on the basis of their race, colour, 
ethnicity, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, or other status’.561 As elucidated 
earlier, freedom of expression promotes pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness, all of which are essential foundations of a democratic 
society. 562  That being said, ‘it may be considered necessary in certain 
democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which 
spread, incite or promote hatred based on intolerance’. 563  Against this 
backdrop, although the case law on Article 10 suggests that it seems difficult to 
draw the line between morally worthless expressions and those contributing to 
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legitimate debate of controversial matters,564 the ECtHR has adopted two 
approaches when dealing with the intersection between freedom of expression 
and incitement to hatred.565  
First, despite the explicit wordingof Article 10(1) ECHR excluding speech 
inciting hatred from the protection, the ECtHR have expressly taken the view 
that what amounts to hate speech is not protected.566 The exclusion has 
consistently been based on the justification that hate speech is incompatible 
with the ECHR’s underlying values567 and, as such, it would not be allowed to 
enjoy Article 10 protection by Article 17 of the same Convention [prohibition 
of abuse of rights].568 To date, relevant case law suggest that what negates the 
spirit of the ECHR and therefore falls within the non-protected hate speech 
category includes, among other things, expressions promoting or inciting 
religious hatred, anti-Semitism,569 racial or ethnic discrimination570 or pro-Nazi 
ideology,571 and those condoning terrorism and war crimes, e.g. Holocaust 
denial.572  
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Having paid cautious attention in identifying excluded expression, the ECtHR 
has also recognised that certain types of hate speech, although they are 
offensive, provocative, insulting or hostile in nature, do not incite violence or 
hatred to the extent that they are inclined to undermine the spirit of the 
ECHR.573 Rather, some of them could bear on a matter of public interest, 
leading to legitimate debate of controversial or sensitive matters.574 Under such 
circumstances, the ECtHR has adopted the balancing approach, in which the 
expression in question is protected but is subject to some restrictions set out by 
Article 10(2).575 The rationale underlying this approach may be that allowing 
the less extreme types of hate speech to be balanced with other competing 
interests at stake can be seen as a way to enhance pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness in societies.576 Such circumstances have involved, inter alia, 
offensive online comments criticising misleading real estate business 
practices;577 racist and nationalistic views directed to provoke the historical 
debate about the 1915 massacres of the Armenians;578 and hostile remarks 
made against Muslim immigrants to stir up debates on their rapid growth in 
numbers.579 
Rather than taking extreme approaches in either totally depriving all kinds of 
hate speech of Article 10 protection or protecting them regardless,580 adopting 
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this balancing approach would be more harmonising for the confrontation 
between freedom of expression and the protection of individuals and the public 
from hate speech. While it is comprehensible for the ECtHR to preclude 
exceptionally intolerable hate speech from the protection so as to keep the 
ECHR’s fundamental values intact, the balancing approach will in most cases 
provide sufficient room for the ECtHR in its judicial analysis to not only look 
at the merits or reprehensibility of the content per se, but also other identifiable 
public interest reasons it may carry.581 More importantly, it reflects the pivotal 
balancing function of Article 10(2) in dealing with the question of how much  
interference imposed against different types of expression is to be tolerated. 
3.3.2 Concluding remarks for Article 10(1) ECHR 
Apart from the excluded hate speech delineated above, expression that 
contributes to free flow of information and ideas, ranging from political to 
commercial types expressed through all means of communication, is protected 
under the meaning of Article 10(1) ECHR. This is because it helps promote the 
principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness and is thus necessary 
for maintaining a democratic society. In this sense, unauthorised reproductions 
of literary, musical, dramatic, artistic, or any other derivative copyright-
protected works may fall within one of the categories of protected expression, 
albeit being subject to copyright infringements. 
When such unauthorised uses of copyright works occur, copyright law ensures 
that the rightsholders are placed in a position to take legal actions against 
infringers. This may then lead to different remedies or sanctions ordered by 
courts. It is these types of copyright measures that are, in the freedom of 
expression’s view, understood to constitute interferences with the rights 
protected by Article 10 ECHR, and where there exists an interference with 
freedom of expression by the exercise of copyright, part of the assessment of 
the legitimacy of that interference will depend on the type of expression 
concerned. All of these types of expressions can engage in copyright 
discussions in various forms of reproduction, such as copies of minutes from 
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political conferences (political expression) or copies of portraits, images or 
photographs (artistic expression). Considering this overlapping area between 
both bodies of rights, it is now worth examining what types of interferences 
copyright may give rise to and to what extent they are said to interfere with 
freedom of expression in the light of relevant legal instruments and case law. 
 Types of measures applicable to copyright infringement 3.3.2.1
There are both civil and criminal penalties for which infringers of copyright 
law can be liable. At the international level, sections 2 and 5 in part III of 
TRIPS set out the general rules for an infringement of IPR. Section 2 provides 
that states are obliged to ensure that civil remedies are available under 
domestic law for rightsholders to seek injunctions to cease an infringing 
activity, or for damages to reimburse the benefit he has lost because of such 
infringement, including attorney’s fees and costs arising thereof, or both.582 
Section 5 confirms that criminal sanctions, namely imprisonment and fines, are 
also available in wilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale.583 
In the context of copyright, the WIPO Copyright Treaty lays down that it is a 
matter for national authorities to ensure that expeditious and deterrent remedies 
are put in place to permit effective actions against copyright infringement.584 
These generally-defined principles are then transposed into copyright laws of 
member states with more detailed conditions and procedures. For instance, 
Chapter 5 of the US Copyright Act entitles claimants to different civil 
remedies, including preliminary or permanent injunctions, actual or statutory 
damages, and equitable relief such as seizure orders and costs.585 Criminal 
penalties are also determined, including imprisonment and fines, to be 
applicable to some cases where an infringer acts ‘for the purpose of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain’.586 Similarly, UK copyright 
law provides for injunctions and damages, and criminal remedies with various 
                                                
582 TRIPS, Arts 44, 45. 
583 TRIPS, Art 61. 
584 WCT, Art 14: Provisions on Enforcement of Rights. 
585 17 USC ss 502, 504, 505. 
586 17 USC s 506. 
 
126 
degrees of fines and imprisonment.587 
In the EU copyright regime, there are three Directives that are of particular 
relevance to remedies imposed against copyright infringement. First, the 
enforcement directive generally obliges member states to put in place 
appropriate civil remedies to the infringement of IPR.588 Article 8 of the 
Copyright Directive provides that member states shall put in place measures to 
ensure that an application for injunctions or damages or both is available to 
rightsholders in infringement claims.589 Member states are also allowed to 
provide criminal sanctions against such infringements where appropriate.590 
Recital 45 and Article 14(3) of the E-commerce Directive591 require that the 
courts of member states’ have discretionary power to grant different 
injunctions or other measures against intermediaries whose online services are 
exploited by a third party to infringe copyright or related rights. 
Judgments of the ECtHR 
The applications of both civil and criminal remedies within the EU are evident 
in ECtHR and ECJ case law. Both Courts have acknowledged that those types 
of sanctions lead to interferences with freedom of expression protected under 
ECHR and CFREU. In Ashby Donald and others v France,592 the Court of 
Appeal in Paris referred to Article L.335-2 of the French Copyright Act for 
imposing criminal sanction (fines) against the three photographers and for 
awarding civil remedy (damages) to the French Design Clothing Federation 
and five fashion houses.593 When the application was made to the ECtHR with 
the applicants’ claim that the fines and the award of damages were an 
interference with freedom of expression, it was accepted.594 Despite an absence 
of further explanation in the judgment, it was likely that such copyright 
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measures could financially incapacitate the applicants to the extent that they 
were prohibited from expressing themselves freely and, discouraged to further 
exercise their right to freedom of expression via online means.595  
Another example of interferences with the right to freedom of expression 
imposed by copyright law is evident in the Pirate Bay case.596 The criminal 
proceedings together with private claims for damages were brought against 
The Pirate Bay by numerous rightsholders of music, films and computer 
games, whose interests were undermined by the unauthorised use of their 
copyright materials by third-party users accessing the file-sharing service 
website. The Swedish Court of Appeal resorted to the Copyright Act 
(Upphovsrättslagen, 1960:729) Chapter 7 Section 53 and the Penal Code 
Chapter 23 Section 4 to hold the company’s owners liable for joint damages of 
€5 million, and imprisonments. The ECtHR recognised that the service 
provided by the applicants was a means by which public users exercised their 
freedom of expression, and so ‘the actions taken by the applicants are afforded 
protection under Article 10 of the Convention’. 597  Thus, the criminal 
conviction and the award of damages against the applicants in response to the 
claimed copyright infringement interfered with their right to freedom of 
expression. 
Judgments of the ECJ 
The ECJ has also recognised that injunctions awarded on the basis of copyright 
law interfere with freedom of expression.598 In Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM, 
the rightsholder of musical works – SABAM – sued an internet service 
provider whose online services were used by third-party users to infringe their 
copyright. The President of the Tribunal de premiere instance of Brussels 
decided in favour of the claimant by granting an injunction in the form of a 
‘filtering and blocking measure’ against the defendant. The grant was claimed 
to be for the purpose of bringing such infringing activities to an end and 
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preventing further infringement in accordance with Articles 8(3) and 11 
Copyright Directive and Section 87(1) of the Law of 30 June 1994 on 
copyright and related rights.599 The ECJ recalled that the service provided by 
Scarlet Extended SA facilitated the exercise of the freedom to receive and 
impart information online and that this freedom was protected by Article 11 
CFREU. 600  The copyright blocking measure in question suggested the 
blockage of both lawful and unlawful electronic communications, which might 
be a disincentive on future users.601 Such an effect would result from the 
preventive nature of such blocking measure, which protected not only existing 
copyright-protected works, but also works not yet created. Therefore, future 
users who wish to participate in electronic communications may be 
discouraged from doing so.602 Against this background, the copyright measure 
at issue constituted an interference with the right to freedom of expression.603 
It is clear then that copyright protection measures – both criminal sanctions and 
civil remedies – can constitute interference with the right to freedom of 
expression. These measures are primarily intended to bring an end to 
copyright-infringing activities and, in some cases, prevent further infringement 
for the sake of copyright owners’ interests. 
3.3.3 Article 10(2) ECHR: legitimate interferences with the right to 
freedom of expression 
While the analysis of Article 10(1) ECHR demonstrates what protected 
expression is, Article 10(2) provides that the right to freedom of expression is 
not absolute.604 It allows some interference to be justified and legitimate if it 
satisfies three requirements: being prescribed by law, being in pursuance of a 
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legitimate aim, and being necessary in a democratic society.605 
Having applied this notion to the intersection between copyright and freedom 
of expression, Article 10 allows for limits to be imposed on the latter right to 
ensure that it is not immune from the enforcement of the former. This is seen in 
one of the ECtHR’s long-established principles of the interpretation of the 
Convention, in which it has an inherent duty to seek a balance between the 
protection of applicants’ fundamental rights and interference with such rights 
by respondent states.606  
 Elements to be considered ‘when assessing the legitimacy of an 3.3.3.1
interference with the right to freedom of expression’ 
Prescribed by law 
The ECtHR has established a fairly clear definition of what ‘prescribed by law’ 
means. ‘Law’ has been largely interpreted to embrace not only statutes and 
unwritten laws, such as legal norms of a common law regime,607 but also the 
rules made by delegated rule-making authoritative bodies.608 In The Sunday 
Times v UK,609 the ECtHR identified two characteristics of a law for the 
purposes of Article 10(2) ECHR: 
‘First, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must 
be able to have an indication that is adequate in the 
circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. 
Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to 
regulate his conduct: he must be able—if need be with 
appropriate advice—to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in 
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail’.610 
With regard to the ‘accessibility’, it was not a difficult task for the ECtHR in 
this case to decide that the common law of contempt of court satisfied this 
subtest. The law was sufficiently accessible to individuals and enabled them ‘to 
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have an indication which was adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules 
applicable to a given case’.611 The availability of legal advice to indicate the 
existence and the ability to use and understand the law is an important factor to 
determine that the law is sufficiently accessible.612 
Another characteristic that a given law is required to have is a certain degree of 
foreseeability. An established condition for this subtest is evident in the same 
case, where two common law principles embodied in the law of contempt of 
court, namely the pressure principle and the prejudgment principle, were 
considered to be the basis on which an injunction was granted.613 The ECtHR 
accepted that English law provided sufficient precision to allow the applicant 
to reasonably foresee that ‘a deliberate attempt to influence the settlement of 
pending proceedings by bringing public pressure to bear on a party’614 was 
contrary to the pressure principle and thereby constituted contempt of court.615 
The Court added that the possibility that the publication of the articles at issue 
could lead to a public prejudgment of ongoing proceedings was adequately 
foreseeable to such a degree that it was appropriate to say that such publishing 
activity amounted to contempt of court.616 This case suggests that attributes of 
the law at issue – providing sufficient detail and allowing individuals to foresee 
within a reasonable period of time after its formulation whether their conduct 
might lead to an infringement – are determining factors for this subtest. 
In Muller v Switzerland,617 an individual applicant intended to display his 
paintings depicting sexual intercourse between men and animals in an open 
exhibition. The ECtHR had to deal with the question of whether or not the 
temporary seizure and fines imposed on the applicant were in violation of his 
right to freedom of expression. In the ruling, the ECtHR had a chance to 
further clarify its previous proposition given in The Sunday Times v UK. In 
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addition to the ancillary assertion that the accessibility test was satisfied,618 the 
ECtHR agreed with the Swiss courts that the challenge by the painter, that the 
term ‘obscene’ in article 204(1) of the Swiss criminal law was too ambiguous 
to allow artists or exhibitors to foresee the possible risk of breaking the law, 
was unfounded. Despite the required degree of precision of interference,619 ‘the 
Court has however already emphasised the impossibility of attaining absolute 
precision in the framing of laws’.620 This may be because the ECtHR also took 
into account the ineffectiveness of inflexible laws in keeping pace with 
constantly evolving public opinions on obscenity.621 
Legitimate aims 
An interference must also pursue a legitimate aim; that is, it must pursue one of 
the purposes enumerated in Article 10(2) ECHR to be justified. Among those 
purposes, particular attention should be directed to the aim of the protection of 
the rights of others. Copyright is captured by this aim. To determine to what 
extent, the ECtHR’s case law concerning Article 1 of Additional Protocol 1 
(A1P1) – the protection of peaceful enjoyment of property – should be 
considered. The ECtHR has endorsed the fundamental legal status of 
intellectual property by virtue of its determination that it is protected by A1P1. 
That intellectual property is protected by A1P1 was confirmed by the ECtHR 
in Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal.622 The applicant, an American company 
selling the beer under the Budweiser brand, argued that they had a right to 
register the brand as a trademark. The Portuguese Supreme Court held that the 
word ‘Budweiser’ could not be registered as a trademark as doing so would 
infringe the appellation of origin rule recognised in a bilateral agreement 
concluded between the Portuguese and Czech governments. In an application 
to the ECtHR, the applicant argued that this constituted a violation of its right 
                                                
618 Ibid. paras 20, 29. 
619 Ibid. para 29. 
620 Ibid. Nevertheless, the acceptable degree of foreseeability is not only determined by the fact 
that the law in question is enacted in a certain legal instrument, but also by the level of 
precision regarding a course of conduct such a law is designed to protect or exclude, and the 
formalities and conditions attached to such conduct. See Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo v 
Ukraine App no 33014/05 (ECtHR, 5 May 2011) paras 61-66. 
621 Muller v Switzerland (n 548) 29. 
622 App no 73049/01 (ECtHR, 11 January 2007). 
 
132 
to enjoy peaceful possession of its intellectual property as protected by A1P1. 
A preliminary question was whether A1P1 was applicable to intellectual 
property. In answering this, the ECtHR began by establishing the general 
principle that the protection afforded by the Article may be enjoyed by a 
person who had a ‘legitimate expectation of obtaining an asset’,623 both in 
tangible and intangible forms. It then made reference to Smith Kline and 
French Laboratories Ltd v Netherlands,624 in which the European Commission 
on Human Rights submitted that a patent was regarded as personal, 
transferable and assignable property owned by the proprietor; therefore, it was 
protected by A1P1.625 The Commission’s recognition was bolstered by the 
ECtHR’s statement, which firmly reiterated that A1P1 was widely interpreted 
to encompass all IPR.626 This important concept was understood to underpin 
the statement in Ashby Donald v France that the imposed interferences based 
on copyright infringement pursued the aim of protecting the rights of fashion 
designers.627 It may be inferred that interference initiated by national copyright 
laws can, to a great extent, have recourse to the broadly-interpreted notion that 
copyright, as a form of IPR protected by A1P1, satisfies the requirement that 
interference with freedom of expression has a legitimate aim. 
Necessary in a democratic society 
Before assessing in detail the extent to which copyright is necessary in a 
democratic society in light of the test in Article 10(2) ECHR, it is necessary to 
consider the views of the two prominent courts towards the need to strike a fair 
balance between freedom of expression and copyright. 
Judgments of the ECtHR 
A1P1 does not afford greater protection to rightsholders than that afforded by 
Article 10 ECHR. This can be seen from the actual provision, which reads: 
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‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of 
international law’. 
The text indicates that the right to peaceful enjoyment of property is subject to 
some limitations, and that the right to freedom of expression is one of them. 
This was one of the two decisive elements on which the ECtHR based its final 
ruling that there was no violation of Article 10 ECHR in Ashby Donald and 
Others v France.628 The ECtHR acknowledged that, where the two conflicting 
rights are among those guaranteed by the Convention and its Protocols, no 
right has absolute priority and the need to protect one may, in turn, lead to 
restrictions on the other.629 Such circumstance is well represented in this case 
where it reveals the clash between two fundamental rights, both of which 
pursued legitimate aims: copyright protection guaranteed by A1P1 and 
freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR. In this regard, national 
authorities are obliged to strike a fair balance between them through their 
margin of appreciation and this assessment will form part of the assessment of 
whether the restriction was necessary in a democratic society.630 
Judgments of the ECJ 
It is worth taking a look at some of the ECJ’s rulings in similar cases, albeit 
with different laws applied,631 concerning the balancing of two conflicting EU 
fundamental rights. Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM and SABAM v Netlog,632 
both involve SABAM, a Belgian authority responsible for monitoring the use 
of musical works. SABAM imposed obligations on the internet service 
provider (Scarlet Extended SA) in the former case and on the online social 
network service host (Netlog) in the latter to install a filtering system, which 
required them to scan through all users’ IP addresses and all contents 
communicated within their services. This was part of the preventive measure 
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for the claimed purpose of identifying illegal copyrighted file downloads by the 
users of such intermediaries. The ECJ held that, although it was true that IPR 
were protected by Article 17 CFREU, there was no statement that suggested 
the right was inviolable. In fact, the measure in question would impose an 
unlimited burden on service providers and render the system incapable of 
separating illegitimate content from legitimate and amount to an unreasonable 
interference with the freedom to communicate lawful information. 633 
Accordingly, there was no fair balance between copyright protection 
guaranteed by the CFREU, and the right to freedom of expression guaranteed 
not only by Article 11 CFREU, but also by Article 10 ECHR.634 
This analysis shows that both Courts recognise the need to strike a fair balance 
between copyright and the right to freedom of expression. This mutually 
agreed proposition is reflected in the crucial function of the last condition in 
Article 10(2). The necessary in a democratic society test is a decisive element 
that takes into account various factors in examining the level to which other 
competing rights are necessary to a democratic society to interfere with the 
enjoyment of freedom of expression. In light of the need for predictability and 
certainty, an establishment of a clear, but not exhaustive, set of the test’s 
criteria may thus be useful to enable the ECtHR to effectively strike such a 
balance. It would also allow the concerned parties to be made aware of the acts 
of disrupting freedom of expression in the future. 
Analysis in light of the ECtHR’s judgments 
Despite an absence of certain criteria, the ECtHR has construed the 
requirement that an interference be necessary in a democratic society in a 
relatively understandable and consistent way. A number of judgments suggest 
that the test requires the ECtHR to consider whether the interference 
complained of corresponds with ‘a pressing social need’ and ‘whether the 
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reasons adduced by national authorities to justify such interference are relevant 
and sufficient to a level at which it can be deemed proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued’.635 Put simply, whether a fair balance is achieved. 
States are afforded a margin of appreciation in determining where the fair 
balance should be struck, and the ECtHR has taken into consideration various 
factors when applying the two-fold test to the cases. 
Ashby Donald and Others v France636 is one of those rare cases where the 
ECtHR had a chance to put copyright law into the balancing assessment with 
the right to freedom of expression. In justifying the criminal convictions under 
the French copyright law, the necessary in a democratic society test was 
carried out by weighing up types of information expressed against the 
rightsholders’ interests. The Court pointed out that, firstly, the applicants’ acts 
of publishing the photographs taken at a Paris fashion show on their website 
merely for commercial purposes manifestly constituted an unauthorised 
reproduction of the copyright-protected materials and amounted to copyright 
infringement.637 This suggests that there is a ‘pressing social need’ to prevent 
others from prejudicing the rightsholders’ interests protected by copyright law. 
Secondly, in terms of the content, the ECtHR held that neither the photographs 
themselves nor the means by which they were disseminated could be 
understood to contribute to any debate of general interest, but was merely done 
for commercial gain.638 Otherwise, a margin of appreciation given to the state 
to allow copyright to interfere with freedom of expression would have been 
narrower.639 Therefore, considering the type of expression in this case, the 
reasons given by the national courts to justify the underlying interference were 
regarded as relevant and sufficiently proportionate to the legitimate aim. 
Accordingly, copyright outweighed freedom of expression. 
The Pirate Bay v Sweden 640  is another remarkable example where the 
                                                
635 The Observer and Guardian v UK App no 13585/88 (ECtHR, 16 November 1991) para 59; 
Sunday Times (n 531) para 62; Ashby Donald v France (n 492) para 38. 
636 Ashby Donald and Others v France (n 492). 
637 Ibid. para 42. 
638 Ibid. para 39. 
639 Ibid. See para 39 in French texts. 
640 The Pirate Bay (n 497); see Section 3.2.5. 
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necessary in a democratic society test was the determining factor in the 
ECtHR’s decision. The Pirate Bay argued that, as an online database service, it 
simply provided a means for internet users to have access to a catalogue of 
digital torrent files, and that its service facilitated the wide dissemination of 
ideas and information and attracted the protection of Article 10 ECHR. It was 
the users who should be held responsible for the illegal use of copyright-
protected materials through its service. 
On application to the ECtHR, the Court had particular regard to the merit of the 
expressions at issue. It underlined that the protection provided by Article 10 
ECHR to The Pirate Bay’s online service did not reach the same level as that 
afforded to the expression contributing to the public debate, such as political 
expression. 641  It went on to consider the level of sufficiency and 
proportionality between the claimed legitimate purpose of protecting others’ 
copyright interests, the copyright restrictive measures adopted, and the reasons 
used to justify such measures. The Court took into account that the national 
courts were required by national copyright law and A1P1 to protect the 
claimant’s copyright interests and agreed with the national courts’ finding that 
the service had intentionally accommodated and promoted unlawful file-
sharing without any effort to bring it to an end. These reasons were relevant 
and sufficient to justify the copyright measures. Furthermore, ‘the nature and 
severity of the penalties imposed are factors to be taken into account when 
assessing the proportionality of interference with freedom of expression 
guaranteed by Article 10’. 642  In this regard, the ECtHR noted that the 
applicants did not heed several warnings and requests to remove the torrent 
files in question. This was despite them being made aware that the materials 
used in their file-sharing service were copyright-protected. On this basis, the 
ECtHR decided that the interference in terms of sentence and the award of 
damages were not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.643 
Having examined two cases where the type of information in which the claim 
                                                
641 Ibid. 11. 
642 The Pirate Bay (n 497), citing Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v Romania App no 33348/96 ECtHR, 
17 December 2004) 111. 
643 Ibid., citing Ashby Donald v France (n 492) para 41. 
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of freedom of expression lies carries less weighty justification than the 
copyright rules, the focus now shifts to consider the opposite situation where 
the content goes beyond merely commercial, entertainment or curiosity-
satisfying purposes. Such a situation may then have a significant effect on the 
outcome of the final test. 
Contribution to a debate of general interest 
In Barthold v Germany, a veterinary surgeon published an article that 
expressed his concern about ‘the need for a night veterinary service’.644 The 
German national courts found that the publication went beyond objective 
criticism and amounted to advertising aimed at ‘acquiring a commercial 
advantage over professional colleagues’.645 These were, according to German 
law, incompatible with the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Unfair 
Competition Act. Before the ECtHR, the applicant complained that the 
injunctions and fines imposed on him constituted a violation of his right to 
freedom of expression. While the ECtHR’s view concurred with the national 
courts that the interference in question was prescribed by law and pursued the 
legitimate aim of protecting the interests of other fellow veterinarians, the 
necessary in a democratic society test called for a more careful assessment 
regarding the published article’s value to society. The ECtHR recalled the 
general principles of pressing social need and proportionality to examine 
whether the interference at issue was necessary.646 It began the balancing 
assessment by having regard to the nature and substantive content of the 
article. The article raised the problem of the absence of a night-time veterinary 
service, but also contained an emergency service telephone number from which 
animal owners could receive the details of vets open during the weekend. As 
pointed out by the ECtHR, these elements quashed the arguments that the 
applicant ‘had intended to exploit the article for advertising purposes’.647 In 
fact, it was more likely that the publication was aimed at ‘informing the public 
about the situation obtaining in Hamburg, at a time when the enactment of new 
                                                
644 Barthold v Germany (n 543) para 42. 
645 Ibid. para 51. 
646 Ibid. para 55, citing Sunday Times v UK (n 531) paras 59,62. 
647 Ibid. paras 54, 58. 
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legislation on veterinary surgeons was under consideration’.648 The advertising 
benefit was secondary when the expression was capable of encouraging 
citizens to freely contribute ‘to public debate on topics affecting the life of the 
community’, 649  and therefore, ‘the injunctions complained of were not 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and, accordingly, are not necessary 
in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of others’.650 In short, 
the merits of the content contributing to the public debate were decisive factors 
for the ECtHR to decide that the right to freedom of expression should prevail. 
An elaborate consideration of the necessary in a democratic society test in 
contributing to a debate of general interest took place in Hertel v 
Switzerland.651 This case also involved a clash between the right to freedom of 
expression and restrictions based on unfair competition laws. The published 
commercial article contained a report by a scientist who based his research on 
the hazardous effect of microwave ovens on public health. The Swiss national 
court ordered an injunction preventing further publication on the basis of the 
Swiss Unfair Competition Law to prevent further detriment to microwave oven 
manufacturers. The ECtHR held that it was not necessary in a democratic 
society to interfere with the duty of the press to impart information on matters 
of general interest to the public. Indeed, the ECtHR had particular regard to the 
fact that the publication went beyond a mere commercial purpose; rather, it 
formed a significant topic in which people, including researchers like the 
applicant, were enabled to participate in a debate about public health concerns. 
The detrimental effect on the public right to be well-informed to protect the 
commercial interests of a small group of manufacturers was substantial. 
Despite the interference being prescribed by law and pursuing a legitimate aim, 
it was not necessary in a democratic society because of the strong public 
interest in the expression. Evidently, the merits that particular expression 
makes towards public discussions play a significant role in the balancing 
exercise of Article 10 ECHR. Similarly, in Steel and Morris v UK652 in which 
                                                
648 Barthold v Germany (n 543) para 56. 
649 Ibid. para 58. 
650 Ibid. para 59. 
651 App no 25181/94 (ECtHR, 25 August 1998) para 46. 
652 App no 68416/01 (ECHR, 15 February 2005) paras 87, 94. 
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the expression at issue disclosed ‘very serious allegations on topics of general 
concern, such as abusive and immoral farming and employment practices [and] 
deforestation against McDonalds’, the ECtHR held that expressions regarding 
such matters of public interest require a higher level of protection than that 
required for protecting commercial institutions’ reputations. 
The importance of such contributions to a public debate can also be seen in 
cases concerning the conflict between the right to privacy and the right to 
freedom of expression. In Von Hannover v Germany and Axel Springer v 
Germany,653 not only do they contribute to certain criteria used in the balancing 
exercise between Articles 8 and 10 ECHR,654 the distinction between matters 
of public curiosity and those of public interest are also clearly made in these 
cases. In Von Hannover v Germany (No 2),655 Princess Caroline von Hannover 
made a privacy claim against the unauthorised publication of private 
photographs taken during royal family members’ skiing holiday. The ECtHR 
pointed out that such photographs were accompanied by an article which 
discussed the health problems of Prince Rainier III. Accordingly, the published 
photographs and article went beyond a mere desire to satisfy or entertain public 
curiosity in knowing what the royal family did in private; rather, ‘the subject 
qualified as an event of contemporary society’, and the publication ‘did 
contribute, at least to some degree, to a debate of general interest’.656 
On the same day, the judgment in Axel Springer v Germany657 was also handed 
down. The applicant, the owner of a German daily newspaper, had published 
an article reporting the arrest and conviction of a famous TV star for a drug-
related offence. At the outset, the ECtHR held that informing the public about 
the rumoured marital or financial difficulties or daily private life of public 
figures generally did not serve anything more than feeding public curiosity.658 
                                                
653 Von Hannover v Germany (No 1) App no 59320/00 (ECtHR, 24 June 2004); Von Hannover 
v Germany (No 2) (n 500); Axel Springer AG v Germany (No 1) (n 500); Axel Springer AG v 
Germany (No 2) App no 48311/10 (ECtHR, 10 July 2014). 
654 Axel Springer AG v Germany (No 1) (n 500) paras 89-95; Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) 
(n 500) paras 109-113. 
655 Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (n 500). 
656 Ibid. paras 117,118. 
657 Axel Springer v Germany (No 1) (n 500). 
658 Ibid. para 90. 
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However, such a proposition did not apply to the article at issue, which sought 
to inform the public about the judicial facts of a set of criminal proceedings. 
This was particularly true when the person to whom the report referred was 
perceived by most of his teenage admirers to be a well-behaved role model.659 
The debate of public interest resulting from the published article was thus one 
of the decisive factors that assured the ECtHR to hold that the national 
restrictive measure was not of such a nature that introduced ‘a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality’ to the legitimate aim it pursued. 
So far, the case law considered suggests that the extent to which the exercise of 
freedom of expression can contribute to a debate of general interest plays a 
significant role in the necessary in a democratic society test. This is an 
increasingly important and prevailing aspect of freedom of expression that 
copyright law, as one of interferences with freedom of expression, has to take 
into account in its L&Es regime. 
 Protection of journalism 3.3.3.2
Journalism is routinely engaged in the exercise of freedom of expression. This 
is particularly evident when the information, opinions and ideas at issue are 
expressed to the public through newspapers, magazines and so on.660 In the 
course of journalistic activities, journalists may sometimes have to engage in 
particular expressions that are protected by copyright. This may create tension 
between freedom of expression and copyright. In Article 10(1) ECHR, the 
means of communication is one of the criteria that has an effect on the 
balancing exercise carried out in Article 10(2) ECHR – i.e. what interferences 
will be tolerated. Therefore, it is worth exploring further to what extent the 
ECtHR recognises the importance of journalism in relation to its contribution 
to public debate as a way to promote freedom of expression in a democratic 
society, and the degree to which interference with such journalistic freedom, 
such as copyright, are to be tolerated in Article 10(2) consideration. 
                                                
659 Ibid. paras 96, 98. 
660 See Barthold v Germany (n 543); Hertel v Switzerland (n 544); Axel Springer v Germany 
(No 1) (500); Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (n 500). 
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Stoll v Switzerland 
The ECtHR had an opportunity to rule on the principle of journalistic freedom 
in Stoll v Switzerland.661 The case concerned a clash between Article 10 
ECHR, which guarantees the journalist’s freedom in reporting a confidential 
diplomatic memorandum, and Article 293 of the Swiss Criminal Code, which 
imposes criminal sanctions for ‘publication of secret official deliberations’.662 
Despite the final ruling in favour of the latter ground,663 the ECtHR ‘shares the 
view of the Chamber that the information contained in the [document in 
question] concerned matters of public interest’;664 thereby, it acknowledged 
that journalists had an important duty to disclose the matter at issue.665 It also 
confirmed that such practice was protected by Article 10, which not only 
affords the journalists the right to receive and seek, but also the right to have 
access to documents relating to acts or omissions of national authorities 
affecting the public interest. Therefore, any national measures attempting to 
suppress such journalistic activity should be subject to close scrutiny. By 
analogy, this would also be applicable to circumstances where such journalistic 
freedom is interfered with by measures imposed by copyright law, which seeks 
to protect the author’s interests in preventing journalists from freely using 
protected materials without permission. As indicated earlier, whether the 
interference posed by copyright measures will be allowed to interfere with 
freedom of expression is assessed under Article 10(2), but in such a case 
particular emphasis is placed on journalistic activities concerning matters of 
public interest.666 
Axel Springer AG v Germany (No 2)667 
A former German politician had sought an injunction based on a national 
privacy law against the publication disclosing his allegedly corrupt behaviour. 
                                                
661 App no 69698/01 (ECtHR, 25 April 2006). 
662 Ibid. paras 35, 45, 49, 51. 
663 Ibid. para 162. 
664 Ibid. para 118. 
665 Ibid. paras 49, 118, 124. 
666 See also Voskuil v Netherlands App no 64752/01 (ECtHR, 22 November 2007) para 65. The 
ECtHR also recalled that the highest standard of the press freedom was justified by the right of 
public to be properly informed about matters of public interest. Therefore, any interferences 
with such freedom must steer clear of causing the potentially chilling effect to such freedom. 
667 Axel Springer AG v Germany (No 2) (n 653). 
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In particular, the published article criticised the link between his previous 
political role as Federal Chancellor and the benefits offered to him as a 
chairman in the German-Russian organisation responsible for the pipeline 
construction from Russia to Western Europe. The ECtHR found that the 
national courts had failed, among other things, to consider the prevailing public 
interest character of the messages conveyed by such an article when granting 
the injunction.668 The national courts also failed to pay particular attention to 
the contribution of journalists in reporting such a matter, which was capable of 
generating a political debate about whether or not the former Chancellor had 
exploited his high political position to the benefit of himself and the 
consortium. 669 In this respect, it can be understood that not only the content, 
but the merit of journalistic activities also had a significant effect on the 
decision in favour of the right to freedom of expression.670 Therefore, to 
deprive journalists of the right to exercise this freedom would seriously 
undermine the public right to receive information affecting their collective 
interests. A similar scenario would occur even when the politician sought to 
stop the publication at issue by having recourse to copyright injunctive relief. 
Oberschlick v Austria (No 2)671 
Herr Oberschlick was the editor of a political magazine. He published insulting 
comments on a political speech delivered by Herr Haider, the leader of an 
Austrian far-right party. As far as the content of the comments was concerned, 
the word ‘idiot’ was regarded by the national court as disparaging and only 
used for subjective criticism; therefore, the publication of these comments was 
found to be defamation under the Austrian Criminal Code. The ECtHR held 
that the context in which the underlying statements were communicated 
suggested that the speech at issue could be deemed objective, political and 
expected to be provocative and instigating strong criticism.672 It further held 
that the right to freedom of expression not only protects the contents of ideas 
                                                
668 Ibid. para 58. 
669 UK Human Rights Blog, ‘Axel Springer and Von Hannover: Grand Chamber victory for 
media’ (2012) <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2012/02/07/axel-springer-and-von-hannover-
grand-chamber-victory-for-media/> accessed 11 June 2015. 
670 Axel Springer AG v Germany (No 2) (n 653) paras 58, 69. 
671 Oberschlick v Austria (No 2) (n 513). 
672 Ibid. paras 31-33. 
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and information, but also the means by which they are imparted. This latter 
aspect of protection provides the applicant with journalistic freedom to inform 
the public about political matters in their interests, albeit being ‘considered 
polemical’.673 
This judgment suggests that the level at which the conveyed information 
presents a degree of legitimate public concern helps determine how much 
protection is afforded to the press in performing its journalistic role and 
absolving itself from criminal or civil liabilities imposed by national laws.674 
Even when the subject-matter in this case was copyright protected and 
substantially reproduced and published by the editor for commentary purposes, 
such journalistic publication that contributes to a public debate and promotes 
freedom of expression would be weighed heavier than copyright reasons in the 
necessary in a democratic society test. 
Summary 
The case law considered above has attempted to show the close relationship 
between freedom of expression and journalism. It has illustrated how the 
ECtHR has reflected its views towards the contribution made by the journalism 
in guarding the values and effectiveness of freedom of expression. This 
contribution is an important element of the necessary in a democratic society 
test in the sense that it weighs heavily in favour of freedom of expression. This 
is particularly relevant to copyright when freedom of expression is exercised 
by journalists who wish to publish copyright materials that contribute to the 
public debate, such as a written political memorandum containing secret 
negotiation between two political parties’ leaders.675 In such respect, the 
ECtHR may apply the balancing exercise to the competing interests in a way 
that is more likely to uphold freedom of expression for the sake of the public 
interest, despite copyright infringement. Copyright law may have to be more 
tolerant of the exercise of journalistic freedom in a democratic society. 
                                                
673 Ibid. para 33. 
674 See also Kaperzyński v Poland App no 43206/07 (ECtHR, 3 April 2012) para 70, in which 
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The increased freedom people have in terms of varied methods of 
communication leads to a gradual expansion of what falls within the meaning 
of journalistic activities. The internet has become one of the means of 
exercising freedom of expression through online communications,676 and this 
means that the function of journalism is no longer limited to only traditional 
media or professional journalists.677 Journalistic activities can now be carried 
out by much broader scale of actors such as online media, bloggers, social 
networkers, ISPs and search engines.678 It is this kind of development that 
enlarges the area of intersection between freedom of expression and copyright, 
and drives the ECtHR more towards to giving special attention to the concept 
of investigative journalism under the purview of Article 10 ECHR.679 This 
concept is evidently reflected by some additional protection afforded to the 
journalists in the form of principles established through the ECtHR case law.680 
 Establishing the principles of journalistic freedom for a more 3.3.3.3
transparent democratic society – conferring some privileges to 
the guardian of the right to freedom of expression 
Right to access state-held information 
Despite an absence of explicit recognition of the right to access official 
documents in the ECHR, this right has been held to be an inherent part of the 
right to freedom of expression.681 It is understood to stem from the ECtHR’s 
acceptance that the ECHR imposes both negative and positive obligations on 
states to respect and protect Convention rights, such as the right to freedom of 
expression and, in particular, journalistic freedom.682 The ECtHR has held that 
states are not only obliged not to interfere with individuals’ right to receive 
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no 31111/10 (ECtHR, 18 December 2012); Leach (n 676) para 15. 
679 Leach (n 676) para 37. 
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information from the media or journalists,683 but also have a positive obligation 
in certain circumstances to protect such rights from unwarranted 
interference.684 This requires them to form an environment ‘which allows full 
participation in open debates, enabling everyone to express their opinions and 
ideas, though shocking or offending, without fears’.685 
The ECtHR embarked on the realisation of the significance of the right to 
access state-held information in the context of information gathering by 
investigative journalists in Dammann v Switzerland.686 The case concerned the 
conviction of a journalist who acquired secret official documents about the 
prosecution of drug-related offences in a Zurich post office robbery case.687 
Although the documents obtained were not published, the national authority 
found this pre-publication activity in violation of the domestic law aimed at 
protecting official secrets.688 In finding that the fines imposed constituted an 
unjustified interference with freedom of expression, the ECtHR placed 
particular concern to the conviction restricting the journalist from accessing 
official information. It acknowledged that the conviction may have constituted 
censorship and discouraged him from conducting research as a preparatory step 
towards performing a public watchdog role. Also, ‘having regard to the interest 
of a democratic society in ensuring and maintaining the freedom of the 
press’,689 the ECtHR asserted that ‘the conviction was likely to deter journalists 
from contributing to public discussion of issues affecting the life of the 
community’.690 As such, it was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, 
namely the prevention of the disclosure of information received in 
confidence. 691  As is clearly demonstrated, the guaranteed right to access 
information goes hand-in-hand with the journalistic practices of information 
gathering and preparatory research. This aspect of press freedom has a 
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significant influence on the consideration of Article 10(2). 
Another key judgment with an explicit guarantee of the right to access state-
held information was delivered in TASZ v Hungary.692 Subsequent to realising 
that a Hungarian MP and others had submitted a complaint to the 
Constitutional Court for an abstract review of modifications on drug-related 
law, the HCLU (an NGO) applied to the domestic court for a copy of the 
complaint. The request was rejected as doing so would breach others’ right to 
privacy given the personal data contained therein. In its application to the 
ECtHR, the applicant claimed that its right to access information on matters of 
public importance had been violated. The ECtHR held that, firstly, similar 
journalistic protection was afforded to the HCLU insofar as it contributed to 
the watchdog function in creating forums for public debate.693 It went on to 
acknowledge that the national court’s order to hinder access to the state-held 
document of public interest would amount to a serious press censorship and 
‘discourage those working in the media from pursuing such matters’. 694 
Therefore it could not be ‘regarded as having been necessary in a democratic 
society’; rather, the order constituted a disproportionate interference with the 
public freedom to receive such information as guaranteed by Article 10 
ECHR.695 Thus, despite a lack of explicit safeguards in ECHR, access to 
official documents has been incrementally recognised as a right within Article 
10 by the ECtHR.696 
In the judgment on 8th November 2016 in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v 
Hungary,697 the Grand Chamber confirmed that Article 10 ECHR includes a 
right of access to official information and that a refusal by a Contracting Party 
to grant such right in certain circumstances constitutes a violation of the 
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Article. 698  The applicant Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (MHB) is a non-
governmental watchdog, which monitors human rights practices in the 
Hungarian criminal justice system. Having observed problems concerning how 
legal aid defence counsel were appointed by the police departments, MHB 
made requests to several police departments, seeking to obtain information 
regarding the names of the appointed public defenders and all cases assigned to 
them in 2008. After its requests were refused by domestic courts on the ground 
of personal data, MHB made an application to the ECtHR, complaining that 
such denial of access to the data at issue violated its freedom of expression, 
particularly its right to seek information held by public authorities protected 
within Article 10 ECHR.699  
In justifying the existence of the right of access to state-held information 
within the ambit of Article 10, the Grand Chamber adduced that there had been 
a gradual clarification by the ECtHR as well as a broad consensus among 
Council of Europe member states regarding the recognition that Article 10 
could be interpreted to imply such a right.700 Also, regardless of intentional 
omission of ‘the right to seek information’ from the final draft of Article 10,701 
the Grand Chamber observed that all the ECHR’s Contracting Parties had 
ratified ICCPR, which explicitly contains the right to seek information in its 
Article 19. Together with the UN bodies’ confirmation,702 the Grand Chamber 
was satisfied with the proposition that there existed a widespread acceptance 
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that the right to have access to state-held information is corollary to the 
public’s right to receive information about public interest issues and, therefore, 
is inherent in freedom of expression.703  
Nevertheless, it was elaborated in the judgment that a right of access to state-
held information and the corresponding obligation on states to impart such 
information may arise in certain circumstances – where there is a court 
disclosure order or where ‘access to the information is instrumental for the 
individual’s exercise of his or her right to freedom of expression’.704 It was 
further clarified that the following four criteria are relevant for allowing the 
right of access to state-held information.705  
- the purpose of the information request: journalistic activities 
contributing to public debate; 
- the nature of the information sought: public-interest test; 
- the role of the applicant: those performing the public 
watchdog role, including journalists, NGOs, academics, 
bloggers and social media users;706 
- whether the requested information is ready and available to the 
public authorities.707   
Having applied those criteria to the present case,708 the Grand Chamber found 
that the denial of access to the requested official data constituted a violation of 
Article 10 ECHR. Dissenting opinions to date may imply that certain problems 
still need to be clearly addressed if access to State-held information is to be 
unanimously recognised as a right within the scope of the right to freedom of 
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expression. However, the ECtHR has already explicitly confirmed that such 
access claimed in the context of journalistic purpose in relation to disclosure of 
matters of public interest is permitted as a right contained in Article 10 ECHR. 
In light of the above judgments, it can be concluded that the ECtHR has 
provided strong justification to the right of access to state-held information, 
particularly in the context of journalistic activity. Copyright can be brought 
into the freedom of expression discussion where the state might have recourse 
to copyright injunctive measures to prevent the press from having access to 
confidential documents, given that the law of confidence does not yield 
satisfying outcomes. This might be the situation in which the information at 
issue has already been leaked to the public and so is no longer confidential. An 
injunction based on law of confidence is less likely to be granted, but the 
inapplicability of the law of confidence does not preclude the state from 
adopting copyright injunctions to restrict the press from dealing with a given 
set of information. Copyright infringement will be realised if the journalistic 
activity at issue involves unauthorised reproduction of the original document in 
substantial part. Accordingly, when a particular case involves this aspect of 
journalistic freedom, the ECtHR may be driven more to conducting the 
balancing exercise in Article 10(2) ECHR in a way that requires more 
substantial grounds for copyright to interfere with this aspect of journalistic 
freedom because such freedom is a prerequisite to the public right to receive 
information of public interest. 
Protection of journalistic sources 
As far as journalistic sources are concerned, there may occur a situation where 
the sources from which the information is supplied are not necessarily 
guaranteed confidentiality. This may be a disincentive to the sources and may 
subsequently affect the exercise of freedom of expression. This is the principal 
rationale for this ancillary right being recognised in the ECtHR jurisprudence 
as an inherent part of journalistic freedom. In principle, any restriction to this 
right calls for strict scrutiny in the Article 10(2) consideration.709 This was first 
                                                
709 Leach (n 676) para 51; Voohoof (n 494) 11. 
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articulated in Goodwin v UK710 in which the ECtHR proclaimed that the 
protection of journalistic sources is a fundamental element of press freedom. 
Unless outweighed by an overriding public interest, compelling the press to 
reveal their sources would seriously harm their vital role of promoting the free 
flow of information in a democratic society.711 The ECtHR in a later judgment 
laid down the principle that, although the legality of the sources’ conduct in 
receipt of the underlying information could be taken into account in the 
balancing exercise, it could not be the decisive factor justifying an order to 
disclose journalistic sources.712 Despite the lack of explicit guarantee in the 
ECHR, the case law suggests that the right of journalists to protect their 
sources serves as a prerequisite for their freedom to receive and impart 
information and ideas. Without this right, the ability to satisfy the public with 
trustworthy and factual information on matters of public interest may be 
undesirably compromised.713 
In the context of copyright infringement, there may be circumstances where a 
journalist acquires copies of documents from an anonymous source. The 
documents may, for example, demonstrate the budget of the police department 
during the management of a police chief who was allegedly involved in 
corruption. The owner of such documents may resort to copyright law714 to 
support a request that the journalist discloses his source for the purpose of 
finding and sanctioning the real copyright infringer. Such disclosure would be 
an interference with the right to freedom of expression as it would hinder the 
way journalists are supplied with information regarding matters of public 
interest, and anonymous sources would be discouraged from assisting the press 
for fear of the civil or criminal penalties available in copyright law. Therefore, 
interference with freedom of expression in relation to disclosure of journalistic 
sources must be subject to a stricter Article 10(2) ECHR scrutiny. 
                                                
710 Christine Goodwin v UK App no 28957/95 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002). 
711 Ibid. para 39. 
712 Tillack v Belgium App no 20477/05 (ECtHR, 27 November 2007) para 65. 
713 Financial Times Ltd and others v UK App no 821/03 (ECtHR, 1 December 2009) para 63. 
714 See, for example, the English Copyright Law-CDPA s 96, which allows the rightsholder to, 
seek injunctive reliefs so as to prevent infringements or to constitute a deterrent to further 
infringements. 
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Right to criticise: widening or undermining the scope of freedom of 
expression 
Although the right to criticise is one of the most disputable manifestation of 
freedom of expression protection,715 it is an important aspect inherent in 
journalistic freedom. This is because of its contribution to ensuring an adequate 
degree of broadmindedness and tolerance necessary for a democratic society. 
The concept of the right to criticise is believed to have developed from the 
realisation that journalists are sometimes required to seek to communicate to 
the public in rather critical, exaggerated or provoking ways to arouse public 
concern.716 However, such practice is still under the condition that they do not 
go beyond the parameters of Article 10(2) ECHR.717 
A sample scenario is a confrontation between public figures claiming their 
right to private life, and the media invoking their right to freedom of 
expression. Copyright claims seem peripheral in such an incident unless the 
affected figures sometimes have recourse to copyright law to fortify their 
complaints and justify their request for an injunctive order, given that such 
private information appears to qualify for copyright protection. A privately 
taken photograph that reveals that a role-model football player is having an 
affair with his teammate’s wife may well be an illustrative example of such a 
situation. In addition to the privacy claim, the footballer may also seek 
copyright injunctive relief to prevent the media from reproducing or publishing 
the photograph with some critical text. The right to impart information 
becomes weightier in the balancing exercise in Article 10(2) ECHR when it is 
associated with a public debate of general interest. The question then arises to 
what extent the enjoyment of the journalists’ right to criticise against other 
competing rules can be deemed proportionate. The contents of information and 
the social status of the parties being criticised are influential factors in the 
context of the privacy right. 
                                                
715 Paul Wragg, ‘A Freedom to Criticise? Evaluating the Public Interest in Celebrity Gossip 
after Mosley and Terry’ (2010) 2(2) Journal of Media Law 295-320; Javier Garcia Roca and 
Pablo Santolaya (eds), ‘Europe of Rights: A Compendium on the European Convention of 
Human Rights’ (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 381. 
716 Oberschlick v Austria (No 2) (n 513) para 9. 
717 Prager and Oberschlick v Austria App no 15974/90 (ECtHR, 26 April 1995). 
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With respect to the contents, the distinction between matters of public interest 
and those of public curiosity were first highlighted in Von Hannover v 
Germany.718 The case relates to unauthorised publication of photographs and 
articles showing Princess Caroline doing going about her daily activities with 
her children in a public place.719 The ECtHR first submitted that the princess 
was indisputably a public figure who could be expected to be more tolerant of 
being captured in public places and of any photographs and criticism that come 
after such an appearance. However, it later held that the freedom to impart such 
private photographs was not protected by Article 10 ECHR to any greater 
extent than that protecting expression which merely satisfied public 
curiosity.720 In other words, the subject-matter did not contribute to the public 
debate of general interest; therefore, the freedom to criticise should not 
outweigh the right to privacy enshrined in Article 8 ECHR.721 
In Axel Springer AG (No 1) v Germany,722 the ECtHR had particular concern 
for the detrimental effect of misleading behaviour by a famous TV star on the 
public perception.723 In the German courts, the actor succeeded in claiming his 
right to privacy and obtained court orders to prevent further publication of the 
articles. The applicant publisher contended before the ECtHR that such 
measures were a disproportionate interference with its right to freedom of 
expression. The ECtHR found that the national court was mistaken in stating 
that there was no particular public interest in being informed about this minor 
offence. In fact, when weighing Article 10 ECHR against Article 8 ECHR, six 
factors are set out to be considered when the balancing exercise takes place: the 
contribution made by the information conveyed; where the person concerned 
stands in society; prior conduct of the person concerned; the method of 
obtaining the information and its veracity, content, form; the consequences of 
the publication; and the severity of the sanction imposed.724  
                                                
718 Von Hannover v Germany (No 1) (n 653). 
719 Ibid. 
720 Ibid. para 76. 
721 See also Mosley v UK App no 48009/08 (ECtHR, 10 May 2011) with a similar judgment. 
722 Axel Springer AG v Germany (No 1) (n 500). 
723 Ibid. 
724 Ibid. paras 90-91. 
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The first two criteria are primarily of relevance here. As regards the first, the 
ECtHR accepted that the public has always had interest in being informed 
about criminal litigation whilst strictly observing the presumption of 
innocence; ‘the articles in question could then be considered to present a 
degree of general interest’. 725  As for the second factor, the ECtHR had 
particular regard to his prominent role as a senior police officer. This role had 
enabled him to be widely recognised both on TV and in person as a law-
enforcement official. The public interest in being informed about the offences 
prevailed when his law-breaking behaviour was at odds with the role he played 
in the TV series. The public, especially young boys who might have held him 
as a role model, had the right not to be misled by the differences between his 
behaviour in private life and that shown on the TV.726 Therefore, the ECtHR 
confirmed that it was partially the role of a public watchdog to exercise its 
investigative freedom guaranteed by Article 10, which, in this case, prevailed 
over the actor’s right to private life. Although the phrase ‘right to criticise’ was 
not mentioned in the judgment, its existence can be inferred from the ECtHR’s 
guarantee of the ability of journalists to investigate and be critical of matters 
affecting public interest in the context of journalistic freedom. This practice is 
most likely manifest in the scenario where freedom of expression intersects the 
right to privacy, and the six factors listed above provide the overall context 
within which the balancing exercise between Articles 8 and 10 is conducted. 
It would be particularly interesting should private materials, such as those at 
issue in the cases above, namely daily-life photographs or judicial documents, 
also qualify for copyright protection. 727 In such a scenario, unauthorised 
acquisition and reproduction of such materials by journalists in a way that 
violates copyright law will allow copyright owners to be entitled to available 
remedies. These will subsequently be imposed against the journalists’ freedom 
                                                
725 Ibid. para 96. 
726 Ibid. paras 97, 98. See Terry (previously LNS) v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 
(QB), where the English court ruled that the extramarital affairs of a famous footballer who 
was recognised as a role model for many young boys were regarded as matters of public 
interest. There existed in this case the public’s right not to be misled by public figures. See also 
Campbell v MGN Ltd (2004) 2 All ER 995. 
727 See Howard Abrams, ‘Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law’ (1992) 55(2) 4, 16 for 
the consideration of copyright thresholds. 
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to criticise, constituting interference with their right to freedom of expression. 
However, unless there is an overriding justification on the copyright side, the 
merits of the content and the contribution made by the way in which journalists 
criticise particular matters are still weighty factors in the balancing exercise. 
Online media – an emerging popular means of exercising freedom of 
expression 
In addition to the mainstream approach of disseminating information through 
conventional journalism and media, it is undeniable that online platforms and 
knowledge-sharing activities have become important arenas in which the right 
to freedom of expression can be effectively exercised. However, this open and 
easily accessible means of communication has also widened the area in which 
the right to freedom of expression intersects with other competing rights. In 
light of the ECtHR jurisprudence,728 copyright is essentially one of the most 
controversial legal dimensions that constitutes interference with the public 
right to freedom of expression. This concern has become more contentious in 
the digital world where having access to online file-sharing and image search 
services provided by intermediaries is widespread.729 As a counterbalance to 
such growing online activities, copyright law has seen continuous legislative 
attempts to keep pace with technological advances by expanding the scope of 
protection to online materials and enforcement measures, such as anti-
circumvention rules. The following consideration will help clarify where the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence stands in the digital world. 
The right of individuals to access internet and the parallel right to impart 
information in the online sphere were recognised in Ahmet Yildirim v 
Turkey.730 The case concerned an order from a Turkish criminal court to block 
access to the entire Google website. The order was aimed at restraining further 
access to one particular Google-hosted website, which contained offensive 
contents about the founder of the Turkish Republic. The applicant, whose 
academic website was also hosted by Google, contended that his right to access 
and impart information on the internet was adversely affected by this measure. 
                                                
728 See Ashby Donald v France (n 492); The Pirate Bay (n 497). 
729 Ibid. 
730 Ahmet Yildirim v Turkey (n 678). 
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The ECtHR found that the Turkish court had failed to consider the fact that 
‘such wholesale blocking would render large amount of online information 
inaccessible’731 and so directly undermined the right of individuals as internet 
users to exercise their right to freedom of expression in receiving information 
and knowledge. It would also negatively affect the collateral right of Google to 
share such information with the public online. When weighing up the interests 
at stake, the interference with freedom of expression was found to be 
unnecessary and disproportionate. 
It is worth considering Ahmet Yildirim v Turkey in the context of copyright law 
under the circumstance where online activities carried out by a search engine, 
such as Google, are increasingly subject to copyright infringement claims. This 
is usually as a result of its image search service, which displays thumbnails of 
copyright-protected images following public requests, but without 
authorisation.732 A copyright advocate would argue that as the search results of 
picture thumbnails display do not create anything original, but merely 
reproduce others’ creative works and so infringe copyright.733 This reasoning 
also applies to cases where the online dissemination of the photographs or 
electronic files is made purely for profit-making or entertainment purposes. 
In exceptional circumstances where the expression is not merely commercially-
driven, but more inclined to benefit the wider public, greater account should be 
taken of the fact that it is difficult for a photograph-based search service to 
separate information from the form in which it was originally expressed.734 The 
process of making thumbnails in response to a user’s search requests is 
indiscriminate,735 and the merits of these user-friendly activities in promoting 
the right of online users to freedom of expression should also be recognised. 
                                                
731 Ibid. para 66. 
732 See, for example, Perfect 10 Inc v Google Inc and Amazon.com Inc (9th Cir 2007) 508 F3d 
1146. 
733 See cases 308 O42/06 and 308 O248/07, Hamburg Regional Court reported in 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a_C1wVkCvPww&refer=tech
nology> accessed 12 August 2015. 
734 Eric Barendt, ‘Copyright and Free Speech Theory’ in J Griffiths and U Suthersanen (eds), 
Copyright and Free Speech (OUP, Oxford, 2005). The application of idea/expression principle, 
which conventionally disengages copyright from unduly conflicting with Freedom of 
expression, is deemed absent in photographs. 
735 In the US courts’ viewpoint, this picture thumbnail activity is regarded as ‘highly 
transformative uses’ of copyright works. See Perfect 10 v Google (n 732). 
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The image search service might be beneficial to copyright owners when it links 
internet users with the websites on which the original materials can be found, 
and in this light Google can be seen as ‘friendly’ to copyright owners because 
it promotes the owners’ commercial interests. Accordingly, copyright law 
should be tolerant of such practices in cases involving the exercise of freedom 
of expression through online platforms. 
In short, the internet is nowadays an increasingly potential means of 
communication. Online activities such as those provided by search engines are 
an essential element of the internet’s promise to the free flow and open access 
to information and ideas. Considering such merits towards public users, the 
ECtHR must ensure that in light of online communication any copyright 
interferences with freedom of expression are required to present convincingly 
strong justifications in order for a fair balance to be achieved. 
Conditions and responsibilities of public watchdogs in a democratic 
society 
Article 10 ECHR protection broadly encompasses both traditional and online 
journalistic activities to the extent that it protects both the content and style of 
communication.736 To effectively fulfil the role of public watchdog, journalists 
are allowed to resort to ‘a degree of exaggeration and provocation’ without an 
obligation to prove the truthfulness of their remarks.737 Regarding styles of 
communication, they are also permitted in some certain circumstances to 
impart information to the public in a way that may frustrate other legal rules, 
including copyright. 
However, it is by no means the purpose of Article 10 ECHR to leave 
journalistic freedom unregulated; journalists should not overstep certain limits 
and breach the rights and reputations of others with purposes that are devoid of 
public interest738 and the ECtHR has been vigilant in recognising that Article 
10 ECHR confers not only freedoms, but also responsibilities, on journalists. 
                                                
736 Tuşalp v Turkey App no 32131/08 (ECtHR, 21 February 2012) para 48. 
737 Prager and Oberschlick v Austria (n 717) para 38. 
738 See, for example, De Diego Nafria v Spain App no 46833/99 (ECtHR, 14 March 2002) para 
37; Karatas v Turkey App no 23168/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999). 
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While ‘exercising rights to divulge information on issues of general interest 
and to decide whether or not it is necessary to reproduce such documents to 
ensure credibility’,739 journalists must ‘act in good faith to provide accurate 
and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism’.740 
In the context of copyright, this principle ensures that journalists are not 
necessarily always free to copy, reproduce or publish copyright-protected 
materials. The ECtHR recognises that journalistic ethics oblige them to seek 
other available alternatives that have the least restrictive and drastic impact on 
copyright owners’ interests.741 They are also required to take sufficient steps to 
verify a factual allegation and the truth of the disputed allegation.742 This can 
be seen as a prerequisite for journalists exercising Article 10 to contribute to 
the public at large. 
Summary 
Journalism is a potential manifestation of freedom of expression used to 
determine how efficiently such a fundamental right is exercised and 
accommodated in the information age. One of the best means in which matters 
contributing to public debate can be communicated to the public is through 
journalistic activities, and this demands closer attention when such journalistic 
activities are conducted on a digital platform.743 Thus, due regard must be paid 
to any restrictions that prevent journalists from fulfilling this pivotal role. This 
reasoning may in turn entail the need of journalists for to sometimes have 
recourse to privileged freedoms, namely the right to access state-held 
information, the right to protect their sources, the right to criticise and the right 
to exercise journalistic activities online. Only then can they effectively satisfy 
the public right to be properly informed about matters affecting their interests. 
The ECtHR has tended to uphold freedom of expression values in these 
circumstances, where there must be strong and compelling reasons for 
copyright measures to be regarded as justified interferences.  
                                                
739 Fressoz & Roire v France App no 29183/95 (ECtHR, 21 January 1999) para 54. 
740 Ibid; Stoll v Switzerland (n 616) para 103. 
741 See Tønsbergs Blad AS and Haukom v Norway App no 510/04 (ECtHR, 1 March 2007). 
742 Ibid. 
743 Roca and Santolaya (n 715) 379. 
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 The balancing exercise between Articles 8 and 10 ECHR in 3.3.3.4
copyright 
When an infringement against copyright-protected works is caused by any 
unauthorised use based on the exercise of freedom of expression, the balancing 
exercise in Article 10 ECHR may require the ECtHR to examine the nature of 
both rights and weigh the reasons for each to impose restrictions on one 
another. Considering this in the context of a call for elaborate balancing factors 
to deal with the intersection between such rights, it is worth looking at certain 
criteria established in the ECtHR’s judgments,744 clarifying what needs to be 
taken into account regarding the conflict between Articles 8 and 10 ECHR. It 
may be argued that protections of an individual’s privacy and of an 
individual’s creativity are different in the subject-matter and entail different 
legal obligations against concerned parties. Nevertheless, the extent to which 
both right to privacy and copyright in their negative aspects interfere with 
freedom of expression is relatively similar – restricting others from interrupting 
that privacy and creativity and, thus, suppressing the exercise of such freedom. 
Therefore, it may be helpful to extrapolate the criteria employed in the 
balancing exercise between Articles 8 and 10 to that between Article 10 and 
copyright law where appropriate.745 However, they need to be fine-tuned in 
order for ECtHR to reach desirable outcomes. In doing so, it is important that 
the ECtHR is being creative and flexible in employing practical and effective 
principles to interpret the ECHR as a living instrument in response to evolving 
circumstances.746 
While Article 10 ECHR protects the right to freedom of expression, an 
important foundation of copyright protection in the European regime is 
guaranteed by A1P1. In the balancing exercise, the nature of expression in 
question – its contribution to a debate of general interest and artistic creativity 
                                                
744 Von Hannover (No2) v Germany (n 500) paras 108-113; Axel Springer v Germany (n 500) 
paras 89-95. 
745 See n 724 above. See also LIBERTY, ‘Striking the balance between personal privacy and 
media freedom’ (2011) <https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/blog/striking-balance-
between-personal-privacy-and-media-freedom> accessed 13 September 2017. These criteria 
are not only confined to privacy cases, but open to situations where Art 10 conflicts with other 
areas of law. 
746 For more detail about the interpretation techniques of the ECHR see Alastair Mowbray, 
‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5(1) HRLR 57. 
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– will be an important factor in determining how much copyright interferences 
can be tolerated.747 For example, if the subject-matter is merely a comic book 
made for individual entertainment, the reproduction does not deserve as much 
protection from freedom of expression as a political memorandum.  
Another factor to be considered is the purpose for which the expression is 
reproduced. Considering usual types of copyright works such as literary, 
musical, dramatic or artistic expression, interference from copyright will be 
more tolerated when freedom of expression is exercised over the reproduction 
of those works with entertaining or commercial purposes rather than a 
journalistic or other public interest purposes. 
The third factor relates to the way in which the reproduction is made. This is 
important in journalistic activities, where the questions are whether the original 
work is substantially reproduced more than is necessary to convey the 
underlying message to the public, or whether there is a less restrictive 
alternative available for such reproduction. These go hand in hand with the 
principle of proportionality and compliance with journalistic ethics.  
Finally, the level of severity and proportionality of the interference imposed 
also plays a vital role in the balancing exercise.748 Copyright can interfere with 
freedom of expression in various forms, including civil and criminal penalties. 
They constitute different levels of severity depending on the losses suffered by 
copyright owners and the seriousness of the infringement.749 This means that if 
the interference imposed is disproportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting 
copyright holders’ interests, it may be held contrary to the pivotal requirement 
of Article 10 ECHR to strike a fair balance between freedom of expression and 
other competing rights. 
 One may find it futile to realise that many of the balancing criteria illustrated 
above reflect the ECtHR’s practices that can actually be carved out from 
Article 10(2) considerations in the relevant case-law. Yet, considering and 
                                                
747 Lee (n 461) 190. See also Barendt (n 734) 32-33. 
748 David Harris and others, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP 
2009) 10.  
749 See Axel Springer v Germany (n 500) paras 95, 109. 
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extrapolating the ways in which the ECtHR had resolved the conflict between 
fundamental rights through the precisely-established criteria could be seen as 
an opportunity to reiterate the need for those elaborate and certain criteria to be 
developed and applied to other areas of intersection including that between 
freedom of expression and copyright.     
3.3.4 Summary 
As far as the necessary in a democratic society test in Article 10(2) ECHR is 
concerned, the case law suggests that the key factors for deciding whether the 
interference with freedom of expression is necessary consist of the merit of 
types and means of expressions on the one hand, and the necessity for 
copyright to interfere with freedom of expression, on the other. With regard to 
the former, the degree to which each type and means of expression receives 
protection is contingent on how much it contributes to the debate of public 
interest. The degree of contribution will then be used to determine how much 
an interference imposed by copyright can be tolerated. With regard to the latter 
factor, whether or not the interference imposed by copyright carries sufficient 
justification to prevail is subject to the level of social need and the 
‘proportionality of the measure adopted to achieve the previously determined 
legitimate aim’.750 
The case law also suggests that the way these factors are considered is 
generally based on the principle that the more valuable the content or means of 
communication to a democratic society, the greater other competing interests 
have to be tolerant of freedom of expression. This means that the public value 
of a particular reproduced expression has a great effect on the degree to which 
the respondent state is afforded a margin of appreciation to impose copyright 
interference on freedom of expression. Rather than being a clear line dividing 
justified and unjustified interference, with its imprecise wordings the balancing 
exercise in Article 10(2) is intended to create a continuum between the 
competing rights. This will allow judicial discretion to be better exercised in 
parallel with the changing copyright environment and corresponding public 
                                                
750 Roca and Santolaya (n 715) 379. 
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interests.  
In the context of copyright, the way such a continuum works may well be 
represented by two extremes of freedom of expression and copyright protection 
moving towards the centre; the point at which they intersect is where the 
balance lies. This point is, however, not necessarily in the same place on every 
occasion, but is influenced by different types of protected expression under 
Article 10 and degrees of proportionality for copyright interferences. Those 
varying degrees of importance are what determines how fast each side moves 
towards the other end. Less socially valuable speech, such as commercial or 
hate speech, creates more likelihood of copyright interferences being tolerated. 
By contrast, speech that promotes or makes a great contribution to the public 
interest will receive greater protection, so the chance of any copyright 
interference being found justified and proportionate will be lessened. 
Interferences posed by copyright, especially imprisonment, large fines or 
injunctions, can be found disproportionate although the interfered expressions 
such as musical works cannot be said to contribute as much to the public 
debate as political or civil expressions. This is perhaps because such 
interference imposes an excessive burden to freedom of expression. The effects 
may be so general that it may be a disincentive on the freedom of innocent 
future users who are not involved in the infringement.751 Therefore, such 
severe measures will be considered unjustified interference and thus a violation 
of the right of freedom of expression. 
 Rethinking Ashby Donald in light of public interest matters 3.3.4.1
Under ECtHR case law, the situation where the interests of copyright 
protection come under Article 10 scrutiny triggers less litigation than that of 
other protections such as privacy, morality or national security. Only two cases 
have been heard in relation to the clash between copyright and freedom of 
expression; Ashby Donald and Others v France and The Pirate Bay v Sweden. 
However, just because no violation of Article 10 was found in either case does 
not mean that there was no opportunity to develop relevant principles. That 
                                                
751 See, for example, Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM (n 599) and SABAM v Netlog (n 601). 
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there have only been two cases would be a better reason to address such a lack 
of focus on the relationship between copyright and freedom of expression, and 
to propose corresponding solutions. 
Against this background, it is worth reconsidering Ashby Donald and Others v 
France in light of the more general principles and criteria of freedom of 
expression which have developed in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. In particular, 
what the consequences would be if online publication of copyright-protected 
photographs was not merely for commercial and entertainment purposes, but 
carried important messages triggering public debate; for example, photographs 
of a very skinny fashion model attached to an article addressing the 
relationship between the teenage dream of becoming a professional model and 
a need to be very thin. This could prompt the public debate about eating 
disorders amongst teenagers and whether the fashion industry contributes to 
the problem. Another scenario might involve unauthorised publication of 
protected photographs to highlight women’s rights and gender equality. In such 
circumstances, the published photographs might play a supplementary but 
essential role in fulfilling the major purpose of the campaign. Clearly these 
scenarios concern valuable expressions capable of generating public 
discussions and could thus be eligible for a greater degree of protection 
afforded by Article 10 ECHR. If so, individuals such as journalists, bloggers or 
photographers may have the right to contravene copyright by reproducing and 
publishing the protected photographs to draw public attention to the issues that 
the photographs depict. However, the question will arise of why they persist in 
using copyright-protected photographs when other similar photographs free 
from copyright restrictions are also available for use. 
The exercise of freedom of expression entitles individuals to freely choose the 
way they express their speech to attract the widest possible audiences. If a 
Paris fashion show has recently attracted media attention, journalists might 
consider that using contemporaneous images from the show would be the best 
way to raise public awareness and spark meaningful discussion about the 
underlying issue. In any case, this would not mean that the enjoyment of 
freedom of expression would totally dispossess the copyright owners of their 
interests, nor would it be free from the requirement to be balanced with the 
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interests that copyright seeks to protect. The justification of freedom of 
expression is to ensure that a copyrighted work that can contribute to matters 
affecting public interest is not kept from public scrutiny merely because it 
belongs to someone else. Against this background, the balancing exercise in 
Article 10(2) should lead to an outcome that does not rip off the interests that 
either freedom of expression or copyright aims to promote – long-term benefits 
of free discussions and short-term remuneration. It should seek to provide a 
situation where the competing interests are reconciled. 
Having recognised this, the public-oriented character of the photographs in 
question would inevitably change the outcome of the necessary in a 
democratic society test and would lessen the margin of appreciation afforded to 
national authorities to regulate free speech concerns.752 This would in turn 
lower the extent to which copyright can interfere with freedom of expression in 
the balancing exercise. It may be the case that the ECtHR would find an 
injunctive order and large fines disproportionate and insufficiently justified. 
On the other hand, it should also be borne in mind that national authorities 
would enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in interfering with the free speech 
protection if a given expression is less socially valuable, harmful or against 
domestic accepted moral standards, such as those regarded as immoral or 
misused expression in the context of Chapter 2.753  
 Compatibility of the restrictive public policy doctrine with Article 3.3.4.2
10 ECHR 
Seeing copyright-protected works as an individual’s creative expression, 
interfering measures that may be adopted to regulate reprehensible copyright 
expressions can come in the form of injunctive and monetary reliefs imposed 
by the public policy doctrine, which, as argued in the previous chapter, 
                                                
752 Roca and Santolaya (n 715) 376; Harris and others (n 321) 14. 
753 See, for example, Handyside v UK (n 321, obscene books), Muller v Switzerland (n 548, 
obscene paintings) and Wingrove v UK App No 17419/90 (ECtHR, 25 November 1996) 
(blasphemous video), where the ECtHR acknowledged that there was no uniform European 
moral standards and national authorities were thus in a better position to determine what 
offended their morality. See also Bernadette Rainey and others, The European Convention of 
Human Rights (7th edn, OUP 2017) 494. Please also note that the works considered here are not 
to be confused with those excluded expressions considered under section 3.3.1.3 above.    
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operates through either denial or remedial approaches.754 While Chapter 2 
explains how the issue of immoral or misused copyright expression is resolved 
through divergent public policy doctrines,755 as a matter of consistency such 
issue should also be addressed under the Article 10 ECHR framework in order 
to prove the compatibility of such restrictive doctrine with the provision.  
Yet, it seems not a usual practice, if any, that a question of a violation of a 
copyright holder’s right to freedom of expression on the basis of public policy 
grounds is examined under the freedom of expression framework. But such a 
question has been more explicitly discussed in the UK and EU trade mark 
cases, whereby a refusal to grant a trade mark on the public policy grounds is 
considered as interfering with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression 
and is thus brought under Article 10(2) ECHR scrutiny. 756  In the UK, 
Ghazilian’s,757 and Basic Trade mark SA’s Application758 have established that 
Article 10 ECHR and section 3(3)(a) Trade mark Act 1994759 can be equally 
and consistently applied in deciding to either refuse or accept trade mark 
registration.760 At EU level, it has been established following Screw You761 that 
a refusal to register an immoral or offensive trade mark represents a restriction 
as prescribed in Article 10(2) ECHR on the applicant’s freedom of expression; 
it also reflects the realisation that the applicant’s freedom has to be juxtaposed 
with the member states’ responsibility to prevent their society from harm and 
immorality. 762  By analogy, the restrictive public policy doctrine that 
circumscribes copyright holders’ right to freely express their creative works, 
such as those elucidated in Chapter 2, should also be checked its compatibility 
                                                
754 See Chapter 2, section 2.8. 
755 See Chapter 2, sections 2.3-2.6. 
756 Daniel G Radler, ‘The European Community Trade mark: Is it worth the bother?’ (1997) 1 
(1) Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, Article 6; Cheryl Greig, ‘Public Order and 
Morality as Grounds of Refusal: European Concept and Comparative Approach’ (2012) LLM 
Dissertation, p 51 
<https://euipo.europa.eu/knowledge/pluginfile.php/28196/mod.../GREIG_Cheryl.pdf> 
accessed 20 January 2018. 
757 Ghazilian’s Trade Mark Application [2002] ETMR 63. 
758 Basic Trade mark SA’s Application [2006] ETMR 24. 
759 Section 3(3)(a) reads ‘A trade mark shall not be registered if it is…contrary to public policy 
or to accepted principles of morality…’. 
760 Greig (n 756) 55; Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Is There a Right to an Immoral Trade Mark?’ (2009) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1492117> accessed 20 January 2018. 
761 Screw You R495/2005 [2007] ETMR 7. 
762 Ibid. No. 206-207. Greig (n 756) 56. 
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with Article 10 ECHR, as follows.  
As an interference with the right to freedom of expression, Article 10(2) 
requires the public policy doctrine to be examined under the three-step 
conditions in order to prove its legitimacy. There should be no doubt that, if 
successfully incorporated into the proposed public interest defence, the public 
policy doctrine is prescribed by law to the extent that it provides sufficient 
accessibility and certain foreseeability to individuals seeking to adopt it. With 
regard to the legitimate aims pursued, it has been clearly explained in the 
previous chapter through case law that the doctrine generally aims at protecting 
the public from harm caused by immoral or misused works. This aim is 
compatible with those enumerated in Article 10(2), inter alia, for the protection 
of national security, public safety, morals or rights of others. Nevertheless, 
when it comes to the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ test, the less socially 
valuable character of those immoral or misused expressions does not 
automatically render the interferences proportionate and justified. As described 
earlier, the final test in fact entails the considerations of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aims pursued, the severity and the 
chilling effect vis-à-vis individual freedom. Against this backdrop, the doctrine 
with its denial approach may potentially be found too severe and 
disproportionate due to its extreme operation in totally depriving rightsholders 
of copyright protection. Conversely, reasons underlying the availability of 
injunctive and monetary remedies offered by the less restrictive means – the 
remedial approach – can be deemed more satisfactory and proportionate to the 
public-oriented aims that the public policy doctrine pursues. This relationship 
between copyright and the public policy doctrine explained through the 
freedom of expression framework reflects the underlying merit of the 
balancing exercise between countervailing interests, firmly recognised in 
Article 10 ECHR. 
3.4 Free speech protection in the US 
Despite a strong recognition of the merits of freedom of expression, under the 
European regime, Article 10 ECHR provides that freedom of expression is not 
absolute. The right is subject to exceptions permitted by virtue of Article 10(2). 
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In the US, freedom of expression is given paramount importance over other 
competing rights. It is thus instructive to compare the European approach with 
its US counterpart to determine what the consequences would be if the ECtHR 
took the US approach in deciding cases where freedom of expression intersects 
with copyright. 
3.4.1 The First Amendment: prohibition of content-based discrimination 
Freedom of speech is strongly protected in the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution, which guarantees that ‘the government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its messages, ideas, subject matter or contents’.763 This 
recognition is the origin of the rules against content-based discrimination 
which are central to the US free speech regime.764 Although there are some 
exceptions to these rules,765 this protection has created the exceptional feature 
that not only covers general types of speech, but also extends to protect what 
international consensus deems unlawful speech, i.e. highly offensive speech or 
speech that incites racial, ethnic or religious hatred.766 This results in the 
suggestion that, regardless of content, all expression is afforded the same level 
of protection.767 Even laws restricting extreme speech based on content or 
viewpoint would most likely fail to comply with the First Amendment 
protection.768 Within copyright, strong First Amendment protection is reflected 
in the adoptions of fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy as the primary 
internal free speech safeguards. 
3.4.2 Difference in the US and European approaches 
The degree to which a particular expression is protected by Article 10 ECHR 
                                                
763 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See also Regan v Time Inc 468 US 
641, 648-49 (1984); Police Dep’t of Chicago v Mosley 408 US 92,95 (1972). 
764 Hare (n 566) 81-82; Christina E Wells ‘The Law of Free Expression in the United States’ 
(2001) 9 Journal for Legal Science & Practice 353, 355. 
765 Kathleen Ann Ruane, ‘Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment’ 
(2014) Congressional Research Service <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf> accessed 15 
September 2017. These exceptions include, for example, face-to-face insults and child 
pornography. See Chaplinsky v New Hampshire 315 US 568, 572 (1942); New York v Ferber 
458 US 747, 774 (1982). 
766 Frederick Schauer, ‘The Exceptional First Amendment’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton UP 2005) 33. 
767 ‘Although it restricts some speech, it does so regardless of the viewpoint or subject-matter 
of such expression’, see Wells (n 764) 355. 
768 See, for example, Police Dep’t of Chicago v Mosley (n 763). 
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depends on what type of expression it is, and to what extent it contributes to a 
democratic society. However, this distinction is not applicable in the US where 
treating speech differently based on subject-matter, words or facts would be 
considered unconstitutional.769 For instance, the US free speech rules against 
content-based discrimination would have required the ECtHR to rule against 
the law of privacy restricting the right of the press to criticise what was 
described as ‘a sick Nazi-themed orgy with five hookers’ attended by Max 
Mosley.770 Under the US approach, such a law would be deemed content-
discriminatory and unconstitutional. 
In another example, the ECtHR had to deal with expression in the form of a 
poster, signs and photographs depicting the collapse of the World Trade Centre 
with the printed message ‘Islam out of Britain, protect British people’.771 The 
Court ruled that they were insulting, religiously harassing and aggravating and, 
therefore not protected by Article 10.772 The US courts would have regarded 
this approach as content-based discrimination, and thus a violation of the First 
Amendment.773 These examples demonstrate the strongest level of protection 
of freedom of expression in the US approach, and how it is different from its 
European counterpart. 
3.4.3 Preferable European approach 
While it may be undeniable that freedom of expression constitutes a 
fundamental foundation to a good democracy, there are also other rights that 
are necessary to ensure that the democratic society is a peaceful place where 
everyone respects each other’s interests. Therefore, no right should be 
permitted to unreasonably undermine other competing rights, nor should any 
be kept from public scrutiny when its enjoyment becomes excessive. The 
balancing concept endorsed by the European approach in relation to the free 
speech protections is surely preferable. 
                                                
769 Hare (n 566) 81-82. 
770 Mosley v UK (n 721). 
771 Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin). 
772 Ibid. 
773 Hare (n 566) 84-85. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The analysis of Article 10 ECHR has highlighted that the right to freedom of 
expression not only contributes to the protection of the interests of individuals, 
but also to the promotion of democracy and overall human development. Any 
interference with this right must be subject to the most vigilant scrutiny, and 
failure to do so may not only undermine an individual’s right to freedom of 
expression, but also the freedom of society to enjoy the free flow of 
information and ideas. 
When it comes to the intersection between freedom of expression and 
copyright, a fair balance must be struck. All types of expression that allow for 
the exchange of information and ideas are considered to be expression 
protected by Article 10 ECHR. The degree to which each type of expression 
contributes to ‘a public debate of general interest’ helps determine whether the 
interference with freedom of expression will be considered necessary in a 
democratic society, and therefore justified. Where the expression relates to 
matters of public interest disseminated by the press, freedom of expression is 
more likely to be upheld over copyright. Where there are weighty justifications 
for copyright interference, these will also play a significant role in the 
balancing exercise. Severe copyright interference such as large fines or 
imprisonment are less likely to be upheld as they may cause a chilling effect on 
expression. 
The balancing principles identified from Article 10 ECHR and the case law 
analysis may provide useful guidance to the intersection between freedom of 
expression and copyright. However, this may not be sufficient to cope with 
current situations given technological advances and seamless communications 
in the public sphere. Such situations will promise even more instances of 
intersection between the two competing rights in the future. Against this 
background, more certain and detailed criteria of Article 10 may be necessary 
for them to be fairly balanced while keeping pace with the changing 
environment and the public interest. 
An effective solution would lie in attaching a brief explanatory note to Article 
10: both the substantive freedom definition in paragraph 1 and the threefold 
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assessment in paragraph 2 (section 5.1 below). This would consist of an open-
ended list of factors which judges should take into consideration when striking 
a fair balance between freedom of expression and copyright. Since freedom of 
expression reflects the aspect of L&Es that the proposed public interest defence 
seeks to embrace, the principles will provide a clear and certain extent of the 
incorporation of freedom of expression into the scope of the proposed defence. 
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Chapter 4. The Three-Step Test 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have considered the restrictive and encouraging 
functions of public interest defence through the integrated aspects of public 
policy and freedom of expression. The need for flexibility in copyright law has 
now become very important for our society to further develop and keep pace 
with rapidly-developing information technologies. As copyright strives for a 
fair balance between short-term incentives and long-term benefits,774 a flexible 
copyright L&Es system may help achieve the balance. The two aspects 
incorporated into the scope of the proposed defence provide ample space for 
those competing interests to be accommodated within the international 
copyright framework. This would in turn help complete the missing pieces of 
the L&E jigsaw that are not clearly spelled out, nor properly protected in the 
digital era. 
At the international level, all L&Es for copyright are subject to the so-called 
three-step test. The test is an international doctrine recognised in several 
treaties,775 and consists of three abstract criteria used to govern limits to 
copyright.776 Like other L&Es, the proposed public interest defence should 
come under the three-step test scrutiny as a prerequisite to its international 
recognition. The test’s open-ended character has led to doubts over how much 
room the test will allow for new L&Es to emerge. Some assert that the test is 
more likely an author-friendly doctrine 777  that should be interpreted as 
providing strong safeguard to rightsholders’ interests to the expense of L&Es, 
but it is designed to be sufficiently flexible to reconcile divergent interests.  
                                                
774 Irini Stanatoudi and Paul Torremans, EU Copyright law: A commentary (Edward Elgar 
2014) para 11.63. 
775 Berne Convention, Art 9(2), TRIPS, Art 13, WCT, Art 10 and WPPT, Art 16. 
776 The original wording in Art 9(2) Berne Convention reads ‘It shall be a matter for legislation 
in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, 
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author’. 
777 Annette Kur, ‘Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water: How Much Room for Exceptions and 
Limitations under the Three Step-Test?’ Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, 
Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series No 08-04 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317707> 
accessed 22 October 2014, 46; Thomas Dreier, ‘Shaping a Fair International IPR-Regime in a 
Globalized World : Some Parameters for Public Policy’ in Inge Govaere and Hanns Ullrich 
(eds), Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and International Trade (PIE 2007) 73-4. 
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This chapter will begin with an introduction of the three-step test’s background 
and its function as an umbrella term regulating all types of L&Es to copyright. 
The focus then shifts to the effect of the rapidly-developing information society 
on copyright law, which calls for more flexibility to be added into its L&Es 
regime. After that, attention is drawn to the restrictive interpretative approach 
mistakenly embraced by numerous international and national judicial 
authorities. In Section 4.2, the interpretations handed down by the WTO panel 
and those by the ECJ and some national courts in the EU will be examined as 
examples of how the test’s restrictive interpretation could jeopardise 
copyright’s delicate balance with the public interest. This section also 
examines some prominent decisions delivered by national courts in other EU 
member states, which had recourse to different external measures to avoid 
undesirable outcomes caused by the restrictive test against their social, 
economic and cultural needs.778 
Section 4.3 suggests a revision of the test’s legislative and contextual 
backgrounds in light of relevant treaties779 and prominent case law, and argues 
that the three-step test is inherently furnished with the balancing tool needed to 
perform its enabling function to provide room for flexibility in the copyright 
L&Es system. To safeguard such inherently flexible nature of the test, section 
4.4 proposes that the test should be interpreted with some reference points and 
section 4.5 will illustrate step-by-step how the flexible interpretation of the 
three-step test in light of the proposed reference points would allow the public 
interest defence to pass. 
The proposed defence, consisting of the two important aspects of public policy 
and freedom of expression, would be impractical without passing the universal 
three-step test scrutiny. The relationship between the test and the proposed 
defence is interdependent. The test generally functions to determine the outer 
scope of all L&Es to copyright, and this means that, whether or not the 
proposed defence could guarantee its legitimacy in the copyright L&Es, the 
regime depends on how much room the test provides for accommodating other 
                                                
778 Kur (n 777) 4. 
779 Berne Convention, Art 9(2), TRIPS, Art 13, WCT, Art 10. 
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societal interests including freedom of expression, within the copyright 
framework. The basis under which the test could be interpreted to permit such 
new flexible defence can also be intensified by taking into account other public 
policies and fundamental freedoms when interpreting the test. Thus, it 
is important for the entire copyright regime that the test is understood to be, not 
a straitjacket, but flexible and welcoming whatever the future development of 
L&Es will bring. 
The free flow of information in the online environment has affected 
copyright’s delicate balance between rightsholders’ and users’ interests, and 
greater flexibility is required to promote the public interest. 780  Such 
technological advance has led to the arrival of a number of emerging 
unauthorised uses of copyright works, such as user-generated content, search 
engine services, social networking and journalistic activities. Not only have 
these activities contributed to a stimulus for further creativity, they have also 
served the public as a prerequisite for a healthy democratic society. They have 
become essential parts of economic, social and cultural growth.781 It is no 
longer only grants of exclusive rights that are incentives to the creation of more 
works, as L&Es are also becoming more important in ensuring the freedom to 
create and to use the works to fulfil and promote the public enrichment.782 
These types of unauthorised uses do not necessarily undermine rightsholders’ 
economic interests but are parts of what technological advances may entail. 
Some are exercised to keep the entire public away from harm or to keep them 
informed about matters affecting their general interest, serving objectives such 
as uses for public policy and freedom of expression. Given these merits, more 
flexibility is needed within the L&E system to guarantee the legitimacy of uses 
that represent other important values in society. The proposed public interest 
defence is one of those L&Es that would benefit from a flexible &E system, as 
its purpose is to provide safe haven for those important uses mentioned above. 
                                                
780 Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the three-step test: An analysis of the three-
step test in international and EC copyright law (Kluwer Law International 2004) 35. 
781 Martin Senftleben, ‘Fair Use in The Netherlands – A Renaissance?’ (2009) 
<http://ssm.com/abstract=1563986> accessed 15 November 2014, 6. 
782 Stanatoudi and Paul Torremans (n 774) para 11.63. 
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Until now, there has been no sufficient breathing space within the L&E system 
where they can be safeguarded. The three-step test is an international doctrine 
designed to allow member states to devise L&Es according to their domestic 
requirements. It is therefore useful to examine to what extent the test can 
provide flexibility to open up the L&E system and allow emerging L&Es, such 
as the proposed public interest defence, to play a role in protecting other 
competing interests needed for copyright to develop and keep pace with the 
changing environment. 
4.2 Restrictive interpretation of the three-step test 
When considering the interpretation of the test at the international level, the 
guiding principle of restrictive interpretation has been handed down by the 
WTO Panel in its report concerning the compatibility of Section 110(5) of the 
US Copyright Act with Article 13 TRIPS.783 The case analysis that follows will 
examine why such an interpretation, given that it is the first and only 
international interpretation of the three-step test thus far,784 is too restrictive to 
be followed by regional or national judicial bodies in this rapidly-changing 
copyright environment. 
4.2.1 United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act 
In April 1999, the European Communities (EC) requested the establishment of 
a WTO panel to deal with their complaint regarding the inconsistency of the 
US Copyright Act with the obligations under Article 9(1) TRIPS to comply 
with Articles 1 to 21 of the Berne Convention.785 The dispute was centred on 
whether the two copyright exceptions, 786  namely homestyle and business 
exceptions, enshrined in Sections 110(5)(A) and (B) of the US Copyright Act 
respectively, were compatible with the three-step test. Sub-paragraph A 
provides for the so-called homestyle exception, exempting the broadcasts of 
works other than nondramatic musical works in small commercial 
                                                
783 WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) (n 374). 
784 The three-step test was incorporated into Art 13 TRIPS by reference under its Art 9(1), 
which obliges member states to respect Arts 1-21 of the Berne Convention. 
785 WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) paras 3.1-3.2. 
786 Although the word ‘exemption’ was used throughout the original text, it is as a matter of 
consistency of this chapter to use the word ‘exception’ instead to refer to all doctrines that 
impose limits on copyright claims. 
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establishments using homestyle receiving apparatus.787 The business exception 
in sub-paragraph B allows food, drinking and retail establishments to amplify 
the communication of nondramatic musical works with no authorisation or 
royalty fee, provided that they do not exceed a particular floor area.788 For 
those not conforming to this requirement, amplification is still permissible as 
they can use other equipment and comply with additional conditions.789 The 
EC argued that these exceptions permitted free use of copyright works with the 
types of conditions that would entitle a considerable number of establishments 
to be exempted to the detriment of the EC right holders; thus, they were at odds 
with the three-step test.790 The US contended that the rationale behind Section 
110(5) was that ‘the secondary use of the transmission by turning on an 
ordinary receiver in public was so remote and minimal that no further liability 
should be imposed’; therefore, a small commercial establishment that was not 
large enough to subscribe to a commercial background music service could be 
exempted from copyright liability.791 
Article 13 TRIPS was also of importance in this case because it contained the 
three criteria under which the legitimacy of the two exceptions must be 
tested.792 In introductory statements, the Panel stated that the three criteria 
should be subject to cumulative application, but independent consideration for 
each step.793 What is interesting is the fact that the Panel made reference to the 
predecessor provision of the three-step test in Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention before taking the view that ‘Article 13 cannot have more than a 
narrow or limited operation’; in fact, types of L&Es for which this provision 
would allow are only those having limited scope.794 This is a strong indication 
of the Panel taking the narrow route in applying the test. This became even 
more evident in their subsequent step-by-step interpretation. 
                                                
787 WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) para 2.3. 
788 Ibid. para 2.3. 
789 Ibid. paras 2.14 and 2.3. 
790 Art 13 TRIPS reads ‘Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to 
certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work in question 
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightsholder’. 
791 WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) para 2.5. 
792 Ibid. para 6.71. 
793 Ibid. para 6.97. 
794 Ibid. 
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 Step 1: special cases 4.2.1.1
Exceptions to copyright must be confined to particular special cases. The Panel 
started their analysis by generally articulating that the first condition was 
divided into two sub-tests: certainty and speciality. With regard to the former, 
it was straightforward for the Panel to hold that the scopes of both statutory 
homestyle and business exceptions were clearly defined, known and 
particularised to the extent that legal certainty can be assured.795 Emphasis was 
placed on the latter sub-test, and the Panel generally interpreted that the word 
‘special’ implied that a given exception ‘must be limited in its field of 
application or exceptional in its scope’.796 This suggests a requirement for 
narrowness in its quantitative (scope) and qualitative (underlying objective) 
aspects. 797  Following this, the Panel based its analysis primarily on an 
assessment conducted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in 1995. 
The assessment noted that a large percentage of all eating (62%), drinking 
(71.8%) and retail (27%) establishments in the US were beneficiaries of the 
business exception. Whereas only a minority of them were regarded as 
potential users of the homestyle exception. While it was held that the coverage 
of the homestyle exception was sufficiently narrow to qualify as a special case, 
the business exception did not survive the test. Despite the Panel’s mention of 
the qualitative sense of narrowness and the objectives underlying both 
exceptions,798 it seems that it refrained from addressing them at this stage, and 
it could have made the analysis more multifaceted and balanced had it simply 
taken into account other competing interests. It is unlikely that the Panel’s 
reliance on the quantitative sense was an attempt to avoid engaging in the 
discussion about the objectives underlying the exceptions, which it believed 
may belong to later steps.799 Whether or not this was a correct guidance or 
simply a mistake is at the heart of the debate.800 
                                                
795 Ibid. para 6.108. See also Kur (n 777) 23. 
796 WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) para 6.109. 
797 Ibid. 
798 Ibid. paras 6.115 and 6.156, where the US put forward the underlying purposes of the 
business and homestyle exceptions respectively. 
799 Ibid. para 6.127. See also Kur (n 777) 24. 
800 See the Panel’s reason for continuing the analysis of the remaining two steps of Article 13 
in relation to subparagraph (B) in WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) paras 6.160–6.162. 
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 Step 2: conflict with a normal exploitation of the work 4.2.1.2
The exceptions must not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work. In its 
general interpretative analysis,801 the Panel admitted that the term ‘normal 
exploitation’ was not the same as full use of all copyright exclusivity; 
otherwise, nearly every exception to copyright would be inconsistent with this 
step.802 The Panel partially agreed with one of the US claims that ‘normal 
exploitation’ excluded ‘uses from which an owner would not ordinarily expect 
to receive compensation’.803 They went on, elaborating that the exempted uses 
would come into conflict with normal exploitation of the work if they ‘enter 
into economic competition with the ways that rightsholders normally extract 
economic value from that right and thereby deprive them of significant or 
tangible commercial gains’.804 It was also accepted that such harm occurred 
against considerable economic benefits of the rightsholders, including both 
actual and potential effects.805 This means that the assessment also took 
account of adverse effects caused by those using the works without 
authorisation and those likely to do so in the future. 
Prior to applying this general interpretation to the exceptions at issue, the Panel 
clarified the distinction between the two situations covered by the homestyle 
and business exceptions. Those include ‘a situation where one listens to the 
radio and watches the television and a situation where one uses appropriate 
equipment to cause a new public performance of music contained in a 
broadcast or other transmission’.806 They acknowledged that the coverage of 
the former situation was so limited that only a small percentage of beneficiaries 
could qualify for the benefits; therefore, the homestyle exception could not be 
regarded as preventing the rightsholders from acquiring considerable economic 
or practical importance arising from their copyright musical works.807 This was 
not the case for the business exception. In concluding that the exception 
conflicted with normal exploitation, the Panel carried out separate 
                                                
801 Ibid. paras 6.163–6.189. 
802 Ibid. paras 6.167 and 6.182. 
803 Ibid. para 6.177. 
804 Ibid. para 6.183. 
805 Ibid. paras 6.185, 6.186. 
806 Ibid. para 6.214. 
807 Ibid. paras 6.215-6.218. 
 
177 
examinations of the adverse effects caused by the exception on the chance of 
receiving revenue that each affected exclusive right may confer.808  They 
appeared to base their proposition on the same line of reasoning as provided in 
the analysis of the first condition; the exception benefited an excessive number 
of eating, drinking and retail establishments, from which the right holders 
would otherwise have expected to receive compensation for the exercise of 
each exclusive right granted. 809  They also observed that the free 
communication of radio and television broadcast exempted by subparagraph B 
could have induced a number of establishments to shift from the licensed use 
of recorded music from CDs and tapes to this free-of-charge broadcast. This 
could constitute a foreseeable economic harm to the rightsholders of musical 
works in the future.810 
As is clear from the Panel’s viewpoint, the analysis of the second condition 
falls heavily on the side of rightsholders’ interests. Although it was confirmed 
that not every exempted use would be in conflict with a normal exploitation, 
the adopted approach suggested otherwise. It indicated that whether the use 
conflicted with a normal exploitation of the work was contingent on both 
actual and possible adverse effects caused to all granted exclusive rights. This 
leads to the concern that such consideration only takes into account financial 
loss suffered by individual rightsholders,811 and there is no room left in this 
step for the discussion of non-economic or other competing interests. 
 Step 3: unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of 4.2.1.3
rightsholders 
According to the wording of the third condition that implies a balancing 
procedure –interests – this can be where the discussion of policy issues and 
other competing interests can be factored into the equation, but this does not 
seem to have received strong recognition from the Panel. They began the 
general interpretative analysis by providing definitions of ‘legitimate’ and 
                                                
808 Ibid. para 6.173. See also Kur (n 777) 26. 
809 WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) paras 6.206, 6.210. 
810 Ibid. para 6.209. 
811 Ibid, as can be implied from paras 6.209, 6.210 and 6.218. 
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‘prejudice’,812 and noting that the word ‘interests’ was ‘not necessarily limited 
to actual or potential economic advantage or detriment’. 813  Given this 
proposition, it became paradoxical when the Panel later addressed the 
questions of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘reasonableness’ by merely mentioning economic 
rights, whilst refusing to consider the legitimacy of the rightsholders’ interests. 
They also took on the question of the reasonableness of prejudice by 
recognising that: 
‘prejudice to the legitimate interests of rightsholders reaches an 
unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or has 
the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income [emphasis 
added] to the copyright owner [given] market conditions and 
actual and potential prejudice caused by the exemptions’.814 
This concept was then applied to the two exceptions at issue. The detailed 
financial arithmetic of the loss of rightsholders’ revenue from these 
establishments was taken into account as a decisive factor in determining the 
level of reasonableness of prejudice. For the homestyle exception, the Panel 
agreed with the US claim that the financial loss as a result of playing music in 
small establishments covered by the exception was so minimal that it would 
not unreasonably deprive the rightsholders of potential income.815 Concerning 
the business exception, in addition to failing to satisfy the third condition,816 
the quantification of the loss of rightsholders’ income was still a determinant in 
the level of prejudice caused.817 Not unexpectedly, the Panel seemed to simply 
recall their previous propositions in the first and second steps and rely heavily 
on the assurance of the full economic exploitation of rightsholders in the last 
step, but to remain silent about other competing interests at stake . 
What is clear in the Panel’s restrictive standard is an absence of consideration 
of non-economic interests such as public policy, public users’ interests, 
freedom of information and so on. This examination is by no means intended 
to judge whether or not the Panel’s interpretation based on such a restrictive 
                                                
812 Ibid. paras 6.224, 6.225. 
813 Ibid. paras 6223, 6.227. 
814 Ibid. paras 6.229, 6.236. 
815 Ibid. paras 6.270, 6.271. 
816 Ibid. para 6.265. 
817 Ibid. paras 6.249 and 6.251. 
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approach is wrong. It merely endeavours to point out that other important 
interests or objectives underlying L&Es are left out of the three-step test 
consideration, and this is likely to be an important issue that requires an 
immediate problem-solving response. 
4.2.2 Impact of the restrictive interpretation on the EU copyright 
regime: case law analysis 
This section will examine some prominent EU and national case law to 
determine how the Panel’s approach has, implicitly or explicitly, affected 
subsequent cases in terms of interpretations and applications of the three-step 
test. It will illustrate what the restrictive interpretation has done to the EU 
copyright regime, and to what extent it has undermined not only existing 
L&Es, but also those emerging ones driven by societal and technological 
developments. 
  ECJ case law 4.2.2.1
Infopaq818 
This case concerned the strict interpretation of the transient copying exception 
in light of the three-step test.819 The activity at issue was the practice of 
Infopaq in drawing up summaries of articles from Danish newspapers and 
periodicals using an automated data monitoring process. The ECJ was asked to 
give a preliminary ruling on the question of whether doing this without the 
rightsholders’ permission satisfied the conditions enshrined in Article 5(1). The 
ECJ begun its ruling by noting that there were five conditions which the 
service provided by Infopaq had to meet to be exempted by Article 5(1).820 In 
applying those conditions, the Court clarified that, as derogations from 
exclusive rights, these conditions should be strictly interpreted and 
cumulatively applied to the extent that failing to comply with any of them 
would give rise to the activity not being covered by the exception.821 Having so 
established, the ECJ upheld the proposition by referring to the necessity to 
strictly interpret and apply the exceptions in accordance with the three-step test 
                                                
818 Infopaq (n 410). 
819 Copyright Directive, Art 5(1), (5) respectively. 
820 See all five conditions in Infopaq (n 410) para 54. 
821 Ibid. paras 55, 56. 
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incorporated in Article 5(5) of the Copyright Directive.822 This led to one of 
the practices (printing an 11-word extract) carried out by Infopaq falling 
outside the scope of Article 5(1).823 
The reference to the three-step test may be a potential reason why the 
interpretation of the condition of being ‘transient’824 was of such a strict nature. 
This case helps illustrate how unlikely it would be to accept new uses driven 
by technological advances as exempted from copyright liability when 
interpreting the three-step test in a restrictive manner. 
ACI Adam825 
This is another case illustrating how the application of the EU L&Es provided 
in Article 5 of the Copyright Directive is influenced by the restrictive 
interpretation of the three-step test. Application was made to the ECJ, asking 
for a preliminary ruling on whether the Dutch private copying exception should 
be understood as embracing copying from unlawful sources. 826  In the 
proceedings, ACI Adam and other applicants argued that the private copying 
levy determined and imposed on them by Stichting Thuiskopie (Private Copy 
Foundation) and SONT (Foundation for Negotiation of Private Copyright 
Compensation)827 was illegitimate. They contended that the reproductions were 
made from unlawful sources and thus did not fall within the scope of Article 
16c(2) of Dutch copyright law, which was enacted to compensate rightsholders 
whose works were reproduced only from lawful sources. 828  Prior to the 
compatibility check against the national private copying exception, the ECJ 
placed emphasis on the three-step test as the basis under which the EU private 
copying exception provided in Article 5(2) of the Directive should be 
                                                
822 Ibid. para 58. See also Case C-145/10 Painer (n 410) para 18, as citing Infopaq para 62, 
where the three-step test was most likely used as a control over exceptions provided in Article 
5, preventing them from being interpreted extensively to the extent that legal certainty for 
authors with regard to the protection of their works as referred to in recitals 4, 6 and 21 in the 
preamble to Copyright Directive is undermined.     
823 Ibid. paras 64, 67-70, 74. 
824 Ibid. para 64. 
825 Case C-435/12 ACI Adam BV and Others v Stichting de Thuiskopie [2014]. 
826 Ibid. para 19. 
827 Ibid. Two Dutch foundations responsible for collecting the levy on behalf of rightsholders. 
828 Ibid. paras 12-19. 
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interpreted.829 It was stated that one of the objectives of EU copyright law was 
to ensure strong copyright protection to promote the proper functioning of EU 
internal market,830 and so L&Es in copyright should be strictly interpreted in 
compliance with the three-step test provided in Article 5(5).831 The ECJ held 
that permitting private copying made from unlawful sources would ‘encourage 
the circulation of counterfeited or pirated works, reduce the volume of sales or 
of other lawful transactions’ and undermine the rightsholders’ exclusive rights 
to authorise or prohibit reproductions of their works.832 These outcomes would 
infringe the second and third conditions laid down by the three-step test.833 
The ECJ’s interpretation of the national private copying exception echoes the 
WTO Panel’s restrictive three-step test standard in that only the economic 
interests of rightsholders were taken into account, and no other public interest 
reasons. It is also unfortunate that the ECJ followed such a restrictive 
interpretation method for L&Es, despite making reference to other methods for 
giving effect to the purpose of L&Es and to balance conflicting interests.834 
This is not to say that reproducing the works from unlawful sources should be 
condoned, but merely that the economic aspect such as loss of rightsholders’ 
expected income should not be so highly prioritised that it rules out any other 
aspect of copyright law. 
 National case law 4.2.2.2
Mullholland Drive835 
One of the most widely-recognised cases regarding the strict application of the 
                                                
829 Ibid. paras 22, 24, 27. 
830 Ibid. paras 32-37. 
831 Ibid. paras 38-41. See also Case C-117/13 Technische Universität Darmstadt v Eugen 
Ulmer KG (2014) ECDR 23 para 47, where the ECJ, by citing ACI Adam para 26, held that 
‘ancillary right of digitisation must be determined by interpreting Article 5(2)(c) in light of 
Article 5(5),...which is not intended to extend the scope of the exceptions and limitations 
provided for therein’. With this respect, it resulted in the ECJ ruling that, despite granting the 
ancillary right to digitise to be available to publicly accessible libraries, such right is prevented 
from being interpreted as allowing digitisation of the whole library’s collections as it would 
otherwise be contrary to the first condition – certain special cases.    
832 Ibid. paras 31, 38-41. 
833 Ibid. 
834 Painer (n 410) paras 132-134; Case C-201/13 Johan Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v 
Helena Vandersteen and Others (2014) ECDR 21 paras 23, 26. 
835 Cour de cassation française, February 28, 2006 (2006) 37 IIC 760 (Mulholland Drive), 
reversing Paris Court of Appeal, April 22, 2005 (2006) 37 IIC 112. 
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three-step test is evident in the French Supreme Court’s decision in Mulholland 
Drive. An individual bought a DVD of the film Mulholland Drive and wanted 
to make a VHS copy for his personal use, but was prevented by the 
technological protection measures put in place by the film producers. The 
buyer argued that his private copying activity was exempted by Article L.122-5 
of the French IP code.836 Having tested the legitimacy of the exception with the 
three-step test, the Cour de Cassation held that an exception permitting private 
copying of DVDs would undermine the normal exploitation of the protected 
cinematographic work. This decision was made with the realisation of the risk 
of piracy and significant economic harm that pirated DVD copies in the guise 
of exempted private copying would have caused to the movie industry.837 
There seems to be double assessing in this case, as not only does the use in 
question have to meet the statutory requirements set out in the national private 
copying exception, but it must also come under the three-step test scrutiny. 
Having realised that copyright L&Es in EU member states are already 
narrowly defined,838 the second assessment imposed by the restrictive three-
step test can only be understood to insert even more constraints into the EU 
L&Es system. This suggests that a restrictive understanding of the test turns a 
blind eye to the legitimacy of statutory national exceptions, and leaves 
copyright users with uncertainty in vindicating their infringing activities. More 
importantly, it leaves no room for other public interest considerations in the 
L&Es system, and there is a need to accept more privileged use serving other 
fundamental interests in response to evolving information technologies and 
public interest. 
Google Inc v Copiepresse SCRL839 
Another example illustrating the restrictive interpretative approach of the three-
step test on L&Es to copyright is evident in the decision given by the Brussels 
                                                
836 Art L122-5 reads ‘Once a work has been disclosed, the author may not prohibit: 1°. private 
and gratuitous performances carried out exclusively within the family circle…’. 
837 Mulholland Drive (n 835) 10084. See also Jonathan Griffiths, ‘The ‘three-step test’ in 
European copyright law - problems and solutions’ (2009) 4 IPQ 428, 434. 
838 Kur (n 777) 7-11. 
839 Court of First Instance of Brussels, Google Inc v Copiepresse SCRL, February 13, 2007 
[2007] ECDR 5. 
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Court of First Instance in Google Inc v Copiepresse SCRL. In this case, Google 
was sued for copyright infringement over its ‘Google News’ service, part of 
which carried out the computer-generated acts of searching, extracting and 
reproducing press articles from the websites on which the articles had been 
posted by proprietary publishers. Copiepresse was a copyright management 
society acting on behalf of the publishers of the protected articles. It argued 
that Google’s review activities led to substantial unauthorised reproduction of 
titles and extracts from the protected articles; therefore, Google infringed the 
rightsholders’ exclusive right to reproduction and communication to the 
public.840 Google contended that its activities were covered by the statutory 
quotation and news reporting exceptions provided in Articles 21(1) and 22(1) 
of the Belgian Copyright Act respectively, and the right to freedom of 
expression enshrined in Article 10 ECHR.841 
In the ruling, the Belgian Court affirmed that ‘exceptions to copyright must be 
interpreted narrowly and by reference to the triple-test provided for in Article 
5(5) of the Copyright Directive’, whose wording seems to ‘confirm the 
restrictive nature of the exceptions’.842 In support of this proposition, the Court 
went on that, as to the quotation exception, the use at issue would qualify as 
quotation if it contributed to an analysis or comment on the works, rather than 
merely collecting them for general overview.843 Google’s service only indexed 
and classified the press articles, and did not offer any analysis or comment.844 
Concerning the news reporting exception, its purpose was to enable the media 
to respond swiftly and contribute some commentary on current events by using 
the reproduced works as references, not as main objects, for the reporting. As 
the titles and extracts reproduced were the main features of the Google News 
                                                
840 See Graham Smith, ‘Copiepresse v Google – the Belgian Judgment Dissected’ (Bird & 
Bird, 13 March 2007) <http://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2007/copiepresse-v-google> 
accessed 15 September 2016. 
841 See more detailed argument concerning Article 10 ECHR in Chapter 3. 
842 Google v Copiepresse (n 839) para 120. See also Philippe Laurent, ‘Brussels High Court 
confirms Google News' ban - Copiepresse SCRL v Google’ (2007) 23 Computer Law & 
Security Report 290, 292. 
843 Laurent (n 842) 292. 
844 Smith (n 840) 2. 
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service, it could not rely on this exception either.845 
Holding Google liable for copyright infringement draws particular attention to 
the difficulties that a search engine like Google is now facing with the lack of 
flexibility in the EU copyright L&Es regime. Strict interpretations of the 
exceptions seem to result from the Court’s previous experience of the three-
step test. Having subjected the already strictly-defined copyright exceptions to 
this restrictive test, the Court put the entire L&Es system and the public 
interest into deadlock where even trivial intervention with rightsholders’ 
realisable commercial interests can potentially be deemed impermissible. 
Perhaps the use of protected works for the purpose of parody or personal use 
would not be exempted if a rightsholder could generate even a low transaction 
cost and gain commercial benefit.846 Any uses that cause commercial loss to 
the rightsholders would easily be contrary to the second condition of the test 
and would thereby not be justified under public interest objectives against 
copyright protection. 
The analysis of these cases has attempted to show the restrictive approach of 
interpreting the three-step test adopted by the ECJ and courts in EU member 
states. They also illustrate the detrimental effect of this approach on the future 
of the public interest argument. There are a few interesting similarities between 
the cases as to how the three-step test is implemented to excluded national 
L&Es. First of all, all of them seem to agree on the concept that L&Es to 
exclusive rights must be strictly interpreted under the three-step test. Secondly, 
they do not give appropriate account to other compelling public interest 
reasons served by those L&Es; in fact, the majority seem to have substantial 
regard to the second condition and view it as a decisive factor in constituting 
violation of the test. This widely-recognised restrictive approach in the EU 
copyright regime mirrors the influential earlier decisions by the WTO Panel. 
As for its drawbacks, this way of interpreting and understanding the test 
constitutes additional constraint to existing L&Es. It is also likely to have an 
adverse effect on the evolution of the L&Es system by preventing it from 
                                                
845 Ibid; Laurent (n 842) 292. 
846 Griffiths (n 837) 435, 441. 
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serving any other fundamental societal, cultural and economic interests for 
which copyright law seeks to strike a fair balance. 847 These undesirable 
outcomes of the restrictive test would in turn preclude the proposed public 
interest defence from taking place in the EU copyright regime. 
4.2.3 In search for flexibility: samples of ad hoc external solutions 
In addition to the lack of flexibility in the EU copyright L&Es system, the 
restrictive understanding of the test also leads the circumstance where the 
courts in several EU member states have deviated from following such a 
restrictive approach. Instead, they have sought more flexibility by recourse to 
different ad hoc legal doctrines outside their copyright frameworks to 
safeguard their own social cultural and economic needs and to strike 
copyright’s fair balance. 
 The US-style fair use848  4.2.3.1
One popular solution is the US-style fair use doctrine. An early illustration of 
relying on this is from the Dutch Supreme Court’s 1995 decision on a dispute 
between the fragrance manufacturer Dior and a Dutch retailer regarding 
unauthorised reproduction of the protected perfume bottle design for 
advertising.849 Although none of the existing exceptions listed in Chapter 6 of 
the 1912 Copyright Act (Auteurswet) was applicable to the reproduction at 
issue, the Court found that the unique circumstance of this case absolved the 
defendant from copyright liability. In so deciding, it raised the balancing of 
interests between copyright holders and users, which are firmly recognised in 
the statutory L&Es to copyright,850 and there was room outside the existing 
                                                
847 P B Hugenholtz and Martin Selftleben, ‘Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities’ 
(2011) <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1959554>accessed 01 November 2014, 10. 
848 It must be made clear that the ad-hoc solution of the US-style fair use discussed under this 
section is not necessarily considered as an exact adoption of the US fair use doctrine prescribed 
in section 107 of the US Copyright Act per se – its four statutory factors with open-ended 
characters are, in fact, according to Jonathan Band and others, ’Fair Use/ Fair Dealing 
Handbook’ (2015) <infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/fair-use-handbook-march-
2015.pdf> accessed 16 January 2018, recognised in limited jurisdictions. Thus, it should rather 
be seen as an attempt of EU member states seeking to apply and adapt the underlying concept 
of fair use as a paradigm of flexible L&Es to copyright into their narrowly-defined L&Es 
regimes.  
849 Rechtbank Den Haag, Dior v Evora, 20 December 1995 [1996] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 
682. 
850 Lucie Guibault and Kevin van’t Klooster, ‘The balance of copyright-Dutch report’ (1994) 
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L&Es system where users’ interests could be facilitated.851 This approach is 
believed to be an implied adoption of the US-style fair use doctrine to open up 
the Dutch closed-list L&Es system.852 
The Barcelona Court of Appeals has shown that the US fair-use doctrine can be 
used as interpretative guidance in the three-step test.853 The case concerns the 
caching of copyright-protected contents by Google for its search engine. In 
refusing the copyright holder’s argument based on a restrictive interpretation of 
Article 40bis of the 1996 Spanish Copyright Act,854 which incorporates the 
three-step test into the Spanish copyright regime. The Court held that, to avoid 
absurd and inappropriate outcomes, the three-step test must be read in a 
positive manner in parallel with the US fair-use doctrine.855 By doing so, the 
test could function in a way that puts some limits on exclusive rights by 
recognising harmless uses of property by third parties and the general principle 
of good faith and prohibition of abuse of rights within the copyright regime.856 
Having followed this means of interpretation, the Court stated that the test, 
when read in a positive light, was an open door for flexibility to be added into 
the L&Es system.857 Against such merits, the court found it necessary to guide 
the flexible interpretation of the test with reference to the external doctrine of 
fair use. 
Similarly, the Paris Court of First Instance also found that the US fair-use 
doctrine offered a leeway to exempt reproducing pictures in thumbnails as part 
                                                                                                                            
 
<www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/293> accessed 16 September 2016, 7. 
851 Ibid. 7, 32. 
852 Ibid. 
853 Barcelona Court of Appeals, Decision of 17 September 2008 (unreported). See also Raquel 
Xalabarder, Spanish Supreme Court Rules in Favour of Google Search Engine... and a Flexible 
Reading of Copyright Statutes? (2012) 3 JIPITEC 162, para 16. 
854 Royal Legislative Decree 1/1996, of 12 April, which enacts the Texto Refundido de law ley 
de Propiedad Intelectual (TRLPI). 
855 See also Griffiths (n 837), the Court of appeals went as far as applying the four factors set 
out in Article 107 of the US Copyright Act to the caching service in question. 
856 Xalabarder (n 853) para 27. 
857 Ibid. section B: comments at para 27. 
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of the Google image search service from copyright liability.858 After applying 
four flexible factors set out in Article 107 of the US Copyright Act to the use in 
question, the Court came to the conclusion that the use was an adaptable non-
profit activity; the service represented the combined function between a 
dictionary, an encyclopaedia and a directory, serving to promote the authors’ 
works on internet, rather than causing them economic harm.859 With the 
application of the closed-list L&Es system of French copyright law,860 the 
reproduction by Google might not have fallen within the scope of any 
exceptions. This may have nothing to do with the wording of the exceptions, 
but merely that such use would have to come under the scrutiny of the three-
step test. In this situation, unlike the US fair use, the test’s strict interpretation 
in the EU copyright regime would prevent the court from taking into account 
Google’s users’ interests and the contributions the service made to the wider 
public. 
 Fundamental freedoms 4.2.3.2
Fundamental freedoms are also used as external tools to insert more flexibility 
into the L&Es systems. This alternative approach was adopted by the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany in Germania 3861 and by the Court of Appeal 
of The Hague in Scientology v XS4ALL.862 The former case relates to the 
copying of extensive extracts from the copyright-protected film into the 
defendant’s play ‘the Germania 3’, and the latter pertains to the publication of 
quoted statements obtained from an unpublished document owned by the 
Church of Scientology. Despite different facts, the courts in both cases faced a 
similar question; whether the defendants’ claims of right to quotation satisfied 
the requirements set out in the statutory quotation exceptions.863 The courts 
invoked the direct application of external doctrines of artistic freedom and 
                                                
858 Civil Court of Paris, SAIF v Google France (May 20, 2008), Enforceable copy Docket no 
05/12117, 9-11. 
859 Ibid. See also Hugenholtz and Selftleben (n 847) 12. 
860 See Civil Court of Paris, SAIF v Google France (n 858) 7, concerning the applicable law. 
861 Germania 3 Gespenster am toten Mann, Federal Constitutional Court 29 June 2000, 
Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht (ZUM) 2000, 867. 
862 (Scientology/Spaink), AMI/Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 2003, p 
217-223. See also District Court of The Hague, 4 May 2011, IER 2011/39 (Nadia Plesner 
Joensen v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA). 
863 German Copyright Act, Art 51; Dutch Copyright Act, Art 15a. 
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freedom of expression respectively to avoid unwanted outcomes against users’ 
interests caused by narrow applications of the quotation exceptions. 
Another interesting example in which artistic freedom was claimed against IPR 
is manifest in the Darfurnica case.864 The case concerns Danish artist Nadia 
Plesner using, without authorisation, a registered design owned by Louis 
Vuitton. The protected design was integrated into the painting named 
Darfurnica and intended to be an eye-catcher to illustrate a situation in which 
the world of luxury goods gets more attention from the media than the tragedy 
that occurred in Darfur, Sudan.865 At first instance, an ex parte decision was 
made to prohibit the artist from conducting any further infringing use of the 
design. On appeal, the defendant claimed her freedom to artistic expression 
protected by Article 10 ECHR, which was at this time given precedence over 
the freedom to enjoy IPR guaranteed in A1P1.866 If considered from the 
copyright perspective, the defendant may have had to resort to artistic freedom 
as an external support because the parody exception, when read in conjunction 
with the strict three-step test, could not have provided any certainty of whether 
the user’s interests in using the work in such a parodic way would be exempted 
from liability. 
These cases bring out two important points. The adoption of external tools in 
these three cases above indicates an increasingly important role for 
fundamental freedoms in the EU copyright regime, and the need to safeguard 
them in the wake of evolving democratic and information society. In addition, 
such outside influence heralds a critical situation in EU copyright law where 
the doctrine that regulates the entire L&Es system may be too restrictive, and 
so national courts are compelled to seek external ad hoc solutions to give some 
breathing space for emerging or unknown uses of copyrighted works to fulfil 
their domestic needs. This situation demonstrates the lack of flexibility in the 
EU copyright L&Es system as a result of the restrictive interpretation of the 
three-step test; there would be no need to look outside copyright laws had the 
                                                
864 Nadia Plesner v Louis Vuitton (n 862). See also Lucie Guibault, ‘The Netherlands: 
Darfurnica, Miffy and the right to parody!’ (2011) 3 JIPITEC 236. 
865 Ibid. paras 2.7, 2.10, 2.11. 
866 Ibid. paras 4.6-4.10. 
 
189 
interpretation of the test been sufficiently flexible to permit, in exceptional 
circumstances, the extended scope of the quotation exceptions to embrace a 
very long quotation or quoted texts from unpublished documents.867 In such a 
case, the application of the test would be less likely to undermine the 
legitimacy of statutory exceptions. It would also help open up the system to 
allow for the balanced application of such exceptions where necessary and to 
welcome emerging L&Es that serve other fundamental objectives such as 
public policy and freedom of expression. Instead of employing external 
solutions to solve the internal issue of restrictive three-step test, it may be 
better to start dealing with the problem by revisiting the historical and 
contextual background of the test and then reconsidering how its interpretation 
could be improved in search of flexibility. 
4.3 Revisiting the three-step test in search of flexibility in 
international copyright law 
4.3.1 Historical and contextual backgrounds at international level 
Having addressed the problems of the restrictive interpretation of the three-step 
test, one way of solving such restriction is, as this chapter proposes, to revisit 
the test’s historical and contextual backgrounds at the international level. This 
section will argue that the test is designed to be a balancing tool in the 
international copyright regime and should thereby be subject to flexible 
interpretation. 
The test’s original function was as a balancing tool between grants and 
reservations in copyright protection. There are two markedly different legal 
traditions that lie at the centre of the international copyright regime: natural 
law and utilitarian traditions.868 While the former reflects the author-oriented 
civil law tradition with the focus on copyright exclusivity, 869  the latter 
enshrines the common law concept of social utility where copyright is seen as 
an ‘engine of free expression’.870 
                                                
867 Germania 3 (n 861) 867; Scientology (n 862) 217-223. 
868 Senftleben (n 781) 6-16; See also Kur (n 777) 9-13. 
869 Senftleben (n 781) 6. 
870 Ibid. 7. 
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Merely taking one line of reasoning to explain what the entire copyright system 
seeks to achieve seems to be unlikely to provide a realistically appropriate 
answer. In the usual copyright scenario where diverse interests are at stake, 
these two distinct legal traditions should be complementing and balancing each 
other towards the shared purpose of promoting cultural diversity.871 At the 
international level, such a balance is reflected in the way in which grants and 
reservations are enshrined in substantive provisions of international copyright-
related treaties, namely of the Berne Convention, TRIPS and WCT in both 
exclusive rights and L&Es.872 All these treaties contain the three-step test as an 
umbrella provision to determine the scope of permitted L&Es and limit the 
reach of exclusivity.873 The three-step test is designed to draw the lines of 
intersection between grants and reservations,874 and its function is to be the 
linchpin in ensuring that a balance between the two theories is well-maintained 
at the international level. The abstract nature of the test seems to be supportive 
of this conclusion as it enables the test to recalibrate the balance where 
necessary.875 
Despite contradicting the WTO Copyright Panel’s restrictive interpretative 
approach, this flexible understanding is apparent in the contexts under which 
the three-step test has been introduced and incorporated into of the Berne 
Convention, TRIPS and WCT, as the following sections will show. 
 The Berne Convention 4.3.1.1
Prior to its incorporation into the Berne Convention, the test showed sufficient 
flexibility to allow member states to safeguard their domestic interests through 
L&Es. It was introduced at the 1967 Stockholm Conference and codified in 
international copyright law through Article 9(2) of the Convention. At the 
Conference, one of the essential tasks was to strengthen copyright protection 
                                                
871 William W Fisher, ‘Property and Contract on the Internet’ (1998) 73 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 1203, 1212-1220. 
872 David Nimmer, Elliot Brown and Gary Frischling, ‘The Metamorphosis of Contract into 
Expand’ (1999) 87 California Law Review 17, 44. 
873 See Berne Convention, Art 9(2), TRIPS Art 13 and WCT, Art 10. 
874 Senftleben (n 780) 7, 17, 34. 
875 Ibid. 35. It is argued that the balance is constantly shifted due to an influence of 
technological development, which in turn entails the creations of TPMs and digitally-advanced 
copying techniques. 
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granted to authors through a recognition of the right of reproduction.876 As 
indicated in the preparatory document, 877  whether or not this would be 
accomplished was contingent on the discovery of an adequate solution for 
permissible L&Es. As noted by the Study Group carrying out the preparatory 
work for the Conference, it proved difficult to have the L&Es section revised 
given the considerably diverse groups of L&Es available in domestic laws.878 
The Group found it necessary to devise an international formula capable of 
reconciling national diversity and contributing to a twofold objective: 
‘safeguarding the legitimate interests of the author while leaving a sufficient 
margin of freedom to the national legislation to satisfy important social or 
cultural needs’.879 
According to the UK delegate, such international formulae exempting the right 
of reproduction needed to be sufficiently restrictive to ensure that the author 
was not worse off than they would have been without the introduction of such 
right, but must remain sufficiently broad to cover at least existing L&Es in 
national legislations.880 It may be this dualistic objective that established a 
strong foundation under which the three-step test was introduced into Article 
9(2) of the Convention.881 The Committee further admitted that the concerns of 
diverse L&Es at national level could be solved by the test’s abstract character, 
which was capable of encompassing a broad range of existing and emerging 
L&Es and reconciling different national interests. 882 Against this original 
backdrop, the test was initially designed to provide a flexible framework for 
the Convention within which adequate deference was paid to national 
legislatures to enjoy the freedom of safeguarding domestic social, cultural and 
economic aspirations through various types of permissible L&Es to right of 
                                                
876 Senftleben (n 780) 47. 
877 WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm (1967, Vol I) Doc 
S/1, 113. 
878 Ibid, 111-112. 
879 Ibid. 113. 
880 WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm (1967, Vol II), 
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reproduction, with or without remuneration.883 This freedom is nevertheless 
subject to the assessment against the three abstract criteria contained in the test 
as a way to balance with the author’s interests.884 
 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 4.3.1.2
TRIPS should take into account that the promotion of international free trade is 
not necessarily restricted to favour only the producers of goods, but must also 
balance between their private interests and public benefits. Having originated 
from of the Berne Convention, the three-step test was later incorporated into 
TRIPS,885 which for the first time introduced intellectual property law into the 
international trade regime. TRIPS is one of the WTO agreements which was 
negotiated at the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1994. It 
was included in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The rationale of such inclusion came from a growing awareness of 
the significant effect of intellectual property goods, not only on economic 
growth, but also on counterfeiting and piracy issues between trading nations.886 
TRIPS provisions reflect intellectual property rules embedded in international 
trade, and the protection of literary and artistic works is not the purpose for 
which TRIPS provisions were written.887 
TRIPS Preamble 
As an international treaty, TRIPS should generally be interpreted in pursuance 
of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).888 Article 31 states that not only actual texts, but also the preamble, 
shall be taken into consideration along with the treaty’s object and purpose 
                                                
883 Ibid. 1145. 
884 Records 1967 (Vol I) (n 877) Doc S/1, 81. 
885 See TRIPS, Art 13 with slight alterations of actual wordings from an original version 
provided in Berne Convention, Art 9(2). The test was also incorporated into TRIPS pursuant to 
its Art 9(1), requiring member states to comply with Berne Convention, Arts 1-21. 
886 Jerome H Reichman ‘Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks 
of a GATT Connection’ (1989) 22 VJTL 747, 762-63. 
887 Records 1967 (Vol I) (n 877) Doc S/1, 113. 
888 This interpretative method has been referred to by WTO panels and the Appellate Body 
frequently. See, for example WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) para 6.43; Canada – Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (WT/DS114/R) report of the Panel, adopted 7 April 
2000 para 7.14. 
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when interpreting its specific provisions,889 and so as regards the three-step test 
in Article 13, the preamble of TRIPS could be used to resolve disputes 
concerning imprecise wordings or divergent interpretations.890 
The required minimum standard of protection and enforcement of IPR in 
TRIPS is intended: ‘to reduce distortions and impediments to international 
trade’.891 Insufficient IPR protection could lead to a circumstance where piracy 
and unauthorised copying of IP goods could become rampant, and the trade 
system would thus be prejudiced.892 Such protection could also become an 
obstacle to legitimate trade if it is excessively granted to the extent that it 
unreasonably restricts unauthorised use, which might be conducive to a 
reduction of distortions and impediments. The latter proposition could be 
compared to a situation where the interpretation of Article 13 TRIPS relies too 
heavily on the economic interests of rightsholders and provides them with a 
monopoly over their intellectual products. This may result in fewer advantages 
from the restrictive interpretation of the test in favour of rightsholders. A 
flexible interpretation permitting unauthorised use within reasonable limits 
would be more efficient in terms of lessening trade obstacles and promoting 
the dissemination of intellectual innovation. Such excessive protection of IPR 
could be regarded as a trade barrier per se, which is contrary to the intent 
expressed in the preamble. 
Objectives and Principles of TRIPS 
In addition to the preamble, what should be factored into the interpretation of 
Article 13 TRIPS are Articles 7 and 8, which speak of TRIPS objectives and 
general principles of limiting IPR. According to Article 7, there are three 
indispensable objectives to which the protection and enforcement of IPR 
should contribute: 
1. the promotion and dissemination of technological innovation; 
                                                
889 See VCLT, Art 31(1), (2). See also Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting history 
and analysis (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 2.09. As regards object and purpose, see the 
considerations of Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS below. 
890 Gervais (n 889) 2.09. 
891 See the preamble, first paragraph. 
892 Ibid. 
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2. the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge in favour of social and economic welfare; and 
3. a balance of rights and obligations.  
Article 8 sets out general rationales for members when taking specific actions 
necessary to serve three principal domestic requirements: 
1. the protection of public health and nutrition; 
2. the promotion of the public interest in the areas vitally 
important to domestic socio-economic and technological 
development; and 
3. the prevention of the abuse of IPR causing the detrimental effect 
to the international transfer of technology. 
The three objectives in Article 7, when examined in the context of IP law, echo 
the fundamental IP policy of maintaining the equilibrium between rewarding 
creators for their investment and securing accessibility for wider public benefit. 
The legislature should ensure that exclusive rights awarded to creators are 
balanced against exceptions of such rights and promotes creativity and 
innovation.893 Where the public interest is unreasonably stifled by IPR, Article 
8 provides policy rationales for members to justify the adoption of TRIPS-
compatible measures necessary to safeguard it.894 
At the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001,895 it was agreed by the ministers 
from all WTO members that ‘the TRIPS Council shall be guided by the 
objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement 
and shall fully take into account the development dimension’. 896  This 
proposition is consistent with the WTO Panel’s report in Canada – Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,897 in which the Panel found it essential 
to bear in mind the goals and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8, 
especially when examining the specific meaning and conditions set out in 
                                                
893 Gervais (n 889) paras 1.07, 2.71. This is the ultimate objective of IPR in the context of 
TRIPS as part of GATT law. See GATT, Art XX, where the protection of IPR is considered as 
acceptable obstacle to free trade. 
894 Ibid. paras 2.85, 2.86. 
895 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1, Adopted on 14 November 2001. 
896 Ibid. para 19. 
897 WTO Panel – Patent (2000) (n 888). 
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Article 30,898 which is the three-step test incorporated in the patent section, so 
this principle may as well apply to Article 13 in the copyright section. Given 
that these provisions are established in the body of the agreement,899 they 
should be viewed an important basis under which TRIPS provisions are 
interpreted.900 This line of reasoning would allow the Panel to have more 
regard to the need to strike a fair balance between divergent interests when 
construing Article 13 TRIPS in the case of United States – Section 110(5) of 
the US Copyright Act.901 The required balance for the intention to promote 
creation and innovation recognised in Articles 7 and 8 could contribute to a 
flexible interpretation of the three-step test and allow the Panel to be more 
engaged with public policy objectives underpinning the business exception.902 
This may then allow the proposed public interest defence to pass the test and to 
play its role of safeguarding the public policy grounds and freedom of 
expression, restoring the fair balance in the international copyright system. 
 WCT 4.3.1.3
Another international treaty worth considering in search of inherent flexibility 
for the three-step test is WCT. The treaty concerns copyright law and contains 
the three-step test in its Article 10. Two years after the emergence of TRIPS, 
WCT came into force in 1996 to address particular copyright issues raised by 
new economic, social, cultural and technological developments, especially the 
internet and databases, and to ensure that copyright rules were keeping pace 
with such developments.903 
Prior to the finalisation of the treaty in the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic 
Conference,904 the three-step test came to the fore of the preparatory work as a 
basis for controlling all permissible copyright L&Es. 905  Some of the 
                                                
898 Ibid. para 7.26. 
899 Gervais (n 889) para 2.70, 2.87. 
900 Ibid. paras 2.70, 2.80, 2.85, 2.87. 
901 See WTO Panel – Patent (2000) para 7.26, concerning the interpretation of Article 30 
TRIPS. 
902 WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) paras 6.115, 6.155. 
903 See WCT, preamble. 
904 At the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighbouring Rights 
there are in fact two ‘internet’ treaties adopted at the same time, namely WCT and WPPT. 
905 Senftleben (n 780) 92. 
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discussions related to the test’s ability to allow for remuneration to avoid 
unreasonable prejudice to rightsholders’ legitimate interests, and the proposed 
use of the US fair-use criteria to form the basis of assessing the third 
criterion.906 
At the Conference, deliberations about the scope of copyright L&Es formed 
the core issue and it was stated that: 
‘when a high level of protection is proposed, there is reason to 
balance such protection against other important values in 
society such as the interests of education and scientific research 
and the need of the general public for information available in 
libraries’.907  
Despite criticism by many member countries regarding the test performing as 
an additional control to their existing L&Es,908 Article 10 was finalised and 
comprised two paragraphs. Each recognised the application of the test to 
exceptions to rights granted under WCT and of the Berne Convention 
respectively, and it established three conditions under which national L&Es 
must be assessed to prove their compatibility with WCT. Noting that Article 10 
is the only provision that speaks of L&Es in WCT,909 it serves as a filter 
regulating all permissible L&Es, and as a determiner of the scope of exclusive 
rights; thus, ‘the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and 
the larger public interest’910 essentially lies in the interpretation of Article 
10.911 It is of particular relevance in capturing the scope of the test by 
consulting with the Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 WCT adopted by 
the Conference. 
In the statement, it is provided that Article 10 should be understood as 
permitting member states not only to carry forward and appropriately extend 
                                                
906 Ibid. 92-95. 
907 WIPO Doc CRNR/DC/4 (basic proposal), note 12.09. 
908 The fear of double restrictions on existing national exceptions was addressed by, for 
instance, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden in WIPO Doc CRNR/DC/102, paras 489, 495 
and 497 respectively. 
909 Except in WCT, Art 6(2), which deals with exhaustion as a limitation of the right of 
distribution. 
910 WCT, preamble - fifth paragraph. 
911 Jorg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties on Copyright: A Commentary 
on the WCT, the WPPT, and the BTAP (2nd edn, OUP 2015) para 7.10.15. 
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their Berne-compatible L&Es, but also to devise new L&Es as they see 
appropriate in the digital environment.912 The three-step test recognised in the 
WCT is firmly under the context of the digital environment and, when 
considered in its legal environment for which WCT has been designed under of 
the Berne Convention,913 Article 10 shall confer an equal or greater level of 
protection to authors’ exclusive rights than what is permissible under of the 
Berne Convention. 914  However, one should not disregard the effect of 
technological development on the copyright balance, which allows public users 
much improved copying and reproducing techniques for protected materials.915 
This effect undoubtedly contributes to an even more widespread dissemination 
of new knowledge and technological innovation in our society and may in turn 
entail the recalibration of the balance, reflected by a more flexible 
interpretation of Article 10 WCT vis-à-vis L&Es. 
Just because the Agreement Statement provides an open articulation for 
Contracting Parties to exercise their discretion does not necessarily mean that 
they are given a blank cheque to extend their existing L&Es or devise new 
L&Es according to their national interests without checking their legitimacy 
through the three criteria.916However, this does not mean that the Agreed 
Statement could not function as a useful guidance towards the reinterpretation 
of the test in a more flexible manner. The guided flexible approach corresponds 
to the need to maintain the equilibrium between rights and interests as 
recognised in the Preamble. It would enable copyright law to keep pace with 
the changing technological environment, which increasingly tends to place 
more focus on the public interest objectives. 
This all suggests that interpreting the three-step test in a manner consistent 
with its historical and contextual backgrounds can lead to a more flexible 
interpretation. With more flexibility, the notion of fair balance and the 
objectives underlying L&Es can play a more engaged role in the test. 
                                                
912 Ibid. para 7.10.50. 
913 See Article 1(2), (4) WCT, which requires Contracting Parties to comply with Articles 1-21 
Berne Convention and any existing obligations arising from Berne Convention. 
914 Reinbothe and Lewinski (n 911) paras 7.10.16, 7.10.38-39. 
915 Ibid. 
916 Ibid. paras 7.10.62, 7.10.64. 
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4.3.2 Case law in support of the flexible interpretation: the European 
focus 
The flexible interpretation of the test is not unprecedented and can be seen in 
case law from the ECJ and national courts of EU member states. Despite its 
own judgments endorsing the restrictive interpretative approach,917 the ECJ 
embarked on a different approach in Football Association Premier League Ltd 
(FAPL) and Others v QC Leisure and Others.918 In this case, flexibility was 
drawn from the growing importance of freedom of expression guaranteed in 
Article 11 CFREU and Article 10 ECHR to interpret the test in a more flexible 
way.919 The case concerned, among other things, the act of reproducing the 
satellite transmission of the broadcast of live Premier League matches, the 
rights to which were owned by FAPL. The reproductions were conducted using 
foreign satellite decoding devices to give access to the original transmission 
and to display it on the screen without authorisation. As part of the act of 
reproduction was carried out within the memory of a satellite decoder, one of 
the questions referred to the ECJ was whether the defendants were right in 
arguing that such acts were covered by the transient copying exception in 
Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive. The ECJ took into account obligation 
to safeguard the effective function of the transient copying exception, and to 
observe its underlying objective and purpose of ensuring ‘the development and 
operation of new technologies’, pursuant to Recital 31 of the preamble.920 It 
also embraced the need to maintain ‘a fair balance between the rights and 
interests of rightsholders […] and of users who wish to avail themselves of 
those new technologies’.921 Having considered all these factors, the Court 
concluded that the unauthorised reproductions met both the transient copying 
and the three-step test requirements enshrined in Articles 5(1) and (5) 
respectively.922 
                                                
917 See Infopaq (n 410); Case C-435/12 ACI Adam (n 825) analysed earlier. 
918 Joined Cases C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd (FAPL) and Others v QC 
Leisure and Others and C-429/08 Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR 
I-09083. 
919 Hugenholtz and Selftleben (n 847) 25. 
920 Cases C-403/08 (n 918) paras 162, 163, 179. 
921 Ibid. para 164. 
922 Ibid. paras 181,182. 
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In a judgment by the German Supreme Court in Supply of Photocopies of 
Newspaper Articles by a Public Library,923 the Court took a flexible view 
towards the test’s interpretation. The Court had to decide whether the library’s 
acts of making electronic copies of scientific articles and supplying them to 
users on request were covered by the statutory exception for private use in 
Article 53 of the 1965 German Copyright Act. Although it was argued that, 
under this exception, unauthorised copies did not necessarily have to be made 
by the users themselves, the act of dispatching them was held to be similar to 
publishing. This would have interfered with normal exploitation of the work, 
given more intensive uses of such electronic copying method and higher user 
demand in response to technological advances. 924  The Court solved this 
dilemma by allowing the library’s practice in return for an undertaking to pay 
reasonable compensation to the rightsholders. In so deciding, it relied on the 
capability of the three-step test recognised in Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention and Article 13 TRIPS in approving the concept of statutory license 
to reconcile the conflicting interests.925 
A similar trend of decisions can also be found in a case from the Swiss Federal 
Court – ProLitteris v Aargauer Zeitung AG926 – concerning the scope of the 
private use exception, and the interpretation of the three-step test in the digital 
environment. The case was brought by a newspaper group which claimed that 
press review agencies infringed their copyright in newspaper and journals, and 
that the defendants’ act of producing for commercial purpose both electronic 
and paper press reviews through keyword searches of their protected literary 
works did not fall within the scope of the private use exception. Otherwise, it 
would be in conflict with the three-step test. The Court dismissed the 
claimant’s argument and held that the scope of the exception was sufficiently 
broad to cover the defendants’ practice, regardless of whether it was online or 
paper-based, or whether the review copies were made by a third party.927 
                                                
923 Case I ZR 118/96 (before the Bundesgerichtshof), February 25, 1999 [2000] ECC 237. 
924 Ibid. 1004. 
925 Ibid. 1005-1007. 
926 ProLitteris (2008) 39 IIC 990. See Swiss Federal Act on Copyright and Related Rights, Arts 
19(1)(c), 20(2) and (4). 
927 Griffiths (n 837) 438. 
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The Court also made some important points about the three-step test. Firstly, 
concerning the second step, the Court found that the economic interests of the 
right-holders did not carry any particular weight against the users’ interests.928 
Secondly, it reaffirmed that remuneration can alleviate the situation where 
there existed an unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right 
holders, and violation to the third step could thus be avoided.929 Thirdly, the 
Court held that the third-step assessment of prejudice caused by the exception 
should be conducted in a way that struck a balance between the divergent 
interests of rightsholders, authors and users.930 
4.3.3 Summary 
Clearly, review of the historical and contextual backgrounds of the three-step 
test in the relevant treaties is contradictory to what is regarded as the 
mainstream interpretative approach of the test. 931  Having considered the 
drafting history and the context in which the test should be interpreted, it was 
found that the test was not intended to be a straitjacket to national L&Es, nor 
was it designed to tip balance towards the rightsholders’ economic interests. It 
was more likely formulated to be a tool used to adjust the balance between 
individual interests and other countervailing interests. The test should thus be 
subject to flexible interpretation in response to the need of the copyright 
system to keep pace with changing circumstances. This flexible way of 
interpreting the test is not new, as is evident in the case law discussed above. 
It is by no means far-fetched that a rapid development of technologies and 
methods of communication in the near future might again lead to an 
unsatisfactory interpretation of the test and repeat the deviation from the initial 
understanding of the test as a flexible tool. Interpretation and application of the 
test must be guided by certain reference points capable of ensuring that that the 
test’s inherent flexibility is taken into account in an ever-changing 
environment. The fundamental right to freedom of expression and the public 
policy doctrine can be taken as reference points. Given their prominent roles as 
                                                
928 see ProLitteris (n 926) para 6.2. 
929 Ibid. paras 6.1,6.3. 
930 Ibid. para 6.2. 
931 WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) (n 374). 
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safeguards to the public interest, they could provide excellent guidance in 
preventing the restrictive interpretation and could keep the test flexible to allow 
for recalibrations of copyright’s balance through L&Es. 
4.4 Interpretation and application of the three-step test 
4.4.1 The proposed reference points – freedom of expression 
The right to freedom of expression is a crucial point of reference in the flexible 
interpretation of the test. The key significance of freedom of expression derives 
from the strong protection this fundamental right confers, not only to 
individuals who communicate ideas and information, but also to those 
receiving them. This aspect of freedom of expression protection is becoming 
increasingly important as it provides some space for unauthorised use of 
protected works in the public interest. Such use could range from journalism to 
activities empowered by advanced technology, the important feature of which 
is being socially valuable. Against this background, uses falling within the 
ambit of freedom of expression are usually capable of making more accessible 
information and knowledge for public enrichment. Interpreting the test with 
reference to freedom of expression will thus help recall the need to consider the 
degree to which uses permitted by certain L&Es can contribute to the 
promotion of the dissemination and exchange of knowledge and information, 
especially those regarding matters of public interest. This plays a pivotal role in 
shaping our democratic society. It will in particular help ensure that existing or 
emerging L&Es serving important purposes such as news reporting, education, 
transformative use or uses reflecting public concerns such as political, 
economic or newsworthy matters are examined under the test’s procedures. 
When those types of emerging uses are brought onto an online platform where 
an infringement is just sometimes enabled by the way the technology works, 
referring back to the value of freedom of expression may help create a safe 
haven within the test for them to be permitted by existing or new L&Es. 
 Transformative use 4.4.1.1
One of the most evolving US copyright concepts is transformative use – use 
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that alters the original material into a new expression with added creative 
values and meanings.932 This is derived from the importance of freedom of 
expression to social and cultural development and its legality has been 
recognised under the US fair-use doctrine.933 The US courts have been more 
tolerant of unauthorised uses of copyright-protected work with a transformative 
character because they are regarded as productive and socially valuable uses 
with an underlying aim of promoting freedom of expression.934 When subject 
to the fair use assessment, they are ‘capable of tipping the scales to a finding of 
fair use’.935 In both Campbell v Acuff-Rose and Perfect 10 Inc v Google,936 it 
was held that the uses in question – a parodied rap song and Google’s 
thumbnail images – were not in violation of US copyright law. In so deciding, 
the courts acknowledged that the uses did not merely supersede the original 
works but added value and transformed the existing ones into new substantive 
creations with different manner and purpose.937 Due to its contribution to 
public enrichment and innovation, protecting this type of value-added work lies 
at the core of the concept of transformative use. By seeing freedom of 
expression as a reference point, the interpretation of the test can be conducted 
in a more flexible and balanced manner that takes into account of L&Es 
permitting uses that have a transformative quality, either in their nature or 
purpose. This will create a safe refuge for those valuable L&Es and enable 
copyright law to keep pace with rapid technological developments. As a result, 
the balance of interests between rightsholders and users can be re-established. 
 Intergenerational equity 4.4.1.2
The adoption of freedom of expression as a reference point reflects scholarly 
attempts to develop a way in which the three-step test can be interpreted in 
light of the changing environment. One prominent proposal suggests espousing 
the notion of ‘intergenerational equity’ as an interpretive guidance for the 
                                                
932 David Tan, ‘Fair Use and Transformative Play in the Digital Age’ in Megan Richardson and 
Sam Ricketson (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property in Media and 
Entertainment (Edward Elgar 2017) 112. 
933 17 USC 107. 
934 Campbell v Acuff-Rose (n 9); Perfect 10 v Google (n 732). 
935 Leval (n 459) 1111. 
936 Campbell v Acuff-Rose (n 9); Perfect 10 v Google (n 732). 
937 Campbell v Acuff-Rose (n 9) section A; Perfect 10 v Google (n 732) paras 11-12. See also 
Kur (n 777) 544-545 for criteria determining works as being ‘transformative. 
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three-step test. This approach draws a dividing line between copyright’s grants 
and reservations and providing a correct alteration to the copyright’s shifting 
balance.938 Within this approach, the test should be interpreted with reference 
to the intergenerational equity rule, which derives from the shared values 
between John Locke’s labour theory and his world of abundance theory.939 In 
the copyright context, these theories are represented by the grant of exclusive 
rights and L&Es respectively. The intergenerational equity rule speaks of a 
privilege in which a labourer is unquestionably conferred with a property right 
to enjoy his own labour.940 While enjoying such privilege, he is obliged to at 
least leave ‘enough and as good left in common’ for other labourers under the 
latter theory.941 In the context of copyright, the author shall permit users, who 
are to subsequently become authors and enjoy the fruits of their own creation, 
to the similar extent as they were allowed to do with their predecessor’s 
creations.942 Viewed through the lens of intergenerational equity, whether a 
given L&E passes the test is determined by how much a particular use is 
permitted and induces a productive user to build up their own creative work in 
the future by consulting their predecessor’s work as an source of inspiration.943 
Interestingly, this underlying principle of intergenerational equity seems to 
share a common concept with the notion of transformative use.944 
Having access to such materials is necessary to fulfil one’s ability to use 
existing copyright materials as a basis for creating new value-added 
expressions, especially in relation to matters of public interest or technology-
empowered uses. A certain degree of freedom may sometimes be required to 
enable users to step across the boundaries. This is the rationale under which the 
right to freedom of expression should play a part in copyright law as a 
reference point to the interpretation of the three-step test. By doing so, uses of 
copyright-protected works falling within the scope of transformative uses or 
                                                
938 Senftleben (n 780) 36-41, 257-277. 
939 Ibid. Also revisit section 4.3.1 above. These two theories represent the natural law and 
utilitarian law approaches respectively. 
940 Senftleben (n 780) 36. 
941 Ibid. 37. 
942 Ibid. 38. 
943 Ibid. 38,39. 
944 See Campbell v Acuff-Rose (n 9) section A; Leval (n 459) 1105, 1111. 
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intergenerational equity rule will, in the three-step assessment, be considered in 
light of their social values and promotion of freedom of expression. 
 Public policy 4.4.1.3
The test can also play an emergency brake role in controlling the extent to 
which short-term copyright monopoly is enforced against unauthorised uses 
that have long-term public benefits. It should function as a safety valve, 
restricting excessive exercise of copyright to the detriment of the larger public 
interest. Not only would this support the public policy grounds that protect 
against abusive copyright claims, 945  it balances the interests between 
rightsholders and users because both sides of the copyright spectrum should be 
kept within reasonable limits in the public interest. Otherwise, when a 
rightsholder is granted an unlimited control over his creations, or when users’ 
privileges over those creations become piracy or free-riding activities, such 
balance is not fairly struck. 
There are two circumstances that underlie the need for a public policy 
consideration as a reference point in the shifting technological environment. 
Firstly, when copyright is excessively enforced against public sensitivities, 
such as the exercise of exclusive copyright protection over immoral and 
obscene works or with abusive purposes. Secondly, when copyright is used in a 
restrictive sense to constitute undue constraint on the dissemination of 
knowledge, ideas or information. The use of public policy as a reference point 
would function as a safeguard recalling the need to put appropriate limits not 
only to the positive and negative enforcement of copyright, but also to the 
competing interests at issue. This would uphold the firm recognition of the test 
of proportionality within the third step. It will allow the test to examine in 
detail the pursued objective, magnitude and intensity of unauthorised uses 
permitted by a particular L&E over the rightsholder’s interests in light of the 
test of proportionality and fine-tune the process of balancing conflicting 
interests, including the public interest. 
                                                
945 Ibid. See also Kur (n 777) 466. 
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4.4.2 The interpretation of the three-step test in copyright law 
Given the functions and advantages of the two reference points proposed, they 
will now be compared to the example of a collaborative effort to recalibrate the 
interpretation of the test, manifest in the paper Declaration on a balanced 
interpretation of the ‘three-step test proposed by Geiger et al.946 Of particular 
relevance here is that the principles established in the paper appear to provide a 
supportive framework for the reference points proposed in this thesis. The 
paper admits the subversive effects of a narrow interpretation of the test on 
copyright’s balance, and calls for a more balanced and flexible interpretation 
with special consideration given to L&Es serving fundamental rights and the 
broader public interest.947 Since the interpretative approaches proposed in the 
paper and those proposed by this chapter are quite similar, the step-by-step 
analysis suggested in Section 4.5 thus reflects the principles agreed in the 
paper, but develops them further. 
The proposals in the paper were drafted because of a growing concern about 
the future of L&Es on copyright, which had been impaired by an increasingly 
high standard of copyright protection and a very uneven interpretation of the 
three-step test in favour of copyright holders.948 Against this background, the 
Declaration set out to propose: 
‘an appropriately balanced interpretation of the three-step test 
under which existing exceptions and limitations within domestic 
law are not unduly restricted and the introduction of 
appropriately balanced exceptions and limitations is not 
precluded’.949  
Having proclaimed that copyright is ultimately intended to benefit the public 
interest, the paper set out a prerequisite for fulfilling such ultimate objective; 
that the public interest must be served through the grant of appropriate 
incentives in a balanced manner, not only to subsequent rightsholders, but also 
                                                
946 Christophe Geiger and others, ‘Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the ‘Three-Step 
Test’ in Copyright Law’ (2008) 39 IIC 707. 
947 Ibid. 708-09. 
948 Ibid. 707. 
949 Ibid. 711. 
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to original authors and third parties including the general public.950 This 
fairness can be achieved through the suggested flexible interpretation of the 
three-step test, taking into account domestic cultural, social and economic 
considerations. This means that the objectives and purposes of copyright L&Es 
must always be factored into the equation, and thus interpretation will become 
more welcoming to the introduction of open-ended L&Es and more flexible to 
an application of existing L&Es mutatis mutandis to changing technological 
circumstances.951 
What is particularly relevant to the proposed reference points of freedom of 
expression and public policy is the principles enshrined in the paper. They 
require the test to be interpreted in a way that respects important competing 
objectives and third parties’ interests underpinning various types of L&Es. 
Those include freedom of expression and other public interests stemming from 
fair competition, scientific progress and cultural, social, and economic 
development.952 Like the proposed reference point of freedom of expression, 
the paper recognises important values underpinning those fundamental rights 
which clearly reflect the interests of general public.953 As the paper clearly 
states, such fundamental values and interests should be given special emphasis 
in the test,954 as this will lead to a more balanced and flexible interpretation. 
On ‘other public interests’,955 the paper also recognises public policy doctrine 
as a reference point that reflects fundamental constituents to the promotion of 
public interests. This is because the doctrine helps safeguard the interpretation 
of the test from being influenced by undue monopolistic claims of copyright 
over works containing harmful elements. The doctrine also stipulates that 
abuse of copyright is against the public interest and against copyright’s 
ultimate objectives. None of those practices seem to be in accordance with the 
principles provided in the paper; exploiting exclusive rights in such an abusive 
and overreaching manner cannot be deemed normal, legitimate and respectful 
                                                
950 Ibid. 708, 709, 712 for principles 5 and 6. 
951 Ibid. 711 for principles 2 and 3. 
952 Ibid. 711-12 for principle 4 and 6. 
953 Ibid. 710. 
954 Ibid. 
955 Ibid. 712 for principle 6. 
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of the other public interests at stake.956 
4.5 The proposed three-step test  
This section will provide a step-by-step analysis by analogy with the WTO 
Copyright Panel’s decision and demonstrate how the test could be interpreted 
with the suggested reference points. It will also explain the extent to which 
such a proposed interpretative approach could lead to an introduction of a 
public interest defence into the international L&E regime. 
4.5.1 Step 1: certain special cases 
 Revisiting the Panel’s interpretation 4.5.1.1
As far as the WTO Panel’s report is concerned,957 the first criterion allowed the 
homestyle exception to pass its two conditions – certainty and speciality – but 
the business exception failed to meet the latter condition. The Panel had no 
difficulty in deciding that the scope of both exceptions was sufficiently known 
and particular to the extent that they provided a foreseeable degree of legal 
certainty. 958  With the ‘speciality’ test, however, the Panel said that ‘an 
exception or limitation should be narrow in quantitative and a qualitative 
sense’,959 but based its final decision only on the quantitative analysis. The 
Panel was uncertain whether the wording of Article 13 TRIPS also required the 
first criterion to consider the justifiability of the public policy objective.960 
Instead, they looked only at an estimated percentage of beneficiaries being 
privileged by both exceptions in determining whether each exception was 
‘clearly defined and narrow in its scope and reach’. 961  Whether such 
quantitative exceptions were underpinned by particular policy objectives 
justified by well-recognised legitimacy was, according to the Panel, irrelevant 
to establishing special cases.962 Thus the Panel paid little or no regard to the 
US’s argument concerning the underlying policy objectives of the homestyle 
                                                
956 Ibid. 
957 See WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) paras 6.102-6.162. 
958 Ibid. para 6.108. 
959 Ibid. para 6.109. 
960 Ibid. para 6.111. 
961 Ibid. para 6.112. 
962 Ibid. paras 6.111, 6.112. 
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and business exceptions. While the former was enacted to ensure ‘the 
protection of small “mom and pop” businesses’,963 the latter was aimed at 
‘fostering small businesses and preventing abusive tactics by CMOs’. 964 
Against this backdrop, such objectives were, as the US argued, attainable by 
exempting very small commercial establishments from being liable for the 
unauthorised use of transmitted musical works.965 Nevertheless, none of those 
objectives appeared to play a part in the Panel’s interpretation of this step. 
 Addressing the restrictive problem 4.5.1.2
Although this examination is not intended to dispute the Panel’s final judgment 
on the first criterion, the fact that it was restrictively construed is not 
constructive. Mere consideration of the quantity of privileged uses enabled by 
L&Es runs a risk of undermining copyright’s delicate balance between grants 
and reservations because such consideration ignores the qualitative aspect of 
L&Es that may serve other competing public interests.966 For example, it may 
result in undesirable outcomes in which sole consideration of the number of 
copies may arbitrarily proscribe exceptions that pursue socially valuable ends, 
such as the use for teaching or in libraries. Although these types of 
unauthorised use may generate more copies than the original right-holders do, 
its contribution to the dissemination of knowledge and information to the wider 
public is undeniable. The continuing growth and development of online 
communication methods has introduced some temporary or incidental acts of 
reproduction due to technical necessity, such as caching, time-shifting and 
peer-to-peer file-sharing, and these technology-empowered activities play an 
important role in current society closely linked to the promotion of freedom of 
expression and information and other social developments.967 This reflects the 
fundamental interests of the public that should be highly respected in the 
copyright regime. 
Having recognised the importance of those valuable objectives, the missing 
                                                
963 Ibid. para 6.156. 
964 Ibid. para 6.115. 
965 Ibid. para 6.155. 
966 Ibid. para 6.111. 
967 For example, by allowing caching, the efficient functioning of internet transmission systems 
can be safeguarded. See Copyright Directive, Recital 33. 
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qualitative consideration would substantially impair the balance sought; the 
very task that that the three-step test was originally designed to maintain, and it 
should be factored into the consideration of certain special cases. 
 Alternative interpretation 4.5.1.3
A flexible interpretation of the first step could derive from more focus on 
qualitative aspects regarding the speciality subtest. What matters is the 
establishment of rational justifications pursued by a given L&E, instead of the 
number of copies or beneficiaries. It should make reference to freedom of 
expression and public policy to guarantee recognition of this qualitative 
inquiry. These principles play an overarching role in copyright law and 
underpin most of L&Es, reflecting public interest reasons in unauthorised uses 
of protected works.968 Their scopes also embrace the notions of transformative 
use, intergenerational equity, and the balance of all interests involved. The 
attaching of those reference points will take into account various policy 
objectives underlying a particular L&E within the special case assessment. 
According to the WTO Panel, the reference points would have at least 
reminded the Panel of the task and the need to spend some time contemplating 
the objectives underpinning the exemptions claimed by the US. The claimed 
objectives are not of such an overriding nature per se as compared to the 
promotion of fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression; thus, 
consideration of it will not necessarily change the outcome of the speciality 
test. However, it would guarantee that such qualitative consideration will have 
a significant influence on the way in which important L&Es are judged under 
the special case test. Considering the US fair use rule allowing the Google 
online thumbnail service as an example,969 in an absence of the qualitative 
consideration, the fact that technological advances have allowed copyright 
materials such as images to be easily reproduced online may preclude the fair 
use from being recognised as a special case. Allowing consideration of 
freedom of expression and public policy would enable the courts to not only 
                                                
968 Sam Ricketson, ‘The Boundaries of Copyright: Its Proper Limitations and Exceptions: 
International Conventions and Treaties’ (1999) 56 Intellectual Property Quarterly 56, 61. 
969 Perfect 10 v Google (n 732) 1146. 
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look at the quantity, but also the purposes underlying such unauthorised online 
use. The qualitative consideration of a special case will allow the interpretation 
of the first step to take into account other competing interests and make the 
interpretation flexible and more open to allow the adoption of newly-
introduced or existing L&Es, including the proposed public interest defence. 
4.5.2 Step 2: conflict with a normal exploitation of the work 
 Revisiting the Panel’s interpretation 4.5.2.1
As far as the WTO Panel’s report is concerned, the second step interpretation 
seems to revolve around consideration of rightsholders’ economic interests, 
particularly the extent to which their exclusive rights over musical works were 
interfered with by the L&Es at issue.970 
The Panel began by proclaiming that the phrase ‘normal exploitation’ 
stipulated that the scope of the consideration of the conflict was limited to 
‘something less than full use of an exclusive right’.971 This implies that not 
every form of exploiting the work to generate economic benefit by 
rightsholders can be regarded as ‘normal’, and thereby brought into the second 
step’s scrutiny. 
The Panel then established that a conflict arose when the use of works 
exempted by the L&Es at issue ‘enters into economic competition with the 
ways that rightsholders extract economic value from copyright to the work and 
thereby deprive them of significant or tangible commercial gains’.972 They 
went on to adopt a normative construction in explaining that the speculation of 
such deprivation could be acquired from both ‘actual and potential effects’ of 
the economic harm caused.973 This second point again presupposes that not 
every use of the work causing adverse effects on the rightsholders’ commercial 
gains will necessarily conflict with normal exploitation of the work. The 
threshold of this step correlates with the adverse effect on the author’s 
opportunities to acquire economic benefits from a work to the degree at which 
                                                
970 WTO Panel-Copyright (2000) paras 6.163-6.189. 
971 Ibid. paras 6.167, 6.182. 
972 Ibid. para 6.183. 
973 Ibid. paras 6.184-86. 
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they are divested of a major source of income in both actual and potential 
markets. Up to this point, the panel’s reliance on the degree of such economic 
harm seems to suggest that some room is left in the second step for uses that do 
not undermine the author’s right to normal exploitation to such an extent.974 
Third, in determining what constitutes a deprivation to the rightsholders’ 
significant or tangible commercial gains, the Panel took a contrary standpoint 
to their previous remarks.975 They believed that ‘the work’ in Article 13’s 
second condition means all the exclusive rights relating to it’; therefore, 
whether there was a conflict with normal exploitation of the work was closely 
connected with ‘the possibility for rightsholders to exercise separately all three 
exclusive rights guaranteed under the three subparagraphs of Article 11bis(1)’ 
in an attempt to benefit from primary sources of royalties arising from them.976 
Having so concluded, they agreed with the EC to adopt an approach that 
required them to carry out separate examinations of the economic harm caused 
to the rightsholders’ opportunities to generate income that each of the affected 
exclusive right individually offered.977 
 Addressing the restrictive problem 4.5.2.2
The problem with the Panel’s approach is that it interpreted the second step by 
only looking through the economic lens of copyright exclusivity. By tipping 
the scales to the rightsholder’s favour excessively, it resembles the neo-
classical approach, which in theory aims to maximise the social value of 
intellectual works through market perfection.978 In achieving this aim, the neo-
classicists’ view that all economic importance of authors’ creative works is 
reserved in both actual and future markets needs to be protected by clear and 
broad exclusive rights. 979  By interpreting the second criterion using this 
                                                
974 Ibid. para 6.182. 
975 Ibid. paras 6.167, 6.182, as compared with n 971 above. 
976 Ibid. paras 6.171, 6.173, 6.183. See also Art 11bis(1)(i)(ii)(iii) Berne Convention, which 
confers the right to communication to public by wireless means, by wire means and by 
loudspeaker or any other analogous means transmitting the broadcast of the work. 
977 Ibid. paras 6.173, 6.174. 
978 Neil Netanel, ‘Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society’ (1996) 106 YLJ 283,309-310. 
The neo-classical theory and the natural law copyright concept are similar in terms of their 
recognition of broad exclusive rights protection combined with narrowly-defined L&Es. 
979 Ibid. 312-15. 
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approach, rightsholders are endowed with rights over all exploitation forms in 
all actual and potential markets. An individual calculation of market 
impairment on the exploitation of each right conferred by the three 
subparagraphs has to be carried out to demonstrate the extent to which, for 
example, the ‘business exception’ constitutes a conflict with one of the 
conferred rights. This restrictive approach takes for granted the possibility that 
the lion’s share of royalties may have been derived from the exploitation of 
only one of them.980 
It may be clear that the actual and potential economic harm to the author’s 
sources of royalties caused by the business exception is substantial. 981 
However, the approach that subdivided the broad exclusive right into small 
portions could be inappropriate as a basis under which the second criterion is 
interpreted as it ignores L&Es that do not constitute an economic impairment. 
They would more likely be held in conflict with the normal exploitation, even 
before their socially valuable aspects were evaluated in the third step982 
because the reference to individual exclusive rights requires copyright to be 
subdivided along the lines of the international exclusive rights system.983 This 
requirement leads to an assumption that even economic harm to the author’s 
exploitation forms enabled by one of the internationally recognised exclusive 
rights would suffice to constitute a conflict, regardless of the scope and 
economic value of the exclusive right at issue.984 This results in the restrictive 
interpretation of the overall three-step test wherein the low threshold of the 
conflict of normal exploitation in the second step prevents L&Es from 
progressing to the third step’s balancing exercise. As a result, the test leaves 
little space for other important interests underpinning the L&Es to be 
accommodated within the copyright framework. 
                                                
980 WTO Panel-Copyright (2000) para 6.173. 
981 Ibid. paras 6.206, 6.122,6.124 and 6.127, as demonstrated in the report, there were 
approximately 73% of all drinking, 70% of all eating, and 45% of all retail establishments in 
the US entitled to the business exception. 
982 Senftleben (n 780) 33, 190. 
983 Ibid. 189. 
984 Ibid. 
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 Alternative interpretation 4.5.2.3
As a matter of maintaining copyright’s balance, the second step must leave 
some space for L&Es to achieve their objectives. To do this, the interpretation 
of this step should be made flexible by taking freedom of expression and public 
policy as reference points. Despite its main component being centred on the 
economic interests of rightsholders, the importance of other competing 
interests underpinning L&Es should not be abolished from this second stage, 
and it should not be the fulcrum of the entire three-step test. The suggested 
reference points are not necessarily intended to distance the second step from 
its emphasis on the rightsholder’s economic interests, but rather to ensure that 
some L&Es serving socially valuable ends are not unreasonably barred from 
making their way to the final step. 
The determination of an economic harm based on separate examinations of 
individual exclusive rights could be too restrictive to achieve copyright’s 
balance. By adopting the reference points, the second step will be subject to 
more flexible interpretation, and this will allow other fundamental interests and 
copyright’s balance to be maintained. In so doing, the degree of impairment to 
the rightsholders’ economic interests will not be determined in a way that 
arbitrarily takes precedence over other public interest considerations in this 
step, and the reference to all individual exclusive rights will be replaced by an 
alternative reference to the whole bundle of exclusive rights. The latter will 
focus more on the profitability of the market by considering the extent of ‘the 
share that a specific form of exploitation has in the overall commercialisation 
of a work’.985 In other words, the standard used for assessing the economic 
harm to the major source of the rightsholder’s income is based on the interests 
in the overall commercialisation of a particular affected work, not the interests 
in profiting from each individual exclusive right in each sub-market.986 
This interpretative approach is more closely aligned with the practical ways of 
marketing the work. L&Es could ‘draw more resources away from the 
                                                
985 Ibid. 189-190. 
986 Ibid. 189. 
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reproduction right than from a small exclusive right’,987 and such an approach 
allows the test to be more welcoming to other interests in the copyright regime, 
and thus provides more opportunities for valuable L&Es to survive the test. 
This proposal helps reduce the restrictiveness of the second step by shifting 
from the ‘every single individual exclusive right granted’ benchmark to 
‘affected exclusive rights in overall commercialisation’. 
 L&Es under the flexible second step 4.5.2.4
Having explained the merits of the proposed reference points enabling the 
flexible interpretation, it is necessary to examine particular L&Es under the 
recalibrated interpretation of the second step. While this may not lead to 
significant change in the WTO Panel’s judgment on the business exception,988 
it is an example of how the flexible interpretation could make some future 
contribution to emerging L&Es. Against this background, it is worth putting 
some unauthorised uses permitted by the proposed public interest defence to 
the test. 
The defence encompasses use of photographs or documents for quotation, 
criticism or parody in relation to matters triggering public interest debates such 
as political rumours affecting democratic society, national security issues, or 
even celebrities’ bad role-modelling behaviour. Given that those unauthorised 
uses come under second step scrutiny, the reference points could contribute to 
the flexible interpretation. With determination of the economic harm caused by 
this socially valuable use, the restrictive interpretation would focus only on the 
number of unauthorised copies and the harm caused to the rightsholder’s right 
to reproduction, but the flexible approach will call for a better scrutiny of such 
market impairment. It will determine harm by looking into the overall picture 
of the way rightsholders commercialise a given material, and it is unlikely that 
the markets for quotation, criticism or parody are the main sources from which 
the rightsholders would normally generate revenue. Thus, any effect caused by 
such activities could not be expected to constitute a substantial market 
impairment to rightsholders’ right to normal exploitation. 
                                                
987 Ibid. 191. 
988 WTO Panel-Copyright 2000 paras 6.206-7. 
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By assessing the harm more broadly, the flexible interpretation will 
simultaneously reserve some space in the second step for other public interest 
justifications. While the reasonableness of such justifications is not considered 
until the third step, the reference to freedom of expression and public policy 
would ensure that important justifications and public benefits behinds are 
thought of in the second step. These could stem from the likelihood that 
quoting, criticising or satirising the works may encourage current users to build 
their own creativity. This lies at the core of the intergenerational equity 
concept, which favours transformative uses that stimulate the cultural diversity 
and freedom of expression. Such uses could also bring benefit to the 
rightsholders introducing more users to the rightsholder’s work. Given these 
effects, these types of uses should not simply be deemed as in conflict with the 
works’ normal exploitation by subjecting it only to the restrictive interpretation 
of the second step. Ignoring publicly valuable justifications underlying the 
public interest defence risks unreasonable outcomes that undermine the entire 
function of the test. 
 Summary 4.5.2.5
The proposed reference points make the second step flexible by reserving some 
room for other important objectives served by L&Es to justify unauthorised 
use. The inherently dominant benchmark of this second criterion is closely 
connected with the rightsholder’s economic rights; thus, the rightsholder is on 
a better footing than other parties, but normal exploitation is by no means the 
only form of exploiting a work. As a result, the second step merely functions to 
filter out L&Es that exempt large-scale unauthorised use.989 This concept is 
supported by the remarks of the Main Committee I of the Berne Convention 
that ‘if the photocopying consists of producing a very large number of copies, 
it may not be permitted, as it conflicts with a normal exploitation of the 
work’.990 This step thus acts as a gateway to allow only well-qualified L&Es to 
proceed to the core of the copyright balancing process in the third step. This 
also corresponds with the need to refer to the notions of freedom of expression 
                                                
989 This refers to works that could not be said to contribute to anything creative or socially 
valuable, either in cultural diversity or public interest senses. 
990 Records 1967 (Vol II) (n 880) Minutes of Main Committee I, 1145-1146. 
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and public policy while interpreting the second criterion to ensure that socially 
valuable L&Es are not ruled out at this early stage. The rightsholder’s 
exclusive rights and those social values underlying L&Es, which have not yet 
been thoroughly examined in the first two steps, will be balanced out in the 
final step. 
4.5.3 Step 3: Unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the 
right-holder 
As it is the final step of the test in which all interests are tested and balanced, 
interpreting step 3 in a restrictive manner will not lead to a satisfactory 
outcome for copyright law or meet its objectives. Nor is it likely to serve the 
need to keep pace with the changing copyright environment and the public 
interest. In the search for an effective and balanced interpretation, this section 
will recall the WTO Panel’s restrictive interpretation (section 4.5.3.1), address 
the issues arising therefrom (4.5.3.2) and propose an alternative approach to 
interpreting this final step (4.5.3.3). 
 Revisiting the Panel’s interpretation 4.5.3.1
To recap the WTO Panel’s judgment regarding the final step,991 the Panel 
noted at the outset that this step entailed the need to consider justifications on 
both sides – the legitimacy of the rightsholder’s interests and the 
reasonableness of other competing interests underpinning L&Es. As regards 
the former, the Panel initially seemed to base its view on the normative 
perspective992 by stating that the concept of interests was not necessarily 
restricted to only an economic sense.993 However, it was contradictory when 
the Panel later determined what were legitimate interests by merely quantifying 
‘the economic value of the exclusive rights conferred by copyright on 
rightsholders’.994 This could only be understood to indicate that they relied on 
the legal positivist view instead.995 This line of reasoning also appeared to 
influence the calculation of reasonable prejudice. The Panel held that the 
                                                
991 WTO Panel-Copyright (2000) paras 6.244 – 6.251. 
992 Ibid. para 6.224. 
993 Ibid. para 6.223. 
994 Ibid. paras 6.226, 6.227. 
995 Ibid. 
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prejudice became unreasonable when it constituted, or was likely to constitute, 
‘an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner’.996 Having established 
this, the subsequent substantive analysis centred on estimations of the potential 
economic effects, which were the number of privileged beneficiaries and the 
loss of revenue suffered by the rightsholders. Thereafter, detailed economic 
considerations appeared to dominate the rest of the report.997 
 Addressing the restrictive problem 4.5.3.2
The interpretation of the two conditions contained in the third step is purely 
driven by economic concerns. This indicates that the final stage is merely a 
repetition of the second step, which develops in more detail how the 
calculation of actual and potential market impairment suffered by the 
rightsholders should be conducted. The most peculiar aspect about this line of 
thought is that it fails to take into consideration, or even to mention the 
importance of, other affected countervailing interests underlying the exceptions 
at issue despite the long-established understanding that step 3 is intended to 
embrace the calibration process where divergent interests encounter and are 
finally reconciled. 998  The misconstrued third criterion clearly marks the 
inconsistency of the Panel’s interpretation of the test with its historical and 
contextual backgrounds, and contrary to the purpose of incorporating the test 
into international copyright treaties.999 This contradiction is clearly evident 
when the third step was interpreted by the Panel in a way that failed to take 
into account the objective of balancing rights and obligations under Article 7 
TRIPS.1000 Prior to the enactment of substantive provisions, the study groups of 
both of the Berne Convention and WCT also established a similar proposition 
that increasing copyright protection must be balanced against other important 
societal interests, such as education and freedom of information.1001 Clearly, no 
support of the restrictive interpretation could be sought from any of such 
                                                
996 Ibid. 6.229. 
997 Ibid. paras 6.237-6.266, mostly regarding the business exception. 
998 Martin Senftleben, ‘Beperkingen a la carte: Waarom de Auteursrechtrichtlijn ruimte laat 
voor fair use’ (2003) Tijdschrift voor Auteurs-, Media-&Informatierecht 10, 12-13. 
999 Ibid. 
1000 Ibid. 
1001 See the dualistic objectives of Berne Convention in Records 1967 (Vol I) (n 877) para 
12.09. 
 
218 
international copyright treaties. 
The Panel also failed to justify its own considerations about the test’s origin 
and the important function of its third step. In their analysis of the origin of 
Article 13 TRIPS, the Panel considered the guidance on the interpretation of 
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention given by Main Committee I of the 1967 
Stockholm Conference: 
‘If it implies a ‘rather large’ number of copies for use in 
industrial undertakings, it may not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author, provided that, according to 
national legislation, an equitable remuneration is paid. If a 
‘small’ number of copies is made, photocopying may be 
permitted without payment, particularly for individual or 
scientific use’.1002  
It is unfortunate that the Panel did not realise that the third step should be 
interpreted and function to address the intersection between diverging interests. 
The statement indicates that the balancing exercise takes place where the 
purpose of the use (photocopying) causing harm to the rightsholder’s 
legitimate interests is taken into account. It also suggests that the third step 
could provide a platform where the reasonableness of such harm is weighed up 
the rightsholder’s interests to establish whether the use is permissible, with or 
without remuneration. 
The Panel’s interpretation of the third step is overly focused on the 
rightsholder’s economic interests and too restrictive for copyright law to serve 
the wider public interest and the need to keep pace with technological and 
social developments. The third step should be interpreted more flexibly, taking 
into account both rightsholders’ and other competing interests. 
 Alternative interpretation with the reference points 4.5.3.3
The analysis below will suggest an alternative interpretation of the third step. 
This is done by re-establishing its general understanding, unfolding its 
balancing components, and introducing more flexibility into the interpretations 
                                                
1002 WTO Panel-Copyright 2000 para 6.73. Records 1967 (Vol II) (n 880) Minutes of Main 
Committee I, 1145. 
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of those components with reference to freedom of expression and public 
policy. 
Article 13 of TRIPS states that: ‘[l]imitations or exceptions do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightsholder’.1003 This 
raises three issues. First, unlike the second step, the use of ‘interests’ instead of 
‘rights’ could imply that rightsholders and users may stand on an equal footing 
when it comes to balancing divergent interests in step 3.1004 Second, the use of 
‘legitimate’ suggests that only the interests of rightsholders are deemed 
legitimate matters; an assessment taking place in this step does not take into 
consideration every single interest enjoyed by them. Third, the use of 
‘reasonable’ also indicates that, although every L&E serving other interests 
causes prejudice to the rightsholder’s interests to a greater or lesser extent, only 
reasonable ones are permissible. Finally, the use of all these three terms leads 
to the conclusion that a fair balance needs to be struck between an impairment 
caused to individual rightsholders and the parallel benefits gained by the users. 
This line of reasoning reveals the significant role of the third step, as analogous 
to that of the proportionality test.1005 
If these flexible terms were considered alongside the history of the test, it 
would create an adjustable balance between grants and reservations of 
copyright, and the general function of the third step could then be explained in 
light of the principles of proportionality and balance. Whether the outcome of 
this final process is deemed ‘proportionate’ is contingent on whether the harm 
caused by the need to serve other interests is unreasonable or not. The third 
step should examine how justifiable the means (L&Es) used to attain such an 
end is. 
The cornerstone of the third step is that it gives no favour to grants or 
                                                
1003 TRIPS, Art 13. 
1004 Senftleben (n 780) 210. 
1005 Jeffrey Jowell and Anthony Lester, ‘Proportionality: Neither Novel nor Dangerous’ in 
Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver, New Directions in Judicial Review (Stevens 1988) 52-56. The 
role of the long-established proportionality test in Germany (Angemessenheit) and France (le 
bilan coût-avantages) requires a balancing exercise to be carried out between the injury to 
individual rights and the corresponding gain to the community. 
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reservations;1006 thus, the proportionate outcome should be achieved by equal 
examination of the justifiability of both sides of the copyright spectrum. 
Wherever in the spectrum such two ends intersect is where copyright’s balance 
lies, and clearly compromise is required. 
Consequently, there are two balancing tasks in the third step to be fulfilled, 
drawing on the influences of freedom of expression and public policy: 
identifying the rightsholder’s legitimate interests and avoiding unreasonable 
prejudice. Recognising the third step’s function in this way can help ensure that 
copyright law is able to remain sufficiently flexible and up to date for 
maintaining the balance between grants and reservations as the surrounding 
environment evolves.  
Legitimacy of the rightsholder’s interests 
A flexible interpretation of the first balancing task empowered by the reference 
points will lead to wider-ranging considerations of the rightsholder’s interests. 
It will take into account not only economic, but also other important values 
underlying those interests. This proposition is not reflected in the Copyright 
Panel’s ruling, but in the Patent Panel’s approach in interpreting the third step 
of Article 30 in the patent case.1007 Part of this final step’s function is to 
examine the justifiability of the rightsholder’s interests, as only legitimate 
interests should influence the balance. Two different approaches have been 
taken by different WTO Panels. 
The Copyright Panel clarified the meaning of ‘legitimate’ interests through the 
partial adoption of the legal positivist approach.1008 This conservative approach 
primarily views the rightsholder’s interests through the economic lens. Hence, 
what defines legitimate interests goes hand-in-hand with the economic value of 
copyright exclusivity conferred on the rightsholders 1009  and loss of 
                                                
1006 Senftleben (n 780) 212. 
1007 WTO Panel - Patent (2000). 
1008 WTO Panel - Copyright (2000) para 6.227. Although the Copyright Panel implied that the 
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that the economic interests became a decisive factor in this step. 
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rightsholders’ income plays an influential role.1010 Were this approach adopted, 
the overall interpretation of the third step could be restrictive and its function 
would be nowhere close to balancing divergent interests. It would merely 
repeat the second step – extinguishing what constitutes an encroachment to the 
rightsholder’s economic interests. Given that all L&Es could constitute 
prejudice to the rightsholder’s interests to a greater or lesser extent, this 
excessive focus on the economic aspect may have a detrimental impact on the 
threshold of the second element of the third step – reasonableness of prejudice. 
It could result in a repeat of the second step’s outcome where nearly all L&Es 
would be held as constituting unreasonable prejudice. 
A different and more flexible approach to defining legitimate interests was 
adopted by the WTO Patent Panel.1011 A normative approach was adopted to 
endorse the view that legitimate interests are ‘interests that are justifiable in the 
sense that they are supported by relevant public policies or other social norms 
that underlie the protection of exclusive rights’.1012 In this context, there are 
several public policy considerations justifying copyright protection. The 
promotion of cultural diversity can be recognised as the most far-reaching, as it 
embraces both the natural law and the utilitarian arguments.1013 Therefore, an 
essential question to ask when examining the legitimacy of author’s interests is 
whether any economic or non-economic interest that the rightsholder enjoys is 
justified by one or more of the rationales of the copyright protection under the 
rubric of cultural diversity. If not, the interest in question cannot be legitimate. 
The preferred normative approach and its merits 
The approach adopted by the Patent Panel corresponds to the proposal to 
introduce more flexibility into the third step’s interpretation through the 
reference points and the recall of the test’s balancing function. This approach 
has several advantages. First, the flexible interpretation of legitimate interests 
of copyright protection implies that the examination is not limited to the 
                                                
1010 Ibid. para 6.229. 
1011 WTO Panel – Patent (2000). 
1012 Ibid. para 7.69. 
1013 See Senftleben (n 780) sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3. This objective lends weight to several 
concepts regarding grants of protection including personal satisfaction and promotion of 
freedom of expression. 
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interests of only the rightsholder; it is open to those of third parties.1014 Second, 
the rightsholder’s interests in respect of the work represent two sides of the 
same coin – prohibiting others from dealing with the work while being 
rewarded for the intellectual creation. By looking at the interests through the 
economic lens, only those two major interests can be deemed legitimate and 
any others would be excluded, regardless of social value. This could slow 
down or even frustrate the development of copyright law in the rapidly 
changing copyright environment.1015 
The Patent Panel’s normative approach determines the legitimacy of the 
rightsholder’s interests based on whether a given interest promotes cultural 
diversity, and this echoes the reference points approach proposed. Taking into 
account freedom of expression and public policy while examining what 
interests are legitimate could provide strong support for the adoption of ‘the 
promotion of cultural diversity’ benchmark. This would enable copyright to 
continue maintaining the balance between grants and reservations while 
keeping pace with the social developments. 
In step 2, it may be legitimate for a rightsholder to exercise their interest in 
forbidding the L&Es that exempt a ‘very large’ scale of unauthorised uses of 
the creative work, because to consider otherwise might interfere with their 
economic right to normal exploitation, but this economic approach should not 
be repeated in the third step. Considering the two primary interests of 
rightsholders, assessment of cultural diversity is more suited to the reconciling 
nature of the final step, because the rightsholder’s interest in prohibiting L&Es 
that contribute to the dissemination of knowledge, the useful intellectual 
property debate, or the promotion of intergenerational equity is illegitimate 
because it would suppress cultural diversity.1016 The rightsholder’s other main 
interest in being remunerated can always be found legitimate, but this can be 
achieved without supressing cultural diversity by rewarding remuneration as an 
incentive to the rightsholders and permitting the L&Es to serve their ultimate 
                                                
1014 See TRIPS, Art 30, to which the phrase ‘taking account of the legitimate interest of third 
parties’ was added. 
1015 Compare this remark to those in WTO Panel – Patent 2000 para 7.69. 
1016 Ibid. 
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objectives. 
Examples 
It is clearly evident that L&Es for research and study encourage the 
dissemination of the work and free speech. Uses permitted by these L&Es 
might also generate extra income to the rightsholder through future licensing, 
as they draw more users to the work. To prevent these uses would not 
guarantee that the rightsholder would be better off and more incentivised to 
produce further creations. Therefore, instead of allowing the rightsholder’s 
claim of economic interests to quash the L&E, it is better for all affected 
parties and society at large to examine the legitimacy of the rightsholder’s 
interests through the cultural diversity lens. Here, only the interest of being 
remunerated by unauthorised use should be deemed legitimate. In an opposite 
scenario, however, it might be the case where less cultural diversity could be 
promoted by permitting L&Es than by proscribing them.1017 The interest of 
preventing further loss of income by abolishing consumptive use permitted by 
such exemption may be deemed legitimate. 
The Patent Panel’s normative approach reflects the proposed approach to 
freedom of expression and public policy in determining the legitimacy of the 
rightsholder’s interests. Both base their considerations on the promotion of 
cultural diversity which will in turn help introduce more flexibility into the 
interpretation of the first subtest of the third step. It will also produce a positive 
effect on the subsequent ‘reasonableness of prejudice’ subtest by guaranteeing 
the legitimacy of, not only economic interests, but also other interests in 
protecting copyright. This guarantee will promise a fair opportunity for the 
interests of both sides to be balanced in the final stage of the three-step test. 
Reasonableness of prejudice 
With freedom of expression and public policy, the interpretation of what is the 
final balancing exercise – the test of reasonableness of prejudice – could be 
flexible. This would allow the balance to be struck between individual losses 
and community gains represented by the rightsholder’s and users’ interests, 
                                                
1017 See, for example, the business exception in 17 USC s.110(5)(b). 
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respectively. The reference points provide flexibility by ensuring that the 
importance of considering the latter aspect of interests pursued by the 
objectives behind a particular L&E is not overlooked in this final stage. This is, 
however, not a proposition with which the WTO Copyright Panel appears to 
agree. 
At first, the Panel found it ‘necessary to develop an interpretation of the term 
“prejudice” and what amount of it reaches a level that should be considered 
“unreasonable”’.1018 However, there was not granularity provided in their 
subsequent analysis. In fact, it simply stated that: 
‘prejudice to the legitimate interests of rightsholders reaches an 
unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or has 
the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the 
copyright owner’.1019 
This economic-dominant concept later became a decisive factor in determining 
the reasonableness of prejudice caused by the business and homestyle 
exceptions.1020 Regardless of the final outcome, the concept resembles the 
benchmark used in the second step for establishing the conflict with normal 
exploitation, in which the scale is tipped in favour of the right-holder’s 
economic interests.1021 Given the three-step test as a place where recalibration 
between grants and reservations takes place,1022 this seems contrary to what 
should be the cornerstone of its final step. The Panel should at least have spent 
some time considering objectives underlying such exceptions and 
demonstrated what the balancing exercise should take into account and how it 
is conducted. Despite being in conflict with individuals’ interests, other 
justifiable purposes that a particular L&E pursues, especially those of public 
importance, should be examined in the final balancing process. 
Reference to freedom of expression and public policy could help provide a 
solution to this defective restrictive interpretation and demonstrate the 
necessity to provide proper scrutiny, not only of the extent of the economic 
                                                
1018 WTO Panel – Copyright (2000) para 6.222. 
1019 Ibid. para 6.229. 
1020 Ibid. paras 6.251-6.270. 
1021 Ibid. para 6.228. 
1022 Senftleben (n 780) 36. 
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injury suffered, but also of the reasonableness of what causes such injury. 
L&Es causing economic injuries to the rightsholder mostly serve to promote 
fundamental interests in freely receiving and communicating information and 
ideas and in protecting the public from abuse of rights. Therefore, having due 
regard to those points while interpreting this final subtest will in general ensure 
fair and reasonable examination of the objectives behind what causes 
prejudice. The following sections (4.5.3.4 and 4.5.3.5) will therefore illustrate 
in detail to what extent the reference points could help shape the alternative 
interpretation to be sufficiently flexible and suitable for coping with the 
intermittently shifting copyright’s balance. 
 An alternative interpretation of ‘reasonableness’ 4.5.3.4
After having identified the rightsholders’ legitimate interests, the other 
constituent part of the third step deals with justifiability on the user’s side. In 
essence, ‘this element carries on where the first criterion left off’.1023 At first, 
having qualitatively passed the first criterion guarantees that a given L&Es is 
underlined by certain justifiable objectives serving cultural, social or economic 
objectives. Nevertheless, when it comes to a more thorough third step 
assessment, just a mere existence of such objectives would not suffice for the 
L&Es to survive the test. In fact, as suggested earlier, the reference to the 
doctrine of public policy is generally intended to recall to the test the need to 
strike an appropriate balance between the rights of individual and the rights of 
community. The need to strike such balance in turn reflects the bedrock of the 
principle of proportionality,1024 which has long been one of important themes 
that runs through the ECJ and ECtHR jurisprudence.1025 Therefore, in light of 
the public policy, the final subtest would be required to examine magnitude 
and intensity of the pursued objectives underlying L&Es.1026 In doing so, it is 
                                                
1023 Senftleben (n 780) 235. 
1024 See relations between the principles of fair balance and proportionality in Mowbray (n 604) 
308-316. 
1025 See, for example, CFREU, Article 52(1) and the ECJ case law – Case C-283/11 Sky 
Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk, 22 January 2013. See also ECHR, Arts 8-11 
and the ECtHR case law – Ernst v Belgium (2004) 39 EHRR 724 [104]; Krone Verlag GmbH 
& Co KG (No 2) v Austria (2004) 39 EHRR 906 [42]. 
1026 By analogy, this requirement reflects the need to consider the legitimacy of the aim, the 
suitability and necessity of the measure interfering with the fundamental rights protected by the 
CFREU. See, for example, case C-283/11 (n 1025) paras 51-55. 
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suggested that the following aspects of proportionality are duly examined – 
suitability and necessity.1027 
Suitability 
As regards suitability, it must be confirmed whether an L&E that imposes 
limits on exclusive rights is suitable for achieving the objective it pursues.1028 
If not, it cannot be suitable. One clear example is L&Es regarding personal use 
for research and study. This type of L&E allows productive uses of copyright 
materials as a basis for further creations. This could in turn promote the 
dissemination of information and knowledge, which is in the public interest. 
Also, the nature of personal research and study cannot be said to cause 
unreasonable economic harm in actual or potential markets where the original 
books or materials at issue are commercialised. Therefore, the prejudice caused 
is deemed suitable for achieving the objective pursued. 
If such an L&E permitting the personal use has a hidden profit-driven motive 
then the objective is not personal use, but rather economic advantage, and the 
economic harm caused would not fulfil the claimed underlying objective. 
Necessity 
The examination of reasonableness of prejudice encompasses the test of 
necessity or the so-called ‘less restrictive alternative’ requirement. 1029  It 
establishes that a given L&Es must be the least harmful means of attaining the 
pursued objective, causing the minimum injury to the rightsholder’s legitimate 
interests.1030 If this is the case, the L&E is deemed necessary for achieving its 
objective.  
This determination is illustrated in the following two scenarios concerning two 
different practices exempted by the library exception. The first relates to the 
broad practice, which allows users of library services to browse its online 
                                                
1027 Ibid. 
1028 Jowel and Lester (n 1005) 52. 
1029 This has been well-recognised in ECJ jurisprudence. See, for example, Case 11/70 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhrund Vorratsselle Fur Getreide und Futtermittel 
(1970) ECR 1125 paras 8-12; Case 114/76 Bela-Muhle v Grows-Farm (1977) ECR 1211 para 
7. 
1030 Senftleben (n 780) 236. 
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system and download electronic copies of works as they choose. The second 
concerns the narrow practice in which types of online users are individualised 
by a refined library system, capable of identifying those whose use tends to 
contribute to later creations, such as researchers and students. This system 
allows them to download only material relevant to their subjects.1031 
These two personal use-like practices seek to achieve the same important 
objective of disseminating information with the same effectiveness. The 
difference is that the latter is capable of limiting the users to a certain group of 
potential beneficiaries of the L&Es. Thus, the latter has lesser impact on the 
commercialisation of the works in the digital market and causes less harm to 
the rightsholder’s economic interests. Adopting L&Es that permit the former 
practice is unnecessary and constitutes unreasonable prejudice to the 
rightsholder’s legitimate interests. 
There has been an ever-increasing public interest in using protected works in 
parallel with a growing exchange of knowledge, ideas and information through 
advanced technology and online activities. It may still be restrictive for the 
third step, as a final balancing process, to entirely frustrate these productive 
uses with commercial implications merely on the basis of unreasonable 
prejudice to individual interests. There should be a mechanism whereby 
individual loss can be reconciled, taking account of other important interests 
and the broader public benefits arising from such unauthorised use. 
 Making prejudice reasonable by the payment of remuneration 4.5.3.5
Simply that L&Es fail to meet the reasonableness requirement should not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that they cannot pass the third criterion. 
Besides the subtests of suitability and necessity, the test of reasonableness is 
also equipped with the ‘payment of remuneration’ mechanism. This has long 
been established and applied by the courts as a reconciling tool in mitigating 
the magnitude of prejudice against the rightsholder’s economic interests.1032 
The principle originated in a statement made at the 1967 Stockholm 
                                                
1031 Ibid. 206. 
1032 Hannover (TIB) (n 923) 1000-1001; ProLitteris (n 926) 990. 
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Conference: 
‘If it consists of producing a very large number of copies, it may 
not be permitted, as it conflicts with a normal exploitation of the 
work. If the photocopying implies a rather large number of 
copies for use in industrial undertakings, it may not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author, 
provided that, according to national legislation, an equitable 
remuneration is paid [emphasis added]. If a small number of 
copies is made, photocopying may be permitted without 
payment, particularly for individual or scientific use.’1033 
The reference points do not contribute to the initiation of the remuneration 
system per se, since the system has already been entrenched in the third step. 
Making reference to freedom of expression and public policy simply allows the 
interpreter to pay due attention to the values of other countervailing interests 
and the need to strike a fair balance among them. This might help unearth the 
crucial function of the third step, which, as copyright has evolved, might have 
long been forgotten. 
The statement from the 1967 Conference has several implications which can be 
developed in support of the proposed flexible interpretation of the third 
criterion. The second sentence promises not only the existence, but also the 
functioning of the payment of remuneration within the three-step test. The first 
sentence reflects the second step of the test in asserting that L&Es of 
unreasonably harmful effect on the rightsholder’s exploitation’s rights should 
be abolished,1034 and the remaining sentences reflect the third step’s capability 
in implicitly enabling prejudice to be made reasonable by ways of 
remuneration paid to the rightsholder. This is subject to the condition that such 
L&Es are underpinned by one of the competing interests that must not be 
entirely outweighed. Those interests could be, for instance, freedom of 
expression, dissemination of information and knowledge, or the right to be 
protected from harmful exercise of copyright. The remuneration process is 
used when the scope of L&Es, despite serving prevailing objectives, is 
reasonable when compared to the harm suffered by the rightsholder. The 
                                                
1033 Records 1967 (Vol II) (n 880) Minutes of Main Committee I, 1145-46. 
1034 Ibid. 
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question of how much to be paid depends on the extent to which the reasonable 
limit is overstepped.1035 
Although such payment is proposed as an effective tool for reconciling those 
interests, the amount desired by the rightsholder must still be equitable 
because, while this compensation seeks to provide adequate incentive for 
further creations, the rightsholder must be prevented from demanding an 
amount higher than the actual economic injury suffered. 
As indicated by the last sentence of the statement, this special feature of 
payment is separate from the other two: suitability and necessity. It is not 
necessary that the remuneration is always granted as a guarantee of the 
availability of a less restrictive L&Es, otherwise, uses accompanied by 
payment would always have been more reasonable than those unaccompanied; 
thus, the latter type would never pass the necessity subtest. This would 
undermine the concept in the last sentence that the unauthorised use may be 
permissible without remuneration, such as for personal or scientific purposes. 
Examples 
With teaching, it is irrefutable that the use of schoolbooks serves important 
social and cultural interests, but the author’s creation is primarily aimed at 
generating an income through the sale of his books to academic institutions. It 
seems unreasonable to allow others to freely use copies of the book in the 
potential market from which the author could reasonably have expected to earn 
money. In so allowing, one certain outcome is that the author’s major source of 
income is substantially encroached. Leaving him empty-handed would 
constitute an unreasonable prejudice to his legitimate economic interests, 
regardless of the valuable contribution made by the unauthorised use. This is a 
situation where the divergent individual and other interests need to be 
reconciled by ways of remuneration. The author will be able to reap the 
benefits of his investment while the scope of the use can be kept within 
                                                
1035 See Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (Kluwer 1987) 520. It is not the intention of this thesis to provide a detailed calculation 
method, but payment of lump sum is preferable, given the difficulty of ascertaining the exact 
amount the rightsholder would have obtained absent the unauthorised use. 
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reasonable limit and permitted to continue benefiting wider society. 
If the schoolbook is used by an individual for the purpose of personal research, 
this practice may be permitted without an obligation to pay remuneration 
because the nature of the use is capable of contributing to social benefits and 
cultural diversity in the future, and the economic harm stemming from the 
unauthorised use is minimal and unlikely to deprive the rightsholder of their 
major source of income. In fact, there seem to be no close connection between 
the use and the author’s major market. This suggests that the prejudice caused 
is already kept within a reasonable limit, otherwise the interests in frustrating 
and being remunerated from such use would be deemed illegitimate and not 
proportionate to the corresponding societal gains. 
 Summary 4.5.3.6
Having passed the criteria set out in the first and second steps, the L&Es at 
issue are tested in the final third step, which should, as proposed throughout 
this chapter, be interpreted in a more flexible and balanced manner. With 
reference to freedom of expression and public policy, this step would function 
in a way that takes due account of the suitability and necessity of other 
interests that intersect those of the rightsholder. The reference points would 
also help recall the balancing tool of remuneration into the final balancing 
exercise in which the rightsholder’s exclusive rights and other competing 
interests served by the L&Es can be reconciled. There are two different 
outcomes the third step would bring. 
First, the use enabled by the L&Es in question is prohibited or is permitted 
without the payment of remuneration. This is because the justification 
underlying L&Es must be so prevailing that, under certain conditions of 
suitability and necessity, it outweighs the underling rightsholder’s interests, or 
vice versa. This is usually evident an interest in making the L&Es permissible 
is better suited for promoting copyright’s balance than that in prohibiting it, or 
when the L&E in question is not necessary because there is a less harmful 
means available, more suitable for achieving the objective pursued. The 
rightsholder’s interests in proscribing such L&Es can be deemed legitimate and 
thereby more proportionate to promote such balance. 
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Second, one should consider the circumstance where there exist weighty 
justifications on both sides of the interests, each of which should not be totally 
disregarded. In such a case, an obligation to pay remuneration will provide 
balance by minimising the rightsholder’s economic injury caused by the L&Es 
to a level deemed reasonable. Unlike the WTO Copyright Panel’s restrictive 
approach, this should be the way to interpret the third step of the test as the 
final balancing exercise. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The three-step test governs L&Es to copyright protection. At the outset of this 
chapter, it was argued that the restrictive interpretation of the test adopted by 
the WTO Copyright Panel is not preferable because such an interpretative 
approach confers excessive favour on rightsholders. This results in a situation 
where L&Es are arbitrarily precluded from pursuing other important social, 
cultural and economic objectives. This would in turn prevent copyright law 
from recalibrating and striking a fair balance between individual’s and larger 
public interests in response to rapidly changing copyright environment. 
Against this backdrop, the test should be re-interpreted in a more flexible 
manner. The need for flexible interpretation is evident in the analysis of 
regional and national copyright case law, in which different served by various 
L&Es had been adversely affected by an influence of the WTO Copyright 
Panel’s approach. By adopting a flexible interpretation, there will be more 
certainty conferred on those resorting to the statutory private use exception 
provided in the French copyright law, without fear of being in conflict with 
rightsholders’ normal exploitation.1036 The conditions set out in the Belgian 
news report exception could also have been made more lenient to 
accommodate the use of quotations in the online news service provided by 
Google.1037 The resort to some ad hoc external doctrines such as the US fair 
use or other fundamental freedoms to safeguard their domestic interests would 
then no longer be needed. 
                                                
1036 The Mullholland Drive (section 4.2.2.2). 
1037 Google Inc v Copiepresse SCRL (Section 4.2.2.2). 
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More flexibility can be introduced into the interpretation of the test by making 
reference to freedom of expression and public policy which will help prevent 
other competing interests served by L&Es from being taken for granted in each 
step of the test. They do so by requiring the first step of the test to consider not 
only the quantitative, but also the qualitative aspects of a given L&Es. In the 
second step, they would help reduce the extreme focus on the rightsholder’s 
economic interests and introduce space for important countervailing interests. 
In the third, the reference points would guide the final balancing exercise in a 
way that balances the rightsholder’s legitimacy against the reasonableness and 
necessity of the prejudice caused, subject to the test of proportionality. 
This flexible interpretation would allow the test to embrace the considerations 
of other important social, cultural and economic interests served by L&Es. It 
would create an opportunity for newly emerging L&Es, especially the 
proposed public interest defence, to pass the test and play its overarching role 
as a refuge to accommodate the prevailing public interest. This is needed for 
copyright law to maintain its delicate balance and to thrive and progress at the 
same speed as technological communication advances. 
One aspect of the proposed defence confers a strong sense of the right of 
freedom of expression. Two examples are worth considering. The first is a 
situation where there is a clear public interest in knowing about the political or 
national security messages contained in a document written by an individual 
who claims to have copyright over it. A journalist who obtains the document 
from an anonymous source discloses the underlying matter in a newspaper 
without any authorisation. The question arises as to whether their claim of the 
public interest defence as a basis of their activity would be sufficiently 
reasonable to satisfy the third criterion. In this respect, the reasonableness of 
the prejudice caused by the defence must be examined. There is a strong public 
interest in exercising the right to freedom of expression by making such matter 
publicly available, and revelation through the newspaper thus seems to be the 
least restrictive and the most suitable means of achieving the objective 
underlying the defence. As regards the legitimacy of the rightsholder’s 
interests, it is not in dispute that copyright confers on the author the exclusive 
rights to exploit the document. However, under the flexible interpretation, only 
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the interests in connection with the promotion of cultural diversity would be 
found legitimate. In this case, while economic interests could help provide 
incentives for promoting more creation, the rightsholder does not seem to have 
such interests in securing commercial gains over the document. Therefore, the 
harm caused to their legitimate economic interests seems so trivial that it 
should be outweighed by the competing freedom of expression justification 
underlying the defence, without remuneration. 
If it is proven that the rightsholder intend to commercialise the document, the 
disclosure of its content in the newspaper with a large number of copies may 
struggle to meet the suitability and necessity requirements in the final 
balancing step. However, the flexible interpretation would enable the third step 
to allow the prejudice caused to be made reasonable through obligatory 
payment of remuneration to the rightsholder. 
Uses that further promote dissemination of knowledge and information, or the 
so-called productive uses, is another type of use permitted by the proposed 
defence under its freedom of expression limb. These include showing of 
thumbnail images or news report summaries in online services provided by 
search engines. Problems occur when the owners of the original images or 
online newspapers claim that their commercial interests obtained from online 
commercialisation are undermined. The user could argue that the use is 
justified by the fact that the original materials are edited and transformed into 
small thumbnails with links showing the original sources. Thus, rather than 
merely copying for commercial purposes, the use is for informative and 
productive purposes and reflects the adaptive nature of technology. Therefore, 
despite inevitably undermining the rightsholder’s economic interests in online 
selling of such protected materials, the public interest in permitting such use 
would prevail. Since the copyright balance cannot be bound to bright-line 
rules, but must be adaptive to the online technology, the payment of 
remuneration system offered by the flexible third step is a potential solution for 
recalibrating the balance between both sides. 
The public interest defence is also restrictive on public policy grounds. This 
concerns the use of materials made which are immoral or unjust, or which are 
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obscene, offensive or deceptive in nature. The author of such works is 
conferred with exclusive rights to benefit from their creativity, but there is 
public interest in limiting the enforcement of such rights to protect society 
from their harmful effects. This comes in the form of the public policy grounds 
under the scope of the public interest defence. In the context of the three-step 
test, while the author’s interests in disseminating and commercialising these 
reprehensible works should be deemed illegitimate, there is much to consider 
on the public’s side regarding the reasonableness of the means used to achieve 
this. There are two preventive means which the public interest would allow – 
the denial and remedial approaches. 
Under the denial approach, the copyright would be refused, but this is not a 
suitable means for the objective of protecting society from harm under the 
reasonableness requirement in the third step. The deprivation of copyright 
enforcement would be contrary to such an objective because neither injunctive 
nor remedial actions could be enforced. The absence of such protection would 
also have increased piracy and the uncontrolled publication of the 
reprehensible work. 
A more suitable and less restrictive means to reach the objective whilst 
maintaining copyright’s delicate balance is the remedial approach. This 
alternative requires the copyright protection to be enforceable, so that an 
injunctive order can be enforced to prevent not only the exploitations by the 
rightsholder, but also use by pirates or free-riders. This approach is necessary 
because, although monetary relief would not be immediately available, the 
remuneration is retrospectively recoverable after the purge of the reprehensible 
element. This incentivises more creation and constitutes a deterrent to further 
infringing activities. As a result, the public interest in invoking public policy 
grounds prevails over the author’s exclusive rights, and the remuneration 
system remains available under certain conditions, reflecting the flexibility 
offered by the final balancing step in reconciling divergent interests and 
establishing balance. Flexible interpretation of the three-step test enabled by 
the reference points will allow the proposed public interest defence to stand. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to introduce a statutory provision of a public interest 
defence into the international copyright regime to restore the balance between 
rightsholders, users and the public interest in copyright in light of rapid 
technological advances. Continuous expansion of copyright protection has 
appeared to tilt towards the rightsholders’ favour and had a detrimental impact 
on the way in which the balance is maintained through copyright L&Es. This 
has put the public interest under threat and calls for the development and 
strengthening of the L&E system, which resonates with the proposed 
introduction of the public interest defence at the international level. The 
defence provides an overarching copyright exception as a last resort to which 
national authorities can have recourse in exceptional circumstances, with 
clarity and certainty according to their social economic and cultural needs. 
Through this proposal, not only can the public interest be reinforced in parallel 
with the protection of individual interests, copyright’s balance can also be 
recalibrated to keep pace with its changing surroundings. This will ensure that 
copyright law continues to fulfil its purpose of promoting creativity through 
striking a fair balance between both sides of its continuum. 
In achieving such a balance, it is necessary to form a defence to copyright 
which could provide a valid, certain framework within which other competing 
interests are accommodated and respected by copyright. It is proposed that the 
public interest defence be assimilated into the international copyright system 
with integral aspects of public policy grounds and freedom of expression, 
representing restrictive and encouraging facets of L&Es respectively. The 
following is the model public interest defence.1038 
5.1 The model public interest defence 
Limitations and exceptions to the enforcement of copyright in 
relation to all exclusive rights enjoyed by a rightsholder should 
be allowed on the ground of public interest. In determining 
circumstances where the public interest may apply, public 
policy grounds and freedom of expression, as a restrictive and 
                                                
1038 See section 5.3 below as to where and to what extent the implementation of this draft 
legislation should take place. 
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encouraging limitation respectively, are to be taken into account 
as follows. 
1. Public policy grounds 
Scope 
(a) The enforcement of copyright should be circumscribed if a 
work per se, the way in which such work is created, the way 
copyright granted to such work is exercised or the 
circumstances surrounding the creation and publication, are 
contrary to public policy grounds. Such grounds shall include, 
but not limited to, the circumstances where: 
I. With regard to the misuse aspect focusing on 
manners in which copyright is exercised, the right is 
exploited in a way that constitutes copyright monopoly - 
beyond the scope granted by the law, anti-competitive or 
solely directed towards bypassing rules of law to gain 
personal benefits 
II. With regard to the immorality aspect focusing on the 
work per se or the manner in which it is created or 
published, the work or the circumstances surrounding the 
making are immoral, obscene, fraudulent or harmful to 
national security, public sensibilities, the well-being or the 
life of community 
III. Nothing in this provision should prevent national 
authorities from exercising further discretion in determining 
any emerging circumstances contrary to the public policy 
grounds, taking into consideration all the conditions 
specified in (a) I and II. 
Application and operation 
(b) In respect of legal operations affecting the enforcement of 
copyright, the following points shall be taken into account: 
I. Copyright should subsist in the work so as to ensure 
that injunctive and monetary remedies can be enforced to 
keep those circumstances falling within the scope of (a) 
under control 
II. Injunctive remedy should be granted to end misuse 
or immoral activities, or any harm caused by any further 
unauthorised or free-riding dissemination of the work  
III. As a matter of an incentive towards more creation 
and a deterrent against further infringing activities or unfair 
competition, monetary relief shall be retrospectively 
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recoverable after the purge of the content or activity found 
contrary to public policy grounds under subsection (a). 
2. Freedom of expression 
Scope 
(a) Unauthorised uses of copyright-protected works as part of 
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression should be 
permitted under certain circumstances, with a particular focus 
placed on the following considerations. In light of the wording 
of Article 10(1) ECHR, particular regard shall be had to 
expression that conveys information capable of contributing to a 
public debate of general interest, and that promotes public 
engagement in a variety of socially valuable uses of the 
protected works, especially those enabled by online technology. 
(b) The protection afforded to the expression intended to satisfy 
public curiosity or only made for commercial or entertaining 
purposes cannot reach the same level as that afforded to those 
concerning exposure of serious wrongdoing, revelation of 
information affecting national security, public health, public 
safety, public knowledge or any other socially valuable 
expressions with comparable objectives. 
(c) With regard to means of communication in light of the 
informative nature of journalism and the public right to be 
informed about matters affecting the public interest, any 
journalistic activities, either traditional or online and either 
conducted by professional or non-professional journalists, 
regarding the right to seek and access information, the right to 
criticise and the right to protect journalistic sources, or that 
contribute to public debate of such matters, are also protected 
under the scope of Article 10(1). The methods by which 
particular information was obtained and expressed by 
journalists must be in line with the proviso that they act in good 
faith to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance 
with the ethics of journalism. 
Application 
(d) Upon the finding of copyright measures interfering with 
freedom of expression, to prove that the public interest in 
protecting copyright is greater than the public interest in 
preserving freedom of expression depends fundamentally on 
fulfilment of the balancing exercise entrenched in Article 10(2) 
ECHR. However, particular weight should be placed on the 
exercise of the right to freedom of expression in a democratic 
and information society in the context of disclosure of 
information affecting the public interest. 
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(e) In the balancing exercise, any interference with freedom of 
expression caused by copyright measures is deemed necessary 
if there exists a pressing social need, taking into account the 
degree of the reasons given to justify the interference and its 
severity vis-à-vis the subversive impact on freedom of 
expression. It must be convincingly established by the copyright 
holders that the interfering measure sought has sufficient 
justification and presents a reasonable proportionality between 
the legitimate aim of protecting the copyright holders’ interests 
and its consequences to avoid any disincentive that may be a 
disincentive to the exercise of freedom of expression. The 
following factors should be examined: 
I. The nature of the expression at issue focusing on its 
contribution towards public debate. 
II. The purpose of the expression focusing on 
journalistic and public benefit purposes.  
III. The means of reproduction, focusing on availability 
of less infringing means. 
IV. The proportionality between the aim sought to 
achieve and the severity of an impact caused by the 
interfering means employed. 
3. Three-step test 
Subject to the three-step test, nothing in this provision in 
intended to deprive rightsholders of the right to receive payment 
of fair remuneration, insofar as any undue prejudice caused to 
their legitimate interests can be offset to a reasonable degree, 
determined by judicial authorities. 
4. Relationship with specific statutory limitations or 
exceptions 
This provision should be understood as a fallback applicable 
only in circumstances where no specific statutory limitations or 
exceptions existing in national copyright laws will apply to the 
compelling public interest matters identified in paragraphs (1) 
and (2) above. It is by no means intended to supersede the 
operation of the existing limitations or exceptions.  
5.2 Certainty and flexibility in unison 
Establishing the statutory public interest defence with extensive principles 
provides the copyright L&Es regime with more certainty, foreseeability and 
valid authority to accommodate other important societal values. Case law 
consulted throughout this thesis provides detailed guidance for ensuring that 
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unauthorised uses of copyright-protected works that fall under the identified 
public interest criteria are guaranteed their legitimacy. It also provides 
legitimate grounds for uses of the works determined to be contrary to the 
public interest to be precluded from some legal protection. By legislating a 
universal public interest defence with the two elaborate aspects and its certain 
operations, what has historically been described as ‘something approaching 
bemusement’, serving ‘only to heighten the impression of a shifting doctrine 
without settled boundaries’, limited and incapable of assisting the defendants, 
will now be established with workable definition and charted scope.1039 
Furthermore, determining its application to a fallback position helps ensure that 
the possibility of states having to tolerate interferences with their policy 
choices made through domestic statutory L&Es will be retained to a certain 
minimum level.1040 Admittedly, while no absolute certainty can be guaranteed, 
this model provision would at least allow rightsholders, users and courts to 
have a clearer picture of the limits under the abstract term of public interest, 
which copyright law must endure. 
Those circumstances or uses identified as for or against the public interest are 
not circumscribed but open to further development, as the proposed defence 
also recognises the rapidly-changing information technologies, and therefore 
reserves some room for flexibility within its framework. In the face of 
increasingly expanded copyright protection, an open and flexible attribute will 
allow copyright’s balance to be adjusted where required. It is a matter of 
national application in ensuring that such flexibility does not undermine 
certainty, nor the balance it seeks to achieve. National judicial authorities must 
ensure that any emerging uses or circumstances with characters comparable to 
those identified under the defence do not unreasonably prejudice the 
rightsholder’s right to fair economic return through remuneration. This would 
ensure that the proposed defence works in tandem with the long-established 
                                                
1039 Uniliver Plc v Griffin [2010] FSR 33 [18] (Arnold LJ); L Bently and B Sherman, 
Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 219-221; R Burrell and A Coleman, Copyright 
Exceptions: The Digital Impact (CUP 2005) 94; Griffiths (n 22)  
1040 Regarding concerns of uncertainty and overlapping area of application - whether the 
defence is an alternative, or additional, to the statutory permitted acts see, for example, Vitof 
Limited v Altoft (n 31) [175]; BBCPetitioners (n 31) [26]; Griffiths (n 22) 18.  
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three-step test. 
5.3 Explanatory text explaining the choices made in the 
development of the proposed provision  
Inevitably, a legislative introduction of such a universal public interest defence 
has raised a number of questions and concerns with regard to drafting options 
and terminology employed in introducing the provision at international level. 
The following text is therefore aimed at addressing some potential concerns as 
well as explaining the choices made in the development of the proposed 
provision. 
Impact on national policy choices   
The first question concerns the extent of an impact or repercussions that such a 
universal fallback position would constitute against distinct policy options or 
traditional legal approaches taken by different jurisdictions. In addressing this 
question, it should be reiterated that the proposed provision is characterised as 
a fallback provision under which certain acts or measures bearing compelling 
public interest reasons can be accommodated within the copyright regime. As 
demonstrated earlier in the substantive chapters, particular L&Es or solutions 
employed in certain jurisdictions to tackle with circumstances where works 
protected by copyright need to be restricted or disclosed in the interests of the 
public have been marred by either ill-founded terms or ambiguous applications. 
These have in turn raised problems of legal uncertainty and imbalance of 
interests in their copyright laws. Having identified the scope and operations, 
the proposed defence aims at offering from within the copyright regime 
effective legal solutions to loopholes in an area of copyright L&Es. Such 
loopholes may simply be prompted by rapid information technological 
advances that have made it difficult for the legislature to keep pace with such 
developments and to have all emerging acts covered by statutory L&Es. Or 
they may sometimes be caused by the fact that existing L&Es just do not seem 
capable of delivering adequate solutions, so that they are more likely subject to 
judicial interpretations, although inconsistent and scattered, for appropriate 
adjustment to the situations at issue. Therefore, particularly in the latter 
scenario, the proposed fallback provision should not be classed as an additional 
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legal tool to existing domestic L&Es, intended to frustrate national policy 
choices whenever possible. Its functions should rather be understood as 
offering justifiable grounds for fundamental rights or more compelling legal 
principles, i.e. freedom of expression and public policy, so as to ensure that 
copyright law is open up for appropriate adjustment in changing 
circumstances.1041  More importantly, relevant case law and literature reviewed 
throughout this thesis have suggested that those areas of legal concerns, where 
national courts in different judicial arrangements have employed divergent 
statutory or non-statutory doctrines or principles to achieve the relatively 
similar purposes of protecting the public’s interests,1042 are not novel. In fact, 
those attempts have been tried, but not necessarily always successfully due to 
lack of authority or absence or ambiguity of legislative support. Put simply, the 
bottom line here is more likely to offer a certain and justifiable basis to back up 
what the courts have already hinted at, rather than trying to intervene in distinct 
national policy determinations by substituting their domestic L&Es with one 
overarching universal defence.   
Impact on states’ traditional legal approaches 
The proposed universal character also gives rise to another important question 
– to what extent the conflict between the defence’s proposed operations and 
traditional approaches in differing constitutional positions can be justified. For 
instance, how the proposed operation of the ‘restrictive’ public interest 
defence, which imposes some restrictions on copyright enforcement, could be 
vindicated when these seem to contradict the radical US approach in relation to 
an influential constitutional copyright protection on obscene materials. Or with 
regard to the ‘encouraging’ public interest defence, is the reference to Article 
10 ECHR in such a universal provision appropriate for non-European 
countries? Furthermore, is the position taken in Chapter 3 – suggesting a 
seemingly prevailing emphasis on the right to freedom of expression – 
compatible with the author’s right tradition in civil law jurisdictions? More 
                                                
1041 See also Griffiths (n 22), referring this type of functions of the public interest defence in 
the UK copyright law as a pre-empting doctrine. 
1042 Ranging from the interests of being prevented from harmful or immoral activities to those 
of being informed about important information. See 2.3-2.6, 3.2.5 and 4.2.3 for more detail. 
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critically, would it be appropriate to confer on judges considerable power to 
make use of such a universal fallback provision, considering differing judicial 
systems around the world? 
With regard to copyright protection in obscenity within the US jurisdiction, it 
can be argued that, as the ‘restrictive’ public interest defence operates to 
impose some restrictions, inter alia, on the enforcement of copyright in 
obscene materials, such operation could be regarded as content-based 
restrictions and, as such, contrary to the US case-law precedent.1043 Content-
neutrality not only plays a pivotal role in the context of US free speech,1044 but 
also in copyright law. Especially in the latter context, it was strongly contended 
in case law that denying copyright protection to works deemed obscene would 
hinder creativity, constitute chilling effect on the creation of free speech and 
stifle dissemination of science and useful arts to later generations. 1045 
Nevertheless, as explained in Chapter 2, this thesis places a particular emphasis 
on some counterarguments in favour of content-based rules of pubic policy 
grounds. The fact that free speech and creativity receive constitutional 
protection should by no means allow copyright law to turn a blind eye to or 
condone what can be shocking, harmful and undesirable to public sensibilities, 
and, subsequently, leave the question of moral standards to be dealt with by 
other laws.1046 Taking online child pornography as an example, while a 
photographer of original photos and individual online users may be convicted 
and imprisoned according to US criminal law with regard to obscenity,1047 the 
photographer may also have an interest in filing copyright infringement 
lawsuits against those disseminating his original pornographic works online 
without his permission; in such case, the criminal could perhaps claim for 
damages and benefit from criminal activities under the shield of the law, at the 
society’s expense. Granting full copyright protection to obscene works, as in 
                                                
1043 See 2.6 and 2.8.1.2. 
1044 See 3.4.  
1045 See 2.8.1.2; Mitchell Brothers (n 208) 856-7, citing Schneider (n 176) 719. See also 
Belcher v Tarbox, 486 F2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir 1973), where it was held that copyright law 
was never intended to require judges to apply the standard of morality to copyrighted works.  
1046 See, for example, 18 USC s 1466A(a) and (b) (2012), imposing criminal liabilities against, 
inter alia, those producing, distributing or possessing works depicting sexually explicit 
conduct or obscenity.  
1047 See The United States Code, title 18, part 1 chapter 71.  
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the scenario above, ‘could be viewed as government endorsement of such 
illegal works, suggesting that the government approves such activity’.1048 In 
contrast, all laws including copyright should work in tandem as a normative 
matter in order to address such an issue in a way that safeguards the public 
interest, whilst ensuring that copyright law and moral standards are not eroded 
nor compromised by one another.1049 This has become one of the underlying 
rationales under which the ‘remedial approach’ operation of the restrictive 
public interest defence is proposed.1050 As this approach insists that copyright 
still subsists in original works tainted with obscene or immoral features, an 
assertion about the US constitutional protection of creativity being impeded 
should no longer be concerned. Meanwhile, the social problem of immorality 
regarding rampantly obscene materials, such as child pornography, could be 
more adequately tackled with as this approach confers judges with power to 
control injunctive and monetary remedies available to the author during 
different periods of his immorality.1051 Against this background, the content-
based operation such as that proposed by this thesis does not necessarily run 
counter to how the US judges have dealt with copyrightability in obscene 
materials; rather, it offers an alternative to either denial of, or full protection of, 
copyright as a way to reconcile legal and social requirements which both help 
enrich our society. Therefore, it is hoped that, once universally recognised, the 
defence will be sufficiently persuasive and be a helpful tool to US judges when 
dealing with obscenity in copyright works. 
In respect of the reference to Article 10 ECHR in the model provision, some 
would argue that non-European countries may find it dissuasive to adopt the 
defence as doing so could have compromised their own jurisdictions over the 
protection of freedom of expression vis-à-vis other bodies of law. It must, 
however, be restated that it is not an intention of the thesis to necessarily oblige 
                                                
1048  Eldar Haber, ‘Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability of Illegal Works’ (2014) 16 (2) 
YJLT 454, 484. 
1049 Ibid. 485-6. Haber argues that ‘from a social perspective, Congress should not grant 
copyright protection to undesirable works and should instead suppress their creation by 
blocking legal incentives’. Otherwise, allowing criminal offenders to profit from their actions 
will lead to injustice. 
1050 See 2.8.2 for detailed analyses of the remedial approach. 
1051 Ibid. 2.8.2.2. 
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all those countries to concede their authority to the adoption of such a 
European provision, but merely to take into account its useful wordings and 
terminology, mostly incorporated from the international predecessor provision 
- Article 19 ICCPR.1052 Indeed, Article 10 could be seen as a replica of Article 
19.1053 Of particular interest here is the second paragraph of Article 10, under 
which permissible interferences with the right to freedom of expression are 
prescribed in a certain elaborate manner, allowing a balancing exercise to take 
place between conflicting rights. This helps ensure the judiciary with clarity 
that FoE is not absolute, and that under what circumstances they are justified to 
exercise their discretion to impose some limitations on such a fundamental 
freedom. Given the previously identified concern of inadequate safeguards of 
freedom of expression due to an inability of copyright law to keep pace with 
the rapid development of information technologies,1054 it is advised that the 
‘encouraging’ public interest defence be read in the light of the language used 
in Article 10. Together with the richest and most developed ECtHR 
jurisprudence,1055 the defence would thus provide judges with helpful guidance 
about increasingly important aspects of freedom of expression to be given 
particular emphasis against copyright, while ensuring that an elaborate 
balancing mechanism is also there for judges to make appropriate adjustment 
to the interface between both areas of law – wherever the public interest lies. 
Having realised the objectives and rationales explained above, the model 
provision with reference to the balancing exercise recognised in Article 10 
strives to reconcile, and favour to the greatest possible extent, the different 
traditional legal approaches of the US’s strong free speech protection and the 
EU author’s rights tradition.    
Last but not least, the two concerns addressed above also give rise to another 
question – to what extent is it appropriate to provide the judiciary with 
                                                
1052 According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx>, ICCPR is one of the 
so-called International Bill of Human Rights, which establishes the backbone of international 
human rights law. It has been ratified by the majority of 169 countries from around the world, 
all of which are thus bound to respect obligations and duties laid down by the Covenant. 
1053 Except an absence of ‘freedom to seek’ and some additional permissible interferences 
prescribed in the second paragraph. See the analysis of the former at 3.3.3.3 above. 
1054 See 3.2.4 – 3.2.5. 
1055 See 3.2.6. 
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somewhat substantial power to apply standards of morality to copyright works 
(Chapter 2) and to determine situations where freedom of expression should 
trump copyright or vice versa (Chapter 3). Doubts have been cast now and then 
on the judiciary’s attempt to judge upon the truth, the soundness or the 
appropriateness of the opinions embodied in a copyright work.1056 Also, there 
has been criticism about situations in which national judges in copyright cases 
have widely adopted ad hoc legal doctrines outside copyright law to 
accommodate freedom of expression, despite lack of legal authority.1057 With 
the proposal of such a universal fallback provision allowing some flexible 
criteria to be subject to judicial interpretation, it is concerned that this will give 
judges considerable power to interpret copyright matters to the detriment of 
copyright rules in differing judicial and constitutional arrangements. 
Nevertheless, it must be recalled that the reviews of case law and literature 
throughout the thesis have illustrated that information technologies and 
surrounding environment have evolved in a way that has kept changing and 
expanding the sphere in which copyright is challenged by other competing 
interests; this development is perhaps too fast for copyright legislature to keep 
pace with. In these situations, one may inevitably have to rely on judicial 
interpretation to ensure that the law stays up-to-date with the present-day 
conditions and public interest. This then suggests that the role of the judiciary 
should not only be confined to the strict legal interpretation of the law, but 
‘they should play a critical role in establishing the right balance between 
copyright and innovation and human rights’.1058 Therefore, rather than facing 
situations where judges are either reluctant or free to impose some limits on 
copyright due to an absence or lack of authority, it may be better to provide 
them with a valid and elaborate statutory ground from within the copyright 
regime. This will enable them to strike a fair balance between copyright and 
                                                
1056 Belcher v Tarbox, 486 F2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1973); Jennifer E Rothman, ‘Sex 
Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property’ (2012) 23 STAN L POL’Y REV 119, 158;  
1057 See 3.2.5, 4.2.3. See also Thomas Dreier, ‘Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain 
Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary Rights?’ in R. Dreyfuss/D. Leenheer-Zimmerman/H. 
First (eds), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property. Innovation Policy for the 
Knowledge Economy (2001 OUP) 295; Hugenholtz and Selftleben (n 847). 
1058 Monica Horten, ‘Balancing Freedom of Expression Online: Insights from Copyright Cases’ 
(2017) <http://www.iptegrity.com/index.php/european-union/1062-balancing-freedom-of-
expression-online-insights-from-copyright-cases> accessed 1 February 2018. 
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the conflicting interests in the rapidly-changing copyright environment.  
The encouraging public interest defence and the comparable fair use 
Further to the analysis of the US fair use doctrine in Chapter 3 (3.2.4.4), it is 
worth considering whether the factor-based approach developed under the fair 
use doctrine is relevant and offers any valuable alternative in preference to that 
of the proposed defence. At first, it should be noted that there are some 
similarities between the two in terms of their objectives. In general, it can be 
said that both doctrines help to prevent the enforcement of copyright from 
being too restrictive and quashing the very creativity the law is actually 
intended to promote. Just like the proposed encouraging defence, fair use in 
essence functions to alleviate tensions between copyright and freedom of 
expression by providing certain legitimate grounds under which the latter can 
be duly safeguarded in the former regime. Furthermore, such grounds allowed 
by fair use are embodied in the US copyright law in a non-exhaustive statutory 
manner, similar to those outlined in the model provision.1059 Great flexibility is 
accordingly a pivotal feature of fair use, whereby it has been established that 
there are no bright-line rules and all factors should thus be weighed together on 
a case-by-case basis to determine the finding of fair use.1060 Considering these 
similar characters, it may well be sufficed to say that fair use’s factors are to a 
greater or lesser extent comprehensive and could have been adopted in lieu of 
the newly proposed factors applied in the case of the encouraging public 
interest defence.  
However, while the flexible fair use factors may contribute to comparable 
outcomes to that of the defence in the context of promoting creativity for 
public enrichment, they are not necessarily readily equipped with the fallback 
attribute to fulfil another valuable dimension of freedom of expression – 
disclosure of important or confidential public interest information clothed in 
                                                
1059 17 USC s 107. For more considerations, revisit 3.2.4.4: fair use. 
1060 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music (n 9). See also Harvard University: Office of the General 
Counsel, ‘Copyright and Fair Use’ (2018) <https://ogc.harvard.edu/pages/copyright-and-fair-
use> accessed 6 February 2018. 
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copyright works. 1061 This exceptional aspect of freedom of expression is 
sometimes invoked in circumstances where an action for infringement of 
copyright is brought by a claimant with the genuine motive of protecting, inter 
alia, privacy, defamation or breach of confidence or anti-competition.1062 For 
example, one should consider a scenario in which a journalist obtained a 
confidential report from her journalistic source, revealing that the GT200 
machines, which are widely used in most international airports as explosives 
detectors, are not scientifically certified and have manufacturing defects, 
making them inefficient at detecting bombs. The journalist later published an 
article in a commercial news website criticising the scandalous machine’s 
imperfection with the entire confidential report attached so as to cement her 
argument. Given that the report is copyright-protected and owned by the 
manufacturer, an unauthorised use of such report may, among other claims,1063 
provide the manufacturer with a course of action against the journalist for 
breach of copyright. As a counterclaim, the defendant may well contend that 
her use of the report falls within the scope of her right to freedom of 
expression. Considering such type of use in light of the US fair use doctrine, 
the first factor to consider is the purpose of use. Although it is established in 
the US case-law that commercial use of a copyright-protected work is not 
automatically deemed unfair, its profit-making and non-transformative 
characters make it less likely to be weighed in favour of fair use.1064 As the use 
at issue does not transform the original report into new value-added creations, 
but is merely a verbatim reproduction, it does not acquire a transformative 
nature. And while the use per se is not for commercial purpose, the fact that the 
reproduced report is published through a profit-making institution – online 
                                                
1061 The phrase ‘information clothed in copyright’ was used in Hyde Park v Yelland (n 19) 673. 
1062 See sample situations in HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd (n 31); 
Service Corp International v Channel 4 [1999] EMLR 83; Lion Laboratories v Evans (n 6); 
Beloff v Pressdram (n 6);Hyde Park v Yelland (n 19) and Hertel v Switzerland (n 544), 
assuming that the latter of which cases involved the report of the hazardous effect of 
microwave ovens, which was protected by copyright and belonged to the manufacturer. These 
situations are referred as ‘surrogacy’ claims, see also Griffiths (n 22) 16. 
1063 It is most likely that in such case a legal action may initially have sprung from breach of 
confidence or anti-competition, but framed in copyright infringement.   
1064 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music (n 9); Harvard University (n 1060). See also 3.2.4.4 and 
4.4.1.1. 
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commercial website – may weigh against the finding of fair use.1065 With 
regard to the nature of the work, it is confirmed in the statutory provision itself 
that the unpublished nature does not necessarily preclude the use from being 
found fair. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that copyright not only entails 
the right to control the publication of the work, but also the preference to non-
publication;1066 therefore, dealing with unpublished works too would reduce 
the prospect of the finding of fair use in overall consideration. It becomes more 
apparent in the third factor assessment that reproducing the entire report 
constitutes both quantitatively and qualitatively substantial takings, thereby 
tipping the scale against fair use.1067 As regards the fourth factor, the effect 
upon the work’s value is so minimal that, out of all factors considered, it is 
most likely to be found in favour of fair use. This is perhaps because that, as 
previously pointed out, the manufacturer claimant’s genuine purpose is to keep 
the information embodied in the report confidential and restrain others from 
disclosing it, rather than to protect his creativity and seek for economic return 
thereof. As such, there is no correlation between the work not intended for 
publication and the negative economic impact of the published report upon the 
potential or derivative market of the claimant’s report. Nevertheless, assuming 
that prior to the disclosure the original report was going to be published with 
the anticipated profits, the published article that later appeared to contribute to 
commercial gains in the core market may lessen the possibility of the 
unauthorised use to be found fair.1068 In other words, if it is proven that there is 
a potential market existing for the report reproduced,1069 it is less likely that the 
                                                
1065 See Balsley v LFP, Inc 691 F3d 747 (6th Cir 2012), where the Sixth Circuit held that the 
unauthorised publication of the Plaintiff’s registered photographs by the selling profit-making 
magazine was for commercial purpose, thus weighing against a finding of fair use.  
1066 See Salinger v Random House Inc 811 F2d 90 (1987), as cited in Stephen Fishman, The 
Public Domain : Find and Use Free Content for Your Website, Book, App, Music, Video, Art 
and More (8th edn, NOLO 2017) 401, in which it is established that ‘the author has the right to 
control the first public appearance of his or her expression’. 
1067 In Harper&Row v The Nation (n 316), even if the portion reproduced is qualitatively small, 
the taking of the qualitatively important parts weighs against fair use. See also Basic Books, 
Inc v Kinko’s Graphics Corp 758 F Supp 1522 (SDNY 1991); Princeton University Press v 
Michigan Document Services (n 459). 
1068 See also in Balsley v LFP, Inc (n 1065), the Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant’s claim 
that the plaintiff had no intention to market the work; it sufficed to prove that the commercial 
use had a negative effect on any potential market for plaintiff’s work. 
1069 In Roger v Koons 960 F2d 301 (2nd Cir 1992), the Second Circuit held that what mattered 
in the case of unauthorised use of the protected photograph for making sculptures was that a 
potential market for sculptures of the photograph existed. And According to Sony Corp v 
 
 
249 
use at issue may satisfy the fourth factor. Having illustrated step-by-step, it 
seems that in overall assessment the fair use doctrine seems incapable of 
providing an adequate accommodation within which such unauthorised use of 
the report can be justified within the copyright regime..  
As noted earlier, the use of protected works like in the sample scenario merely 
supplants the original version and, as such, establishes, if some, minimum 
connection with transformativeness; more additional contribution to the 
original work would otherwise render the use favourable to a finding of fair 
use.1070 Rather, it serves the public interest by using the authority of freedom of 
expression in ensuring that the public is properly informed about matters 
affecting their interest. Therefore, despite the use involving substantial takings 
or reproduction in entirety of unpublished works with adverse economic harm 
incurred, its public interest nature requires a disclosure of such important 
information, which in turn calls for a fallback defence providing a safety valve 
for fundamental rights, i.e. freedom of expression in copyright law. Against 
this background, it is argued that while the US factor-based fair use doctrine 
may be a valuable tool in the context of furthering the goal of copyright in 
promoting science and useful arts, it is not designed for such types of 
unauthorised uses and is ineffective for coping with public interest situations.  
5.4 Implementation 
5.4.1 The bottom-up approach 
Having established the ambit and merits of the public interest defence, the next 
question is how the defence can be introduced. There are several possible 
starting points from which the defence could become universally recognised 
and effectively implemented. One is to follow a bottom-up approach in which 
                                                                                                                            
 
Universal City Studios 464 US 417, 451 (1984), the burden of proof rested on the rightsholders 
to establish such existence.    
1070 The US Supreme Court stated in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music (n 9) that transformative 
uses ‘lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines 
of copyright’. See also Harvard University (n 1060). 
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it is initially introduced to national copyright legislation in influential states 
such as the US, UK and some EU member states, after which its 
implementation can progressively become an international agenda and lead to 
changes in the form of treaty amendments. This approach seems resonant with 
that in which of the Berne Convention was drafted and later became widely 
recognised as a core international copyright agreement.1071 The history of the 
Berne Convention in providing both minimum standards for exclusive 
protection and corresponding L&Es had seen the involvement of powerful 
states such as the UK, France and Germany, putting forwards their proposals 
for international legislative frameworks.1072 Implementing the defence through 
national legislations also seems permissible under Article 17 of the Berne 
Convention. Although its drafting history suggests that the Article was mainly 
designed to deal with national government’s power to control the 
dissemination of work to maintain public order,1073 the actual wording implies 
that it may also grant the government the right to permit the dissemination of 
any works if necessary. Embracing this flexible interpretation of Article 17 of 
the Berne Convention would then cover not only the public policy, but also the 
freedom of expression aspects of public interest. This may allow the proposed 
defence to be adopted and operate within national copyright laws.  
Considering this approach under Article 17 BC Authority, one should take into 
account the WTO Panel decision in China-US dispute 2009,1074 whereby, inter 
alia, Article 4 of China's Copyright Law, which denies protection and 
enforcement to works that have not been authorised for publication or 
distribution within China, was held to be inconsistent with Article 9(1) TRIPS 
(incorporating Article 5(1) BC) and Article 41.1 TRIPS.1075 Of particular 
relevance here is that, while a national legal principle performing the 
‘restrictive’ public interest doctrine – such as that provided in Article 4 of 
China’s Copyright Law – is permitted by virtue of Article 17 BC, the Panel 
                                                
1071 Sara Bannerman, International Copyright and Access to Knowledge (CUP 2016) 4-5. 
1072 Ibid.  
1073 WIPO, ‘Guide to of the Berne Convention (Paris Act 1971)’ (1978) WIPO Publication No 
615(E) para 17.1-17.4. 
1074 US-China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights (WT/DS362/R) report of the Panel, adopted 26 January 2009.  
1075 Ibid. paras II.12, VII, 197, VIII.741.  
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took the view that the latter Article interpreted in light of Article 5 (1) BC and 
Article 41.1 TRIPS is not intended to permit the operation under which 
copyright protection and enforcement in works with illegal or prohibited 
contents is all denied.1076 Given the proposed preference of the remedial to the 
denial operation,1077 the ‘restrictive’ public interest defence proposed through 
this bottom-up approach under Article 17 BC authority can still ensure that 
copyright can be enforced so as to prevent further acts of infringement or 
abuse; thus, it is compliant with obligations under TRIPS and BC.  
Nevertheless, introducing a legal principle through state practice may in reality 
require a prolonged period of time for consistency and commonality to build 
widespread recognition among states and become an international legislative 
attempt. The drafting history of the Berne Convention also shows that relying 
on legal practices predominantly developed by influential states may run the 
risk that the balance of interests might be tipped in their favour as the main 
beneficiaries of international copyright protection in the drafting and founding 
of the treaties.1078 This may again cause misrepresentation of copyright’s 
balance that the proposed defence seeks to achieve. 
5.4.2 The top-down approach 
Another possible approach to implementing the defence could be initiated from 
a legislative intervention at the supranational level. Again, Article 17 of the 
Berne Convention can be seen as a starting point from which the amendment 
could take place. The possibility that Article 17 could be understood to 
encompass limitations to copyright in both public policy and freedom of 
expression aspects suggests that it is the most conducive platform for the 
proposed defence to be integrated into the international copyright regime. A 
successful change in such a multinational treaty would create an obligation that 
requires states party to bring their implementations and interpretations as 
regards the defence into conformity. 
In practice, however, treaty amendment would also be subject to a lengthy 
                                                
1076 Ibid. paras 7.117, VII.178-VII.197. 
1077 Revisit Chapter 2, 2.8.2.  
1078 Bannerman (n 1071) 5-7. 
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procedure. According to the Vienna Convention,1079 unless provided otherwise, 
any proposed amendment to a multilateral treaty must be consensus-based, and 
each member has a right to decide, negotiate and conclude any agreements 
arising therefrom. This general rule is further confirmed by Article 27(3) of the 
Berne Convention, which demands ‘the unanimity of the votes cast’ by all 
contracting states to revise the Convention.1080 
Negotiation and conclusion of a new treaty seem far from ideal in sparking a 
swift response to the urgent need for the proposed defence. Despite creating 
solid obligations among signatories, the traditional method of treaty-making is 
also dependent on complicated and tedious processes of drafting, negotiating, 
adopting and putting into force. 1081  Particularly in the latter procedure, 
prolonged periods of ratification were evident in two recent WIPO-
administered treaties, namely the Beijing and Marrakesh treaties.1082 After 
several years of preparatory work and discussion, they were successfully 
adopted in June 2012 and June 2013 respectively, but it took approximately 
three years for the Marrakesh treaty to have reached twenty ratifying countries, 
and the Beijing treaty is still seeking more parties to ratify, and has therefore 
not yet entered into force.1083 These are major concerns when attempting to 
initiate or amend the law from the supranational level. 
5.4.3 An alternative approach 
Having realised the traditionally complicated and time-consuming rulemaking 
process inherent in these two approaches, adopting the so-called hard-law 
method to implement the statutory defence seems incompatible with the urgent 
demand to tackle the rightsholder-centric situation. It is important that the 
proposed defence comes into effect in a timely fashion to provide immediate 
                                                
1079 VCLT Part IV: Amendment and Modification of Treaties. 
1080 See Berne Convention (Paris Act, 1971), Art 27. 
1081 Consider the treaty-making procedure in Carolyn Deere Birdbeck, The World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO): A Reference Guide (Edward Elgar 2016) 90. 
1082 Beijing Treaty on Audio-visual Performances (adopted 26 June 2012); Marrakesh Treaty to 
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or 
Otherwise Print Disabled (adopted 27 June 2013, entered into force 30 September 2016). 
1083 See also the time-consuming 6-year ratification periods of WCT and WPPT after their 
adoptions in Edward Kwakwa, ‘Some Comments on Rule Making at the World Intellectual 
Property Organization’ (2002) 12(1) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 179, 
182. 
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and specific relief to any changes occurred in a dynamic, rapid-paced and 
technologically-driven area of copyright law.1084 The flexible, easily adoptable 
and immediately applicable character of so-called soft law seems more 
realistic, effective and thereby better suited for enabling the defence to gain 
universal recognition and implementation more quickly.1085 
The term soft law refers to certain categories of norms which are technically 
non-binding.1086 While it is perceived as an informal law-making method, its 
wide degrees of authority and supplemental functions usually convince states 
to follow in practice. 1087  The soft-law technique is often relied on by 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations as an alternative for 
exploring, experimenting and establishing international legal practices without 
imposing strict obligations on states to ratify.1088 This may take the forms of 
recommendations, resolutions, declarations or guidelines.1089 
The WIPO’s competency is not only in administering IP treaties, but also in 
devising soft-law instruments to develop, clarify and supplement existing 
international IP rules.1090 Some important examples are the 1976 Tunis Model 
Law drafted in collaboration with UNESCO, 1091  the 1999 Resolution 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks,1092 the 2007 
adoption of 45 Development Agenda Recommendations1093 and several WIPO 
standards in relation to industrial property.1094 
                                                
1084 Ibid. 193. 
1085 Ibid. 
1086 Ibid. 187. 
1087 Ibid. 
1088 Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the 
International Legal System (OUP 2000) 292. 
1089 Ibid. 
1090 See Birdbeck (n 1081) 90. 
1091 Tunis Model Law on Copyright with a commentary drafted by the Secretariat of UNESCO 
and the International Bureau of WIPO, Copyright 1976, 165. This was designed to address 
issues relating to protection of folklore, exceptions and limitations to rights, fair use, and the 
right of translation. 
1092 WIPO Doc No A/34/13 (4 August 1999) <http://www.wipo.int/eng/document/ 
govbody/wo_gb_ab/doc/a34_13.doc> accessed 23 August 2017. 
1093 See <http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html#b> for more 
detail. See also the 18th session of the CDIP in October 2016 in Geneva, Switzerland, which 
reviewed the WIPO implementations of its subsequent Development Agenda 
Recommendations from 2008 to 2015. 
1094 See <http://www.wipo.int/standards/en/part_03_standards.html#group-a> for lists of the 
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In the field of copyright, WIPO plays a distinct and influential role in shaping 
binding international copyright standards in response to emerging cyberspace 
and prevailing social needs. This can be seen from its deep involvement in the 
passage of the WCT, WPPT, Beijing and Marrakesh treaties.1095 As regards 
soft law, although the copyright regime has not seen WIPO having recourse to 
non-binding instruments as much as other areas of IP, copyright-related matters 
such as using copyright to promote access to information and creative content, 
are still part of WIPO implementation plans for its development agenda.1096 
WIPO through its SCCR1097 has in recent years engaged in numerous meetings 
and studies with particular emphasis on copyright L&Es.1098 Throughout those 
activities, the SCCR has also recalled the need to recalibrate the balance 
between interests of rightsholders and users in face of rapid technological 
developments.1099 
WIPO’s authority and its ongoing discussions under the SCCR’s expertise, 
might present the most conducive route for the public interest defence to be 
inserted into the international copyright regime in the form of a 
recommendation by WIPO.1100 The comprehensive and predictable defence 
                                                                                                                            
 
relevant standards. 
1095 These treaties are WIPO milestones, for bringing copyright in line with digital age and for 
establishing for the first-time international provisions exclusively addressing L&Es to 
international copyright law. 
1096 WIPO Doc CDIP/12/9 (October 21, 2013); CDIP/4/5 Rev (December 1, 2009). See also 
WIPO Development Agenda Recommendations 19, 24, 27. 
1097 See General Rules of Procedure of WIPO, Part III: Ad Hoc Committee of Experts. The 
SCCR is an ad hoc committee of experts, which provides forum where WIPO member states 
and observers meet to discuss, debate and decide on issues related to the development of 
balanced international legal frameworks for copyright. 
1098 WIPO, ‘Limitations and Exceptions’ <http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/limitations/> 
accessed 10 August 2017, see also examples of studies on L&Es presented in the SCCR 
sessions listed therein. 
1099 Ibid. See, for example, the 27th SCCR meeting from 28 April – 2 May 2014, during which 
the side event was convened by Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) to discuss the 
possibility for updating the Tunis Model Law on Copyright L&Es in the digital environment 
for developing countries. 
1100 As to its function, ‘the SCCR formulates recommendations for consideration by the WIPO 
General Assembly or a Diplomatic Conference’, see WIPO, ‘Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR)’ <http://www.wipo.int/policy/en/sccr/> accessed 10 
August 2017. 
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proposed under the soft-law would quickly become widely and consistently 
accepted among the international community. The recommendation would 
have a swift normative influence on state practice and reflect domestic needs 
for flexible and judicially manageable L&Es and provide a quick solution to 
those copyright regimes.  
The inherently distinguished features of soft law-type instruments1101 will 
provide countries not quite ready to embrace the new system with room to 
adapt the recommended defence in accordance with national priorities. To put 
it simply, States will be more willing to negotiate and adopt international 
norms that show respect for national autonomy,1102 and the defence will thus be 
promulgated more quickly and efficiently through the soft-law approach. 
WIPO Recommendations attract overwhelming national compliance and can 
be seen as a binding instrument in practice.1103 This would not only pave the 
way for a quick and universal implementation of the public interest defence, it 
would also be seen as a first step towards further treaty-making opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1101 Revisit n 980 above. 
1102 Hugh Hansen (ed), Intellectual Property Law and Policy: Volume XI (Hart 2010) 299. 
1103 Kwakwa (n 1083) 193. 
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